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I DECLARE THAT THE WORK PRESENTED IN THIS THESIS IS MY OWN. 




The thesis examines the viewer's position in relation to contemporary moving 
image installations, particularly the work of the artist and filmmaker Eija-Liisa 
Ahtila (b. 1959, Finland). It maps out a shift in research from the analysis, 
occupation and rethinking of subject positions to the mobilisation and 
inhabitation of encounters, where the positions are in constant becoming. In 
dialogue with Luce Irigaray's philosophical thought and related theoretical 
discourse, it traces a shift from the disruption of dualism with strategic 
mimesis to the critical inhabitation of a space of mediation opened up by 
resemblance. In terms of methodologies in the field of visual culture this 
implies a move from the problematics of representation, and from 
deconstructive and re-signifying practices, to questions of the viewer's and 
researcher's implication. 
The argument is structured around two parts, firstly on the Girl as an 
unmarked figure that unsettles definitions of centred, identity-based 
subjectivities and their gendered attributes. The figure emerges here not as a 
representation but as an event, while the focus is drawn from interiority as 
the core of a subject to surfaces as sites of contacts. This leads to the 
second part of the argument, on the notion of the address, which initiates a 
further shift of attention onto the modes by which the works and the 
characters in them allow and call for the viewer's involvement. The thesis 
examines these moves with the use of the concepts of staining, haunting, 
thinking aloud and witnessing, which all emphasise outward and forward 
orientation. They focus on boundaries as sites of disruption and production of 
positions of viewing, thinking and speaking, instead of as their markers. 
Through close reading of Ahtila's works the thesis argues for active 
viewership that demands constant critical situated ness in terms of affiliations 
arising from communication. 
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INTRODUCTION: THINKING FOR 8 
1 A. THINKING FOR 
A poet encounters the incomprehensibility of war and death in the 
latest moving image installation by Eija-Liisa Ahtila, Where is Where? 
(2008). In this layered narrative time folds on itself and spatial 
coordinates entangle together. The past and the elsewhere is 
suddenly here and now. While she writes, the poet's home and her 
lived moment entwine inseparably with historical events, the murder of 
a young French boy carried out by her Algerian friends in the midst of 
war. 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA WHERE IS WHERE? (2008)1 
The introduction to the thesis sets out here to map the research journey, the 
process of working with the moving image installations of Eija-Liisa Ahtila (b. 
1959, Finland) over a period of nearly a decade. In contrast to the 
abovementioned case of the poet in Ahtila's work, my journey has involved 
no encounters with historical documentations of war (except a few glimpses 
in Where is Where?), only with fictional narratives of tragedies concerning a 
I All images in the thesis are stills taken from preview DVDs of the works unless otherwise 
stated . 
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few individuals and their relationships. I have not witnessed evidence of 
atrocities, merely small stories focused on strategies of survival in the 
everyday. Despite this, my position as a viewer and a writer has been 
thoroughly shaken by questions regarding my implication and responsibility. 
Yet, are these concerns that dissimilar to those arising from the work briefly 
discussed here, from the story of a poet's research into a historical tragedy? 
Does the encounter with art works and fictional narratives necessarily differ 
from the engagement with any other media imagery and modes of narration, 
when it comes down to questions about the viewer's active involvement? 
Furthermore, can the viewer's role be something beyond the alternatives of 
reception or reading, immersion or interpretation? 
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The work Where is Where? is returned to at the end of the thesis but in order 
to get there a number of corners have to be turned. The whole thesis can be, 
actually, described as a story of a journey with Ahtila's works. It leads from 
concerns around representation to questions about the address - of the 
works and of the viewer. Or, more specifically, it traces a route from the 
investigation of the limits and the disruptive potential of representations of 
femininity in moving image art works towards an inhabitation of a space 
opened up between the works and the viewers. This has demanded a shift of 
focus away from the content of the works, what they tell about, and the 
narrative strategies they employ. It has also implied a move aside from the 
examination of how the narrative possibilities of moving image installation are 
appropriated and experimented with, and how the limitations of 
representation are challenged in the works. Similarly, I have had to abandon 
the position of an interpreter of the critical issues raised or strategies used in 
the works, and of the various novel yet-unmarked figures that may arise from 
them. 
The shifts outlined above are a result of intense critical engagement with 
Ahtila's works as well as with Luce Irigaray's philosophical thought and a 
wide field of related post-structuralist and feminist theory. This is not to be 
taken as a linear development but more like a series of ruptures caused by 
encounters with art and theory that have disallowed the comfort of mastered 
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critical approaches. This orientation tangible in my work can be argued to 
parallel moves traceable in both the art practice and the theory I have 
engaged with. My journey has taken place in tandem with not only shifts in 
Irigaray's work, which are tracked here shortly, but also in the field of visual 
culture at large. Those are centred loosely around a shared frustration with 
the discourse on representation that has manifested itself in a multifaceted 
search for alternative critical approaches in the name of, amongst others, 
relationality, performativity, criticality, affectivity, and participation.2 Simon 
O'Sullivan sums this up as he brings contemporary art practices into an 
encounter with Gilles Deleuze's and Felix Guattari's thought. In his 
persuasive claim for a step beyond textual reading strategies, and for the 
very potential of a beyond, he stresses that the critique of representation 
remains within the field of representation, yet: 
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"there are possibilities for art and thought beyond representation, and 
indeed beyond the latter's critique and crisis (those deconstructive 
strategies which almost despite themselves can stymie thought)".3 
The aim of this thesis, however, is not to make claims for cultural shifts on a 
wider scale, but to trace how the close dialogue with both art and theory has 
deeply troubled my position as a viewer, thinker and writer. Furthermore, the 
move away from familiar tools of deconstructive analysis as well as 
representational operations in writing is not a swift and smooth one, as is 
demonstrated here. Yet, I argue that the challenge posed by the potential 
move beyond representation has a sense of urgency in the field of visual 
2 See e.g. Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics (Paris: Les Presses du Reel 2002); Gavin 
Butt, ed., After Criticism (London: Blackwell 2005); Taru Elfving & Katvekaisa Kontturi, ed., 
With Art: Steps Towards Participatory Research (Helsinki: The Society for Art History in 
Finland 2005); Simon O'Sullivan, Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond 
Representation (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2006). The recent discussion on the so-called 
"documentary turn" in visual culture, which is claimed to follow and challenge "linguistic turn" 
that stressed textuality and the problematics of representation, is also relevant here. It has 
many connections with my project, yet falls outside the scope of this thesis. See e.g. Maria 
Lind & Hito Steyerl, ed., The Greenroom: Reconsidering the Documentary and 
Contemporary Art #1 (New York: Sternberg & CCS Bard, 2008). 
3 O'Sullivan 2006,5. See also O'Sullivan 2006, 15-16. O'Sullivan argues that the crisis of 
representation is also, fundamentally, a crisis in the prevailing notions of subjectivity. This 
parallels closely my investigation, yet I shift focus from the problematics of subjectivity or, 
more accurately, from modes of subjectivity to the processes of encounter where subjects, 
amongst others, are in formation. 
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culture and weaves intimate links from there to other areas of culture, politics 
and ethics. 
The thesis performs the role of a result, an end of a journey, while it does not 
really aim at closure. In the beginning of Ahtila's work Consolation Service 
(1999) the voice-over narrator explains that the story concerns ending: "The 
first section describes how to do it, in the second it happens. The third 
section is a kind of a consolation service." The story unfolding in this thesis 
borrows the narrative structure of the quoted work with slight modifications: 
the introduction presents in two parts why and how the journey has taken 
place, in the following chapters it happens, and the conclusion could be 
described as an ending - yet this aims to serve, simultaneously, as another 
beginning, or an opening outward and forward. 
The journey told here entwines, moreover, with the structure of my argument, 
both in the introduction and in the thesis as a whole. The subsections of the 
second part of the introduction track the entangled paths I have taken with 
Ahtila's works and Irigaray's thought. This maps out also the two main parts 
of the thesis: the Girl and the address. It is followed by theoretical grounding 
and positioning of the key concern of the argument, the address of the 
viewer. Finally I lay down the concepts that have carried the argument 
forward and around which the chapters are organised: staining, haunting, 
thinking aloud and witnessing. But, first of all, why has the journey taken 
place, and why should it be told? 
THOUGHT IN ACTION 
This is a story of a search for action, or for modes of possible action. An urge 
to act, following encounters with various forms of visual culture, has driven 
both the research and the process of writing that has given shape to this 
thesis. On the one hand, this has been fed by a growing frustration as a 
witness to the wealth of media reportage and documentary forms of narration 
faced with on a daily basis. The available forms of spectatorship, from 
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consumption to deconstruction, as well as the implied modes of knowledge 
production and distribution have failed somehow to account for the 
experience of these encounters. Even more acutely, they have not offered 
me ways to respond - not only to understand but also to act out these 
engagements as truly productive, future-oriented. 
12 
On the other hand, Ahtila's works have challenged my adopted position as a 
critical reader of visual culture and the associated refined methods of 
interpretation. The works refused to give representation to, for example, the 
notion of excess I was investigating, as will be discussed shortly. Neither did 
the existing models of critical focus on either the cinematic apparatus or 
narration appear sufficient for the investigation into the modes of operations 
of the works. The works defied capture in terms of comparisons of 
conventions such as those of avant-garde film and classic narrative cinema, 
or video installation art and cinema. The enquiry into how they troubled these 
distinctions or appropriated and reworked the possibilities of these practices 
appeared to yield no satisfactory responses to, not to mention explanations 
of, the lure of the works. 
Close reading is the method that emerged in the process of research and 
writing. It is prevalent throughout the thesis and the journey mapped out 
here. The wealth of audiovisual and textual details drew my attention closer 
and closer until my readings no longer interpreted aspects of the works or 
wove connections between them. The attempts at assigning signification led 
to myriad dialogues between the work and a number of recent critical 
concerns in philosophical thought. The works did not provide illustrations for 
the concepts and questions in my writing. Nor did I aim to translate the 
audiovisual language of Ahtila's works to another conceptual language, or to 
claim there was such a referential relationship between them. Rather, I argue 
that Ahtila's practice has allowed me to bring together a wide-ranging set of 
questions that have urgency for me as well as appear central to the current 
debates in the fields of visual culture and critical thought. The close reading 
of the works facilitates in the thesis further dialogue between the works and 
the critical concerns. It mediates as well between the various theoretical 
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approaches linked here through the art works and my descriptive accounts of 
the minutiae in them. Furthermore, as argued in more detail at the end of the 
thesis, the work has also offered a starting point for enquiries into questions 
that cannot be contained by the works themselves or by my dialogue with 
them. Ahtila's work has, thus, had a unique impact on my approach and 
thought. Yet, I claim this may be likewise at the heart of the interest and 
presence it has gained over the past decade in the field of international 
contemporary art, where it persists unfitting to the recognisable trends in 
moving image, such as the so-called documentary turn. 
The close readings do not explain what the work communicates or how it 
operates as such. However, my method gestures towards an understanding 
of the work as highly conceptual thought in its own right. As such it could be 
connected to a lineage of conceptual art instead of, or alongside, the 
traditions of figurative and narrative practices. Yet, the positioning of the work 
in relation to an art historical genealogy or the making of claims about 
contemporary art practices in a wider scale do not constitute the focus of my 
research here. Rather, the field of visual culture and the shifts aside from the 
problematics of representation have encouraged me to adopt another 
approach: I engage with Ahtila's work as a mode of thinking aloud or, in other 
words, as thought in action. This notion of thought (examined in depth in the 
chapter 3a: Thinking Aloud) emphasises the simultaneity of thought and 
action. Action does not follow thought, or vice versa, but thought acts in the 
world. This is also what allows for its connections with other thoughts. 
My writing recognises and aims to put into further action this operation of the 
works. Thinking aloud myself, I do not simply discuss the work as thought in 
action or present its web of links with(in) other thought. I do not write about 
the work or certain critical discourses, but with them. This mode of writing 
with is closely connected to the move aside from textual reading strategies 
and the problematics of representation in the field of visual culture. It has 
allowed my thought to move. The practice of writing with art works rather 
than about them implies a break away from the hierarchical question 
concerning who determines the work's meaning, as Irit Rogoff has argued. 
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She describes this as a process where the thoughts and images found in the 
works drive critical investigations on, while the theoretical discussion locates 
the art works within cultural debates they are not usually placed in dialogue 
with.4 I would underline, furthermore, that this approach shifts attention from 
the determination of meaning altogether as well as undoes the writer's 
position as an interpreter of an object of study. The writer becomes instead 
entangled in the production of a myriad of novel connections, where various 
modes of thought co-exist and feed each other. This has many affinities with 
the method described above as close reading. It also resonates powerfully 
with the critical concern at the heart of this thesis, that of the address and the 
space opened up by it, where distance or a mediation persists defying 
attempts at fusion as well as capture. 
I argue that Ahtila's work, the philosophical discussions visited here, as well 
as my work are all concerned with how to achieve this kind of space 
necessary for transformative encounters and how to inhabit it. Furthermore, 
the aim here is to allow these differing views and their productive interactions 
to act in this text and to make space for further dialogue, call for further 
action. This is what my thought, and writing, is for. Thus, the method of close 
reading cannot be detached from the key question driving my work: How to 
act when addressed, as a viewer? 
4 Irit Rogoff, "Studying Visual Culture", in Nicholas Mirzoeff, ed. The Visual Culture Reader, 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1998),26. My approach here is largely indebted in 
particular to Rogoff's thought. See also Elfving & Kontturi 2005. 
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28. THINKING WITH 
WITH THE ART WORKS 
The initial focus of the research was on the works of Eija-Liisa Ahtila and 
other contemporary Finnish female artists, whose photographs and moving 
image installations presented a series of female characters that appeared to 
disrupt conventional representations of women and femininity.5 Drawn to the 
appropriation of certain near-stereotypical gendered tropes, I set out to 
explore what kinds of alternative modes of picturing and understanding 
femininity may be emerging in the works. What kind of a promise held, for 
example, the female protagonists seemingly in the midst of internal turmoil 
yet defiantly holding onto a sense of agency? Or, those who appear to 
confuse the boundary between the innocence associated with girlhood and 
the embodied sexual desire of mature women? 
EIJA-liISA AHTILA IF 6 WAS 9 (1995-6) 
5 The artists, whose practice I initially also focused on, include Elina Brotherus and Salla 
Tykka, both of a younger generation than Ahtila yet established in the international art world . 
This raises questions about the representation of a marginal culture, which would have lead 
me to assumptions of a shared cultural identity of some kind and to an investigation of 
influences etc, i.e. to trace a common (art historical) genealogy. Instead, the aspect of 
cultural specificity that remains of relevance to my current research, yet will be beyond the 
scope of this thesis, relates to (Finnish) language used in Ahtila 's work and how this affects 
the address of the works and the viewer's engagement with it in the intemational scene. 
Notably, the other artists previously focused on do not, generally, use spoken or written 
language in their works. 
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My first encounter with Ahtila's work, the installation If 6 Was 9 (1995-6), 
coincides with my absorption into Luce Irigaray's writings and the 
problematics of the excessive feminine. 6 This was followed by a critical 
attempt to bring together in my research theoretical and visual investigations 
of the disruptive force of the feminine, matter and fluidity etc, as radical 
challenges to the binary logic. Ahtila's work, significantly, refused to give 
visual form to this notion of excess according to my expectations. It ruptured 
my project and, eventually, demanded another approach. 7 
Elements associated with female embodiment, sexuality and subjectivity, 
appeared to be, nevertheless, repeatedly employed in Ahtila's works: for 
example, details such as red colour and spatial openings, or themes such as 
the breaking down of a unified subject position. Her work also troubles 
habitual spatial and temporal coordinates in its appropriation of the 
language(s) of cinematic narration. Therefore, I stuck to my tools of 
exploration. They were primarily offered by Irigaray's thought and, in 
particular, her critique of the "logic of the same", where sexual difference is 
locked in a binary relation and femininity is only recognizable as the (inferior 
and negative) opposite of the masculine norm.8 Irigaray's notion of mimesis, 
the playful repetition shortly discussed in more detail, provided me with 
means to examine how the art works in question ruptured the operations of 
6 I saw Ahtila's work in the exhibition NowHere in 1996 at Louisiana Museum of Art in 
Denmark. This coincides with my discovery of Pipilotti Rist's practice, which played a central 
role in my research until I returned to Ahtila. 
7 On discussions of the excessive feminine and art, with an emphasis on touch, materiality, 
transience etc, see e.g. Rosemary Betterton, An Intimate Distance. Women, Artists and the 
Body (London: Routledge 1996); M. Catherine de Zegher ed., Inside the Visible: An Elliptical 
Traverse of 20th Century Art. (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press 1996); Hilary 
Robinson, Reading Art, Reading Irigaray: The Politics of Art by Women (London & New 
York: I.B.Tauris 2006). The connection of excess to notions of boundary and limit, i.e. how 
rethinking of excess demands a rethinking of the limit, weaves a link from this earlier 
research to my current enquiry. Excess will be also discussed in this thesis in relation to the 
notion of exposure and it connects with the problematics of sustainability that my argument 
touches on towards the end. See Rosi Braidotti's association of sustainability with the 
critique of excess, which demands a rethinking of the (feminine) excess in terms of rupture, 
away from transgression of boundaries. Rosi Braidotti, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics. 
(Cambridge: Polity Press 2006a). 
8 "The logic of the same" or "the law of the same" refers in Irigaray's writing to dualistic logic, 
or the "phallogocentric order", where difference is always defined as an opposite, a mirror or 
a negation, of the familiar and the same, i.e. the norm. This binary logic can therefore 
accommodate or recognise neither difference that deviates from that which is already known 
nor change, i.e. openings in the enclosed circle formed by the opposites. See e.g. Luce 
Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1985a), 25-34. 
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this dualism and pointed towards that which cannot be accommodated within 
it. As a strategy of jamming the languages of dominant discourses it seemed 
relevant in the conceptualisation of the operations of Ahtila's works. 
EIJA-liISAAHTILA TODAY (1996-7) 
Writing about the work, I also aimed at my description of it to produce the 
effects of strategic repetition, i.e. to allow for something unexpected to 
emerge. Finally, from between the lines of detailed analysis, a figure arose. It 
was a girl in a red shirt, in the work Today (1996-7), who appeared to linger 
on the thresholds of the narrative realm as if its narrator. This one and the 
same figure focused my attention on a speaking subject that stands out 
visually yet seems to have no clear position of her own and, simultaneously, 
on a mode of speech that seems to be directed at the viewer. It led to the two 
stages of my research, which became the two main parts of this thesis: one 
focused on the figure of the Girl and the other on the address. 
First of all (Part 2: The Girl), I set out to examine this found figure following 
Irigaray's claim that the Girl is no-thing in the logic of the same, positioned 
before any markers of female sexuality.9 This was also supported by the 
9 Irigaray 1985a, 48. 
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argument of Deleuze and Guattari that the Girl's body is the first one stolen in 
the fabrication of opposing organisms. 1o Her position as the foundational site 
of erasure allows, thus, for the disruption of the binaries in a different way 
than the excessive feminine does. The Girl encouraged rethinking of excess 
not as fluidity and materiality, but in terms of surface with nothing to hide. 
A key question driving my research was, how could something that is 
unmarked by the languages of representation be articulated without reducing 
her back to the same dualism or locking her into yet another discursive 
frame. Writing about the various female characters veiled in red in Ahtila's 
works I caught glimpses of a figure that may only unveil itself in its mobilising 
effects on others and its surroundings. The research was led towards a 
notion of a decentred subjectivity, which is in constant process in relation to 
others and to the spaces inhabited, etc. The rethinking of female morphology 
in non-unitary terms of interdependence instead of feminine unbound fluidity 
or maternal fusion, suggested a model of subjectivity not based on essence 
or identity. Therefore, it also appeared no longer necessarily gender 
specific. 11 Yet, the works refused to give a representation to this. The Girl as 
10 Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
(London: The Athlone Press 1988), 276. 
11 See Irigaray's rethinking of feminine morphology with concepts, such as the lips and the 
viscous, and other feminist theories on the maternal that trouble clear distinctions of one and 
two, or one and the other. E.g. Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One (Ithaca New York: 
Cornell University Press 1985b), 23-33; Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger, "The With-In-Visible 
Screen", in M.Catherine de Zegher, ed. Inside the Visible: An Elliptical Traverse of 20th 
Century Art, (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press 1996). This has resonated in my mind 
with Jean-Luc Nancy's notion of singular plural. Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural 
(Stanford California: Stanford University Press 2000). Emphasis on the process of 
interconnections drew me also towards Deleuze and Guattari's notion of becoming, and 
particularly the work of feminist theorists such as Rosi Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz, who 
have brought the thought of Deleuze and Guattari into dialogue with Irigaray's thinking. They 
notably persist on the continuing relevance of sexual difference while sketching out 
trajectories of thought, ethics and politics beyond it. See e.g. Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic 
Subejcts: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Thought (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994a); Rosi Braidotti, "Of Bugs and Women: Irigaray and 
Deleuze on the Becoming-Woman", in Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor, Margaret Whitford, ed. 
Engaging with Irigaray (New York: Columbia University Press 1994b), 111-137; Braidotti 
2006a; Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington & 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1994); Elizabeth Grosz, Space, Time, and Perversion: 
Essays on the Politics of Bodies (London & New York: Routledge 1995). See also Tamsin 
Lorraine, Irigaray and Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy (Ithaca & London: 
Cornell University Press 1999); Dorothea Olkowski, "Body, Knowledge and Becoming-
Woman: Morpho-logic in Deleuze and Irigaray", in Ian Buchanan & Claire Colebrook, ed. 
Deleuze and Feminist Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000). 
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a figure did not figure, but appeared as an event. It triggered a shift of focus 
from possible modes of embodied subjectivity this figure may suggest to 
concerns about its formation in singular contacts. Moreover, it initiated a 
move crucial for my argument from unveiling that, which has remained 
unmarked, to surfaces that do not hide anything as such. This meant a shift 
in my approach from interpretation and re-signification to critical encounters. 
The focus of my research returned to the ways that Ahtila's characters speak 
(Part 3: The Address). They address the camera as if talking to the viewer, 
and at times as if to themselves, but hardly ever directly to each other within 
the narrative. First of all, I turned again to mimesis in the examination of how 
some of the works seem to mimic stereotypical modes of speech that reflect 
oppositional values and ideas associated with masculinity and femininity: An 
authoritative father in MelWe (1993) is incapable of having a dialogue with 
his family and, instead, attempts to speak for them all. A woman in Okay (of 
the same three-part installation, 1993) appears to be, then again, open for 
the inhabitation by other voices and unable to hold onto the boundaries that 
distinguish her from others. Instead of reinforcing these readings the works 
can be said, however, to reveal both positions to be untenable. They appear 
symptomatic of impossible cultural ideals attached to the boundaries of 
gendered subjects. The works drew my attention to how speech functions on 
these very borders, simultaneously reflecting and producing relations. 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA MElWE (1993) EIJA-LIISAAHTILA OKAY(1993) 
The characters' modes of speech can also be, at times, associated with 
mimetic femininity in their apparently citational nature. Often the characters 
seem to be as if reading out a script or borrowing someone else's words. 
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Another repetitive mode of speech is found in descriptive narration, such as 
in The House (2002), where the female protagonist describes her house as if 
mapping its coordinates and her position within it. Yet, instead of securing 
the boundaries of herself and of the house the description leads to their 
increasing confusion. Description is pushed beyond its representative 
function and may allow for something yet-indescribable to emerge. These 
modes of speech undermine the transparency of the message in various 
ways. They draw attention from what is said to how the characters speak. 
The performative nature of speech is, thus, emphasised: use of language is 
always repetition of certain conventions and codes, but it is also an event in 
itself.12 Citationality is what gives us a sense of responsibility for the ways we 
repeat certain kind of speech, as Judith Butler has argued.13 Yet it also 
brings with it potential for re-signification and re-contextualisation. According 
to Butler speech can , therefore, operate on the borders of the unsayable and 
open the boundaries of legitimacy in speech for new emergent modes of 
speaking.14 Hence, not only does repetition promise openness to novel 
significations, but also to different ways of communicating. 
EIJA-liISA AHTILA THE HOUSE (2002) 
In my research the modes of speech in Ahtila's works have not so much 
pointed towards what is unsayable, but to how speech operates beyond or 
aside from signification. The works guided me to another key concern of my 
argument: the orientation of speech. This outward reach is neither reducible 
back to who speaks nor to where the speech originates from or where it is 
12 On performativity, see J.L.Austin, How to Do Things With Words (Cambridge 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1962); Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism 
and the Subversion of Identity (New York & London: Routledge 1990). Judith Butler, Bodies 
that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (New York & London: Routledge 1993). 
13 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York & London: 
Routledge 1997), 27. 
14Ibid ., 41 . 
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directed to. The distinction of the problematics of the address (discussed 
here shortly) from modes of speech will make this clear. The question is no 
longer simply about how the works address me, a viewer, but how I am 
implicated in this address. 
WITH (IN/OUT) MIMESIS 
21 
The relationship between art and theory entwines closely with the key moves 
that have marked my research journey. My work can be characterised as a 
steady move away from the problematics of repetition. What is at stake here 
is, in particular, a step aside from the application of theory to the 
interpretation of art. This means not only a shift from approaching the works 
as deconstructive of representations of femininity but also from the definition 
of my own readings as strategic repetitions. First this led me to map the 
intersubjective space between the works and the viewer, then on to the 
rethinking of communication, and finally to a reworking of my position as a 
viewer, a critical thinker and a writer. 
Reiteration has been a way of thinking with the works in my writing. Instead 
of making sense of what I see, however, the descriptive accounts of various 
aspects of the works have been doing the same as the observations in The 
House: making things gradually more complex and incomprehensible. The 
descriptions have ceaselessly unsettled my analysis and points of view. Here 
the retelling of my research journey also allows for a move beyond making 
sense, beyond interpretation and representation. This implies a shift of focus 
from what takes place in the works to what happens in an encounter with 
them. 
This I claim to be one possible way of moving beyond mimesis. Irigaray 
introduces mimesis, a deliberate assumption of the feminine role, as an initial 
strategy in the undoing and questioning of the "tight-woven systematicity" of 
the logic of the same: 
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"To play with mimesis is thus, for a woman, to try to recover the place 
of her exploitation by discourse, without allowing herself to be simply 
reduced to it. It means to resubmit herself - inasmuch as she is on the 
side of the "perceptible", of "matter" - to "ideas", in particular to ideas 
about herself, that are elaborated in/by a masculine logic, but so as to 
make "visible", by an effect of playful repetition, what was supposed to 
remain invisible: the cover-up of a possible operation of the feminine 
in language. It also means "to unveil" the fact that, if women are such 
good mimics, it is because they are not simply resorbed in this 
function. They also remain elsewhere".15 
With mimesis Irigaray reveals that in the continuous reproduction of the logic 
of the same both matter and the feminine, as well as difference, are excluded 
from the oppositions that supposedly define them. As a condition of the 
binary logic this repression offers, as a kind of a blind spot, possibilities for 
imagining other modes of signification. This elsewhere where women remain 
is not outside or before discourse, but within it. Mimesis mobilises meanings 
and values attached to sexual difference without, however, laying 
foundations for another logic as such: 
"the issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of which woman 
would be the subject or the object, but of jamming the theoretical 
machinery itself, of suspending its pretension to the production of a 
truth and of a meaning that are excessively univocal."16 
The deliberate assumption of the feminine role as a mirror can cause it to no 
longer simply reflect the prioritized masculine but to unsettle this opposition. 
It opens a space of resemblance. As Judith Butler argues, with mimesis 
Irigaray refutes the equation of resemblance with copy.17 Appropriating the 
very role allocated to femininity as a mirror, i.e. inauthentic and secondary, 
mimesis aims to unsettle the very foundations of dualism based on the 
oppositions of original and copy, depth and surface, solid and transient, etc. 
15 Irigaray 1985b, 76. 
16 Irigaray 1985b, 78. 
17 Butler 1993,45. 
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Representation is defined in these same terms with its persistent reference to 
an underlying essence. Mimesis should, thus, trouble it as well. Furthermore, 
if mimesis opens towards something beyond the binary logic, I claim it must 
also lead beyond the problematics of representation. Its initial operation may 
well be the unveiling of what is reproduced in representations and how this is 
done. It may also tease out silences and contradictions, i.e. possible 
openings, within the operations of representation. Yet, it must reach further. 18 
If the feminine, as it appears in Irigaray's thought, is approached as a 
"movement of destabilization of identity" following Rosi Braidotti, it is a project 
of making space for that which is impossible within the binary structures of, 
for example, knowledge and representation. 19 What else could this imply 
than the establishment of another logic or production of alternative models of 
subjectivity? 
This research attempts to answer the question with a shift of attention onto 
communication, while remaining in close dialogue with Irigaray's thought. In 
addition to mimicry, resemblance and the feminine itself, Irigaray has 
reconsidered a series of other notions associated with femininity, such as 
touch and proximity.2o In her work these notions emphasise indeterminate 
and intermediate spaces as well as the dynamic of ceaseless change and 
openness. They trouble the closed circuit of oppositions, such as one and the 
other. Within feminist philosophy and art theory these notions arising from 
Irigaray's thought have been both appropriated and critiqued, in particular as 
alternative definitions of femininity - at times as essentialist, at others as 
strategic re-evaluations that challenge the masculine norms.21 Irigaray's work 
can be, however, read as playful repetition in itself. These notions can be, 
then, considered beyond the problematics of sexual difference. They do not 
merely deconstruct the prevailing order, but open a path out of these frames. 
18 Irigaray states that mimesis is a possible strategy in "an initial phase". Assuming the 
feminine role deliberately "means to convert a form of subordination into an affirmation, and 
thus to begin to thwart it". Irigaray 1985b, 76. 
19 Braidotti 2006a, 87 & 183. 
20 See e.g. Irigaray 1985b, 23-33, 79; Luce Irigaray, I Love to You: Sketch of a Possible 
Felicity in History (New York & London: Routledge 1996), 121-128; Luce Irigaray, The Way 
of Love (London & New York: Continuum 2002), 15-53. 
21 See e.g. Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor, Margaret Whitford, ed. Engaging with Irigaray (New 
York: Columbia University Press 1994); Robinson 2006. 
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Central here is, in my view, an orientation in Irigaray's work through the 
rethinking of the ethics of sexual difference towards an increasing emphasis 
on the questions of communication. Touch, for example, no longer appears 
in the recent texts as a challenge of the feminine to the masculine 
prioritisation of vision. Instead, it is associated with the encounter that takes 
place in communication. As Irigaray writes, "it is essential that the other touch 
us, particularly through words".22 
Touch implies proximity. A difference always remains in it, like in 
resemblance, never allowing for the reduction of the other to what is already 
known. Touch neither threatens with nor promises fusion that is associated 
with the maternal and the material. Instead, it draws attention to the space 
between subjects, from the subjects to their edges, to the surfaces of 
contact. This no longer calls for a repositioning of the subjects. They happen 
together in the space of communication that is opened up by the outward and 
toward reach of speaking and listening, which Irigaray stresses over the 
exchange of messages.23 Her thought has, thus, remained integral to this 
research and its shift of focus on to the address. 
ON THE ADDRESS 
With Ahtila's works I have been drawn to focus on the mode(s) of address 
instead of who or what addresses me. The inexpressive, citational mode of 
speech, together with the address of the camera, disrupts the coherence of 
the illusionary fictional realm. Its otherwise unnoticeable boundaries turn into 
thresholds. The fragmented positions of the characters are, then again, 
reflected within the structure of the multi-screen installations and the 
perspectives allowed for the viewer. The characters appear insecurely 
situated, not quite recognized as speaking subjects by themselves, or by 
others within their world, or by me, a viewer. Their address seems to have no 
22 Irigaray 2002, 18. 
23 E.g. Irigaray 1996. 109-119; Irigaray 2002, 15-53. 
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fixed direction, or address, either.24 It does not, therefore, offer me the 
privilege of any more clearly recognised position than the characters 
themselves have. 
25 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA IF 6 WAS 9 (1995-6) 
In order to lay the foundations for the argument developed in this thesis, my 
understanding of the notion of the address is mapped out here in relation to 
some theoretical discussions of it. In particular Vivian Sobchack's 
introduction of the concept into the discourse on spectatorship of cinema has 
been central to my thought. The following discussion crafts out a path from 
the questions of where and who to the investigation of how address operates 
and what it does. The address has got built into it a reference both to a place 
and to a movement. According to Sobchack, 
"address, as noun and verb, both denotes a location where one 
resides and the activity of transcending the body's location, originating 
from it to exceed beyond it as a projection bent on spanning the 
worldly space between one body-subject and another. ,,25 
Furthermore, Sobchack claims that a subject is affirmed both at and as an 
address.26 The notion of address refers both to situated ness and outreach. It 
is oriented toward the others as well as connects the present situation with 
the past and the future yet, nevertheless, remains immanently located in all 
24 Compare with Louis Althusser's claim that "practical telecommunication of hailings is such 
that they hardly ever miss their man". Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses: Notes towards an Investigation", in Lenin and Philosophy: and other essays 
(New York: Monthly Review Press 2001), 118. 
25 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience 
(Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1992), 25. 
26 Ibid. , 24. 
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its possible becomings opened Up.27 This understanding of the address is at 
the heart of my investigation. 
Address is something both the film and the spectator, as well as the 
filmmaker, possess, Sobchack argues. The engagement between the 
spectator and the film appears as intersubjective and gives rise to what I call 
the space of address.28 In Sobchack's discussion this space troubles the 
distinction between what is shared and what is individual: she writes, for 
example, of the possibility to reside imaginatively in each other while 
remaining "discretely embodied and uniquely situated".29 This calls for a 
rethinking of spectatorship, identification, and related concerns, such as 
empathy, away from fusion and immediacy, towards communication based 
on the recognition of irreducibility. 
According to Sobchack the address, as a projection toward the other(s), has 
to find a hospitable host in order for communication to be possible. The 
viewer is, therefore, not a passive receiver, but takes actively part in the 
encounter by way of, amongst others, comparison of experiences and 
viewpoints. 3o This makes possible both dialogue and ruptures, i.e. 
divergences, which give the viewer heightened awareness of the differences 
between her/his and the film's embodiment and situation.31 This is also what 
allows for convergence and rapture which, Sobchack stresses, means 
"identification of the other's "path" or intentional trajectory with (not as) my 
own".32 It is a matter of similarity, not sameness, which is precisely what 
makes non-predetermined becoming possible in the encounter between the 
viewer and the film. Moreover, the emphasis lies here not on the recognition 
27 See Sobchack's emphasis that address "is able to reflectively connect that body both with 
its own future and past situations and with the bodily situations of others". Ibid., 261. 
28 Sobchack defines intersubjectivity as "the emergence and distinction of myself from other 
selves", and refers to an intersubjective space that exceeds individual situations. Ibid., 55. 
She calls this "a third, transcendent space". Ibid., 25. This relates to her distinction of 
transcendent from transcendental vision, whose confusion is, according to her, at the heart 
of the theories of cinematic identification. Ibid., 268-9. 
29 Ibid., 261. 
30 Ibid., 262, 171-2. This also relates to the questions of silence and attentiveness, which I 
will return to later. 
31 Ibid., 286. 
32 Ibid., 274. 
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of the other but on the other's orientation and movement as comparable to 
mine. The space of address allows for one to journey with the other. This 
relates closely to the notion of witnessing, which I focus on in the rethinking 
of active viewership instead of the figure of the host proposed by Sobchack. 
My research concentrates on the address in cinematic installations and 
differs, thus, from Sobchack's phenomenological argument that focuses on 
the intersubjective engagements between the spectator and the film as 
embodied beings.33 I focus on the visual gestures and modes of speech that 
trouble the separation of the fictional realm from the space of the viewer and, 
simultaneously, unsettle the viewer's position. Therefore, my argument does 
follow Sobchack's move away from the understanding of the film either as a 
mirror, a canvas or a window mediating illusions. 34 Theorisation of the 
spectators' relationship with cinema has focused to a considerable extent on 
questions of identification and ideology, Sobchack argues. She distinguishes 
two theoretical positions that characterised particularly the discussions of 
1970's and 1980's: Marxist theory investigated cinema as an ideological 
apparatus that interpellates the viewer and speaks the culture, while 
psychoanalytic theory drew attention to the confusion of the spectator's and 
camera's vision in false identification. She distances, thus, her argument 
from the theory of suture, which brought the two strands of thought initially 
together, as well as from the Marxist and psychoanalytic discourses that 
developed critically from it. Cinematic experience appears in these theories 
monologic, Sobchack claims and proceeds to develop an argument for a 
dialogic understanding of cinema around a notion of the address. 35 
Many cinematic installations problematise the views of film discourse as 
outlined above, while opening up for the viewer other possible modes of 
33 For Sobchack this lays the primary foundations for the secondary, though simultaneous, 
structures (ideological, rhetoric etc) and codes (that communicate the subjectivities of the 
characters etc). Ibid., 8, 12,278. 
34 Ibid., 285. 
35 Sobchack 1992, 18. On suture see e.g. Robert Stam, Film Theory: An Introduction 
(Malden: Blackwell, 2000),136-139. On critical discourses following from the theories on 
suture, see e.g.Christian Metz, "The Imaginary Signifier', in Screen, Summer 1975 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1975), 14-76; Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema", in Screen, 16, no. 3. Autumn 1975 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975),6-18. 
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engagement with film.36 However, it is not so much my focus on a specific 
form of visual culture, such as installation works, but examination of relational 
engagements and communication in these encounters that detaches my 
argument from both the frame of film theory and the phenomenological 
approach guiding Sobchack's thought. In my argument emergence is what is 
at stake, in the address of the viewer, not the subject positions or their 
production or reinforcement. 
This allows, amongst others, for a return to Louis Althusser's discussion of 
interpellation, as another important theoretical account of the address. 
Althusser claimed that ideology acts by hailing individuals as subjects and 
that ideology, in fact, is this very hailing.37 Interpellation draws attention to 
how subjects are called into being by an address and, specifically, 
recognition and misrecognition of themselves as the addressed. This is a 
reoccurring event that, according to Althusser, takes place in everyday rituals 
that guarantee the subject's sense of concreteness and irreplaceability.38 
(Further discussion of interpellation and the address in the chapter 3a: 
Thinking Aloud.) 
Therefore, while their singularity is reinforced, the subjects actually appear as 
ceaseless processes, products of their intersubjective encounters with 
others, dependent on the recognition of themselves and of each other. These 
interactions take always place within the frame of certain ideologies or 
discourses39, which are produced simultaneously with the subject(s). The 
promise of change built into the address is underlined in the discussion of 
interpellation by Donna Haraway, who emphasizes that subjects who 
mis/recognize themselves in a discourse "can and do refigure its terms, 
36 Moreover, I suggest that cinematic installations can problematise further the distinctions 
between e.g. presentation and representation, or primary and secondary structures and 
codes, which Sobchack refers back to yet emphasizes as non-oppositional. Notably she 
associates them both with mediation, which is of central importance for my understanding of 
the space of address. Sobchack 1992,11-13. 
37 Althusser 2001, 117-8. 
3K Ibid., 117. 
39 In the shift from the notion of ideology to that of discourse I follow here Donna Haraway, 
see e.g. Donna Haraway, 
ModesL Witness@Second_Milfennium.Fema/eMan©_Meets_ OncoMouse TM (New York & 
London: Routledge 1997),49-50. 
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content, and reach". 40 How I can and do mis/recognize myself tells about the 
limits of discourse and of my own subject position as well as may hint at 
possibilities beyond them. This echoes Sobchack's thought that the 
possibility of rapture and rupture, and of similarity and difference, in the 
relation between the viewer and the film allows for recognition of other 
modes of being, or of becoming other.41 
Furthermore, interpellation means interruption amongst other things, as 
Haraway stresses.42 Hailing is an event that never simply reinforces but 
momentarily exposes all the parties for reconsideration and change. 43 This 
allows for a step aside from recognition. Moreover, it facilitates a shift from 
the oppositions of identification and interpretation, immersion and 
detachment that haunt the investigations of both the address and 
spectatorship. As an interruption the address gestures towards that, which 
takes place between, the intermediate. The space between the addressee 
and the addressed is not simply that of a specular relation, but an opening 
within and beyond that, which was thus ruptured - such as an established 
relation. The mapping of this space of address aims to make explicit that the 
address is not simply to be found in the work, nor is it produced by whoever 
speaks or produces speech. What happens, when I respond to the work as a 
call, as an address? How do I, in turn, address the work? 
If both the work and the viewer possess an address, as a location and an 
orientation outward, the space of address under my focus is potentially a site 
of sharing. Sobchack suggests that address to the world may 
intersubjectively converge while address in the world is never the same.44 
This immanent address is, however, not unaffected by change as it opens 
outward, I argue. Yet, in its very irreducibility it denies closure of the space of 
address opened up. Address could be, therefore, seen as mutual. 
40 Ibid., 50. 
41 Sobchack 1992, 286. 
42 Haraway 1997, 49-50. She refers here to the interruption of both the subject and the body 
politic. 
43 See further focus on exposure throughout the thesis in terms of a rupturing encounter. 
44 Sobchack 1992, 286. 
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Sobchack's notion of mutuality as experienced by the spectator with the film 
problematises the definition of identification as either reduction of or 
absorption into the other.45 According to Irit Rogoff, then again, mutuality is 
not based on shared background or language, but a shared understanding of 
the nature of saying and hearing.46 This suggests that mutuality does not 
imply a shared location but a shared sense of each other's singularity and a 
shared ability to address, to reach out towards the others. 
ON THE VIEWER 
The rethinking of the viewer's implication in the address stems here from the 
examination of the space between cinematic installations and the viewers. In 
order to locate the key concerns and the specific focus of my research I 
reflect them now briefly against some recent critical discussions of 
spectatorship and of practices closely related to Ahtila's, namely video and 
installation art. The emphasis on an intersubjective relationship between the 
viewer and the work appears central to the discussions of installation and 
video art. Moreover, decentred subjectivity and activation of the spectator's 
position have been key concerns there in close dialogue with film theory.47 
The so-called Cartesian subject, centred and unified by the renaissance 
perspective and much of visual culture, is destabilised in contemporary art 
practices, it has been claimed.48 Two strands can be identified in this critique 
and its theorisations: One focuses on the viewer's embodied position, 
denying a single detached viewpoint from which to contemplate the work. 
The other, then again, draws attention to the fragmentation of the subject 
(re)presented and unveils gendered, racial, class and other hierarchical 
45 See e.g. Sobchack's discussion of the "mutual absorption in the world" that takes place in 
the space opened up by address. Ibid., 273. 
46 See e.g. Irit Rogoff, "We: Mutualities, Collectivities, Participations", in I Promise It's Political 
(Cologne: Museum Ludwig, 2002). This resonates with Sobchack's thought that 
intersubjective engagement is grounded in a knowledge of what seeing is as well as what it 
is to be a seeing subject and a visible object. Sobchack 1992, 52-55. 
47 See e.g. Claire Bishop, Instal/ation Art: A Critical History (London: Tate Publishing, 2005); 
Erika Suderburg, ed. Space, Site, Intervention: Situating Instal/ation Art. (Minneapolis & 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 
48 See e.g. Amelia Jones, Body Art: Performing the Subject (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press 1998),37; Bishop 2005,11. 
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structures and ideological exclusions. The laUer's concerns with visibility, 
legibility, representation and interpretation do overlap with questions of 
spectatorship, as Amelia Jones' argument discussed below exemplifies. Yet, 
my aim is to further overcome, or perhaps sidestep, this distinction. 
The shift of focus from the apparatus, formal and narrative structures, and 
content to the intersubjective relation between the work and its viewers is 
linked with changes in theoretical methodology, particularly from Marxist and 
psychoanalytic theories to phenomenology and post-structuralist theories. 49 
For example, Amelia Jones' critical examination of what she terms body art, 
from the 1960's and 1970's performance to the multimedia installations of 
1990's, focuses on intersubjectivity from a feminist phenomenological 
position similar to that of Sobchack's. She also recognizes the artwork as 
both a site and a subject in complex intersubjective exchanges. 50 Jones 
stresses her own particular embodied positioning as the viewer of the works. 
Yet her main emphasis is on the various possible modes of subjectivity 
performed and articulated in the works. 
Jones's investigation of body art focuses on the critical strategies of the 
works that are not unlike the playful repetition, or mimesis, proposed by 
Irigaray.51 The modes of embodied subjectivity emerging from the works in 
her readings are intersubjective, fragmented and in process. They challenge 
the so-called Cartesian subject and the related hierarchical dichotomies of 
mind and body, subject and object, masculine and feminine etc. 52 Jones 
claims this to have deep resonances in the relationship between the artwork 
and its interpreters. According to her argument the viewer's implication is 
encouraged by the dispersal and particularization of embodied subjects in 
the works together with the opening of the art making and viewing processes 
49 Phenomenological investigation into the relationship between the work and its viewers has 
been closely associated with installation art and its predecessor Minimalism from early on, 
but in relation to video and film phenomenological approach has more recently come to the 
fore. See e.g. Bishop 2005, 48-81; Jones 1998, 30; Sobchack 1992. 
50 See e.g. Jones' discussion of Vito Acconci's work, Jones 1998, 111. 
51 Jones writes e.g. about the strategic adoption of structures of femininity that "work through 
iteration to unhinge them", discussing this in terms of Judith Butler's theories of 
performativity. Jones 1998, 179. 
52 Ibid., 37. 
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to intersubjective desires and identifications. 53 Furthermore, she claims that 
body art practices "solicit rather than distance the spectator". 54 Yet, she 
emphasizes that this is not due to some immediate presence of the 
embodied subjects/objects, but rather their interdependence and 
performative nature. This troubles also the viewers' attempts to gain or 
sustain coherent and stable positions in relation to the works. 55 
32 
Jones draws attention to the potential that lies in the denial of distance, which 
she associates with disinterested interpretive position. 56 This I investigate 
further, but with a focus on the space between the work and the viewer as 
the site where their encounter takes place. My argument moves here away 
from the very notion of exchange that is underlined by Jones.57 It explores 
instead in depth what proximity, identification and, indeed, intersubjective 
engagement might imply if the embodied subjects are no longer fixed unities 
but in process and entwined with(in) the world - if they are mediated, multiply 
identified and particularized, as Jones claims in her discussion of 1990's art 
practices and specifically new media installations. 58 
53 Ibid ., 26. 
54 Ibid. , 31 . 
55 Ibid. , 107 & 160. 
56 Ibid ., 181-2. 
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51 Ibid ., 30-31. My move implies, for example, a shift from thinking about the work as a site of 
exchange between the viewer and the artist. 
58 Ibid., 199. 
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The decentring of the characters' positions in Ahtila's works affects the 
viewer, I argue. This is achieved with various means that subtly rupture the 
conventions of cinematic narration and appropriate the possibilities offered 
by the installation format. The same means can be said to operate as 
distancing devices, simultaneously unsettling the viewer's centred 
perspective and denying immersion into cinematic illusion. My argument, 
nevertheless, does not build on an analysis of these different strategies. 
Moreover, I do not aim to place Ahtila's practice and the questions of 
spectatorship it raises in the context of specific artistic traditions or 
discourses around particular media or methods. What matters here is the 
challenge her work poses for the viewer, and for my thought, and what this 
allows for. 
33 
Problematisation of the opposition of detachment and immersion, which 
haunts discussions of spectatorship, is of central importance here. The 
complexities of this distinction are present, for example, in the discourse 
around installation art. It has largely been framed by the claim that 
installations decentre and activate the viewer, while this argument has relied 
heavily on notions that emphasise immersion and immediacy, multi-sensory 
experience and participation, as well as heightened awareness, as Claire 
Bishop argues in her critical history of installation art.59 What emerges here is 
simultaneity of active agency and disorientation, or a position both centred 
and decentred. This invites critical consideration beyond the reinstatement of 
the contradiction as characteristic of the viewing of installations. Closer 
examination unveils ambiguities troubling the above binaries. The distinction 
of psychological absorption and physical immersion, for example, points 
towards similar problematic assumptions of immediacy and fusion in the so-
called cinematic illusion and the first hand experience of installations. 60 The 
59 Bishop 2005. 
60 See the critique the immediacy and presence by e.g. Dan Graham, which Bishop links with 
the critique of cinema by e.g. Christian Metz. Bishop 2005, 72-6; Dan Graham, Two-Way 
Mirror Power: Selected Writings by Dan Graham on His Art (Cambridge, Mass. & London: 
MIT Press, 1999); Metz 1975. See also, amongst others, feminist critique of the interpellation 
of subjects through identification in cinema, whereby certain norms and ideals are 
reinforced, Mulvey 1975. Spectator's position can also be seen to be determined through 
identification with the camera (and certain characters) as centred, in comparison to the 
decentred viewer in e.g. installations. Yet, both present modes of immersion, where the 
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association of active agency with a distanced and centred position calls for 
further examination of the entangled relation between the cinematic image, 
the installation and the viewing situation, as well as of the viewer's 
implication. The focus on the address allows for this as it draws out a space 
of encounter that promises neither detachment nor immersion as much as 
spacing, proximity and similarity. 
The notion of the address as a process that entwines with the production of 
subjectivity may overcome also problems with decentring that assumes a 
subject already centred and, therefore, privileged and exclusive. 6 ! 
Furthermore, it facilitates a move away from the notion of intersubjectivity, 
which similarly implies certain pre-existing positions as well as the 
phenomenological reversibility between subject and object, self and other. I 
shift focus from subjects to what happens in their mutual engagements: What 
kinds of possible understandings of communication and being in common, of 
proximity and resemblance, this may allow for? 
THE VEHICLES OF My JOURNEY 
Staining, haunting, thinking aloud, witnessing - the key concepts that carry 
my argument forward through this thesis have all emerged from my 
engagement with the works. Once they had taken shape they took up a 
mediating role between the works, the theory referred to and my thought. 
Initially I approached aspects of the works with these concepts as my 
analytical tools. Yet, instead of capturing the works and their operations in a 
conceptual frame, they ended up opening a space of proximity. The speech 
boundary between the work and the viewer disappears in different ways. Moreover, the 
opposed notions of identification and detached observation can both be seen to suggest loss 
of awareness of one's embodied position in relation to the work encountered, albeit the other 
is understood as passive and the other active. 
61 See feminist critique of post-structuralists, e.g. Rosi Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance: a 
Study of Women in Contemporary Philosophy (Oxford: Polity, 1991), 1-15. Jones points out 
that the decentred subject has been identified as "a description of the fragmentation of the 
male subject in late capitalism". Jones 1998, 44. This relates to questions of participation 
and the critique of e.g. Nicolas Bourriaud's "relational aesthetics" for focusing on practices 
that address and reinforce a ready-made community. See Bishop 2005, 119. 
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of the characters, for example, resembled thinking aloud while they were 
positioned as if witnesses. Resemblance created between the concepts and 
the works an interval, where I was situated. 
The concepts persisted on a slightly uneasy relationship with the works but 
this is what allowed for them to facilitate encounters. Concepts can be 
understood as not only tools of analysis but also of intersubjectivity, Mieke 
Bal argues. 62 Instead of offering a common language as a ground for 
dialogue, as Bal claims, I prefer to think of them here, however, as opening a 
space where we strive towards communication. Like the address, they do not 
reside or originate in the works, in the theory sources or in my thought. They 
are in the middle, yet not reducible back to any fixed positions or 
relationships. The address as a notion has, actually, grown out of and taken 
shape alongside the concepts of staining, haunting, thinking aloud and 
witnessing. It allows for the movement of the argument from one conceptual 
vehicle to another as well as knots them together in complex ways, here and 
through the chapters organised around them. 
Furthermore, like the figure of the Girl, these concepts do not operate in 
representational terms. They do not have any set points of reference. They 
can be, nevertheless, also distinguished from the non-figurative figures that 
appear as markers of constant situatedness. The concepts suggest, instead, 
acts whereby this emergence can happen. They have also triggered the 
shifts of focus outlined here as well as the related ceaseless changes in my 
position as a viewer, thinker, writer. Staining drew me to the surfaces of the 
figures engaged with, yet only through haunting I became stained myself, 
entwined in the encounters, on my bounds. I began to realise that not only 
the characters but I was also thinking aloud, with the works. Witnessing this 
allowed for an acute awareness of the stake and the potential I held as a 
viewer. 
62 Mieke Bal, A Mieke Bal Reader (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 
2006), xxii. 
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The notion of the stain emerged, first of all, as I focused on the dynamics 
between the bright red shirt worn by the girl in Today and the room of an 
elderly woman bathed in red glow later on in the same work. It is informed by 
a strategic move away from the problematics of leakages and fluidity, and 
their intricate associations with femininity. It questions the assumption of an 
interior that is revealed by leaks and the implicit reference to an excess that 
troubles boundaries. Focus on the red shirt as a red stain referred me to the 
problematics of the surface as well as to the notion of the limit, no longer as a 
boundary to be transgressed or a dividing line, but as a threshold, a spacing 
and a site of contact (chapter 2b: Staining). 
Stain as a concept encapsulates what may be called culturally coded varnish 
that makes embodied subjects together with their surroundings readable (see 
Elizabeth Grosz and Kaja Silverman).63 Yet, it also refers to spots that may 
in their material thickness disrupt at any point this smooth surface of 
representation. I claim that both aspects of the stain are events on the 
surface, but can no longer be defined as purely representational as opposed 
to some assumed depth or matter. The stain appears as mediation, both as a 
shared ground that allows for reading and recognition, and as its disruption. 
In its opacity as a rupture it defies attempts at understanding and 
interpretation. Yet, simultaneously, it makes space for another kind of contact 
on our bounds. Like the shared cultural codes also the disruptiveness of, for 
example, the red shirt does not simply lie in the images but happens in the 
encounter with them. Stain refers, thus, not to evidence or a mark, but to an 
operation. What really is at stake here is constant staining that is not simply a 
matter of ceaseless re-signification or positioning of embodied subjects in the 
field of visibility. 
In terms of both staining and haunting the argument steps aside from 
questions concerning the positioning of embodied subjects. They both call for 
a rethinking of boundaries as surfaces, as sites of contact to be inhabited. 
63 Grosz 1994 & 1995; Kaja Silverman, The Threshold ofthe Visible World (London & New 
York: Routledge 1996); Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-
Analysis (New York & London: WW.Norton&Co, 1981). 
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They question what it is to be situated. With haunting the investigation moves 
from the problematics of the female body as a vessel to be occupied and 
fought over to a reconsideration of what the openness of bounds may imply 
(chapter 2c: Haunting). The ghost defies unity and fixity. Yet, what it figures 
are its social relations and not, for example, an alternative model of 
subjectivity, I argue following the theorisation of haunting by Avery Gordon.64 
It is located by complex entwinements within the world, yet these do not 
secure it a place as such, but haunt. Haunting is, then again, always an 
address, a demand to be reckoned with. The ghost signals beyond itself, but 
not necessarily or merely to a repression to be dealt with. Like the stain, 
haunting does not simply provide evidence. Thus, I approach the Girl as a 
ghostly figure that haunts, but not as a sign of something silenced or 
forgotten, to be unveiled, given voice or visibility to. If it resembles the ghost, 
the mobilising effects of the Girl lie in its outward orientation, not in what it 
may reveal of itself or of the structures it disrupts. It is haunted by its ever-
evolving relations, while it haunts as an address. 
The notion of thinking aloud allows me to consider responses to haunting, to 
the sense of urgency awakened by it (chapter 3a: Thinking Aloud). It has 
guided me to the problematics of address, shifting steadily attention from 
how the works speak to me, a viewer, to how my thought and writing may be 
an address in itself. Instead of defining a mode of speech it has gestured 
towards a space opened up by it. Not unlike stain and haunting, thinking 
aloud troubles the oppositions of interior and exterior or subjective and 
shared. It unsettles, thus, the distinction of thought and speech. It locates 
both on the thresholds, where the subject entwines with and encounters the 
world. Both thought and speech address, driven by and calling for dialogue. 
This demands reconsideration of communication as taking place in a space 
of mediation crafted out by the reach of speech, thought and, for example, 
64 Avery Gordon, Ghostly Matters. Haunting and the Soci%gica//magination (Minneapolis & 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
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listening (see Luce Irigaray and Jean-Luc Nancy).65 This spacing is not 
determined by what is spoken, by and to whom. It defies attempts at bridging 
it with understanding based on capture and closure. Thought is not simply 
aimed at knowledge, nor is speech merely geared towards exchange of 
messages. When outward and forward orientation is emphasised, they allow 
for yet-undetermined contacts and connections with/in the world. Thought, 
speech and writing appear, then, both as modes of address in themselves 
and as acts that respond to a call. 
The notion of witnessing arose, similarly to thinking aloud, from the attempts 
to figure out how the characters address the viewer (chapter 3b: Witnessing). 
The positions of the characters, as if both witnesses and narrators, create a 
sense of mediation between them and their personal narratives. The speech 
reminding of confession refers here, thus, neither to a truth, to a past, nor to 
an interior reality of a subject. Instead, closely connected to the discussion of 
thinking aloud, with witnessing I focus on what happens in the space opened 
up by speech. Witness accounts both address and require an address, i.e. 
someone who responds to them. Emphasis on the address suggests that 
witnessing operates beyond or aside from the problematics of representation, 
beyond documenting, making visible or producing truth claims. Testimonies, 
in their address, also point beyond the witness. They do not simply convey 
singular experiences, nor merely refer back to, confirm or give rise to subject 
positions (see Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub).66 
Witnessing may allow for a rethinking of spectatorship in terms of active 
involvement, I argue indebted to the thought of Donna Haraway and Rosi 
Braidotti. 67 Witnessing appears as a critical practice of situated viewing that 
is driven by the urgency of communication and gives rise to an urge to act. 
65 Irigaray 1996 & 2002; Jean-Luc Nancy, The Gravity of Thought (Amherts New York: 
Humanity Books, 1997); Jean-Luc Nancy, A Finite Thinking (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003). 
66 Shoshana Felman & Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, 
Psychoanalysis, and History (New York & London: Routledge, 1992). 
67 Haraway 1997; Braidotti 2006a; Rosi Braidotti, "Posthuman, All Too Human: Towards a 
New Process Ontology" in Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 23 (7-8) (London: SAGE 
Publications 2006b), 197-208. 
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Not unlike thinking, it is to be touched, moved to the edges of myself, of what 
I know, and of knowing itself. Witnessing, like thought and speech as well as 
the stain, has to do with exposure, yet not in terms of revelation or unveiling 
but encounter and emergence. The association of witnessing with silence is 
central here. Silence, like haunting, is no longer necessarily a sign of 
repression or something to be overcome. It addresses and needs to be 
listened to, yet it is also a space offered by the listener or the viewer-witness 
to the speaker. It refers to making space as well as paying attention to that 
which is not or cannot be articulated within modes of communication geared 
towards understanding. Both haunting and silence gesture towards another 
mode of knowledge that is not based on capture but rupture. 
Staining, haunting, thinking aloud and witnessing are all characterised here 
by an orientation outward and towards. Due to its reach, witnessing can be 
argued to be always for something while this does not imply speaking on 
behalf, giving voice or visibility. An address involves the viewer-witness as 
much as, for example, the one giving testimony or the producer of an image. 
Similarly, the stain addresses and this address does not only originate in the 
one who appears as a stain. Or, in other words, when I am touched by a 
haunting, and called to reckon with it, I am already implicated. I am also 
"haunted by wordly contacts", following Gordon's words. 68 Viewing, thinking, 
and writing - like witnessing - are modes of response and of taking 
responsibility for one's encounters as a viewer. 
RUPTURES OUTWARD, TOWARDS, FORWARD 
As suggested in the beginning, this research journey with Ahtila's works has 
been carried forward by ruptures. The critical approach that has grown out of 
this process can also be discussed in terms of disruption. Initially related to 
the interference of binary logic and the representations of sexual difference, 
the notion of rupture has now become associated in my work with the 
68 Gordon 1997, 55. 
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address and, for example, with encounter and compassion.69 Rupture 
carries, thus, a sense of urgency. What to do when called for, and forth? 
What to do when interrupted into compassion, to be with and to be for? How 
to listen to or see the unrepresented, the repressed? What can this do apart 
from giving yet another voice or representation to them? I do not want to 
refute the value of the work that aims to give visibility to those 
un(der)represented, drawing attention to their plight and the cultural 
structures oppressing them. Neither do I claim to have exhausted the 
possibilities of deconstructing, for example, images of femininity. My 
argument does not move in a linear progression beyond representation and 
representational critique, but as a step aside, or as an interruption. 7o 
For example, the figure of the Girl did not end up offering me any more 
precise coordinates, never mind a representation, of a relational subject. 
What emerged is a figure that no longer figures. With it I have not given voice 
to a subject previously unrepresented. Neither has my research striven 
towards knowledge of how the figure of the Girl is produced as a no-thing, or 
how this entangles with the experiences of historically and culturally specific 
beings. Instead, I aim to mobilise this impossible position and emphasise 
how it unsettles all others entwined with it. My research is, therefore, 
powered by a shift from what to how: from what haunts to haunting as a call 
to act, or, from what is witnessed and the position of the witness to the act of 
witnessing. This act is approached as an address, at an address that is 
constantly situated in the ever-changing web of connections with/in the world. 
These contacts are, furthermore, also what haunt us and give rise to the urge 
and the possibility to act. In a way, the emphasis on the how turns both the 
what and the where also into events. 
69 On compassion see Nancy 2000; On Deleuzian thought on the encounter and becoming 
as rupture, see e.g. O'SUllivan 2006. This also relates to the notions of touch, proximity (or 
intimacy) and similarity (or affinity), all troubling the oppositions of meaning-matter, distance-
fusion, different-same. 
70 More on the move "beyond" representation as well as its critique and crisis, which means 
neither a focus on content nor form, nor artist's intention nor textuality etc, see e.g. Butt 
2005; O'Sullivan 2005. Note also my emphasis on figurative work and its non-
representational aspects and/or address and affects. This connects as well as distinguishes 
my argument from the discussions on participation in art, experiential and non-figurative art 
forms, collective and activist practices, yet the positioning of my research in relation to this 
varied field of art theory is not relevant to my thesis. 
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EIJA- liISA AHTILA WHERE IS WHERE? (2008) 
Whether encountering evidence of tragedies or simple personal narratives, 
the distinction is sidestepped as my argument is no longer geared to veracity 
nor privileges the message. In the work Where is Where? (2008) the 
documentary material of the Algerian war calls for a witness but Ahtila's 
fictive narrative addresses the viewer as well. The implied opposition of 
mimesis and diegesis, or description and event, is problematised in this 
thesis in a multitude of ways (see chapter 3a: Thinking Aloud). For example, 
the synopses of Ahtila's works perform as re-enactments of first encounters 
and problematise, thus, assumptions of immediacy. The space of 
resemblance, initially activated by Irigaray's strategic mimesis, undoes also 
this binary. It allows for, amongst others, witnessing to be thought away from 
mere reinforcement or reception of something shown or revealed. 
Therefore, I do not want to undermine the importance of the issues at stake 
but, on the contrary, to stress the urgency of the viewers' implication. This 
enquiry arises from a deeply felt frustration when called for as a witness. It is 
fuelled by a hope to open ways towards action beyond and alongside 
knowledge production and distribution. The knowledge provided by, for 
example, the media, or the understanding of the complex reasons behind 
things witnessed, does not seem enough. I write for a further sense of how 
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this all touches me. This may gesture towards potential ways of turning 
awareness to action. Implication does not then, primarily, refer to a 
responsibility that arises from an understanding of one's involvement. It 
promises empowerment, ability to do something. As a viewer and researcher 
of visual culture, what can my role be aside from interpreting or underlining 
the message? Or, alternatively, unearthing how the message was conceived 
and, for example, what prejudices or unspoken agendas it is driven by? What 
can be done beyond translating the message and allowing it to speak in 
different ways, in new contexts and alliances? How can and do I respond to 
the address of Ahtila's works or, for example, media imagery and news 
reportage, avoiding the reduction of it all to what is already known? This 
demands that the space of address remains an unbridgeable rupture, where 
proximity and similarity are attainable and aimed for instead of recognition, 
immediacy or detachment. 
My argument is characterized by a move to the edges, from interiorities to 
extremities. This does not reverse a hierarchical order but aims to sidestep it 
by focusing on the thresholds. The concepts discussed above do not, in the 
end, make sense of the address of or in the works, but suggest possible 
modes of response. Staining, haunting, thinking aloud, witnessing - they 
drew me to a space of resemblance. There not only the concepts had 
proximity with aspects of the works but I also became aware of the potential 
likeness of my own acts with the operations I found intriguing in them. Yet, I 
no longer mime the figures found in the works. My response is entangled 
with how I, in turn, address the works and beyond: how I actively allow for 
novel connections and complex mutualities that neither depend on 
predetermined identities nor require representations. 
If I have been a witness to Ahtila's works, my witness account is not simply a 
reiteration of what has happened. The story of my research journey here, in 
this introductory chapter, continues the event and calls for witnesses. If my 
writing is a mode of thinking aloud, as suggested in the title of the thesis, it is 
characterised by an outward and forward orientation. This text is a space 
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where thought acts, responds to a call and makes its own appeal for further 
encounters, further ruptures. 
44 
2. THE GIRL 
TODAY 45 
EIJA-LIISAAHTILA TODAY (1996-7) 
The story unfolds in three parts on screens that form three walls of a square. 
It begins on the left-hand screen with a view across a chaotic yard of a small 
residential house. The image focuses first on a teenage girl throwing a ball 
on her own in the sun. She enters a dimly lit bedroom, where her father sobs 
uncontrollably on a bed. She tells that he has been crying all day following 
the accidental death of his father. 
The next screen introduces an elderly woman. While emptying a dishwasher 
she talks about the society, the fear of maturity and the commodification of 
pleasure. The space darkens and a panning image gives a glimpse of a 
naked figure lying on a bed next door, while the woman's voice refers to her 
father and to the outside world. 
The last part shows the father in a cottage by a lake talking about his father, 
avoidance of physical touch, a sense of failure, and his own fatherhood. His 
daughter lingers quietly by. The image moves onto a dark road where an old 
man lies down and disappears into the shadows of pine trees, while the 
father drives along the road. The man jumps up suddenly in front of a car. 
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2A. NO-THING LEAKING 
FIRST: NO-THING 
Today (1996-7) begins with an image of a grinning mask, somewhere 
in a garden full of junk. A girl stands in front of a yellow metal wall. The 
bright sun highlights the colours of the girl's red shirt and blue skirt. 
"Today my father is crying", she begins. She is the narrator in her 
father's and grandfather's tragedy, which has just ended in the latter's 
death. Her sequence in the three-part narrative is introduced with the 
title Today. In contrast to the following parts called Vera and Dad, hers 
is not named at all. She is simply presented as the present, in the 
present, inhabiting a messy yard, a border zone or a grey area 
between the privacy of the home and the public space, the interior and 
the exterior realms. 
EIJA-LIISAAHTILA TODAY (1996-7) 
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The girl in a red shirt focused my attention on the figure of the Girl that 
circulates actively, in a variety of guises, in visual culture. Unnamed, without 
a clear place of her own. I searched for her in theory and found her, yet again 
in numerous cloaks. She appeared as not-yet, no-longer, not-quite, not a 
woman or anything else. That is, nothing, as Luce Irigaray suggests in 
Speculum of the Other Woman (1985). Her reading of Freud shows how, 
according to his logic, Girl never was nor will be: 
"what has become apparent to him about it, female sexuality can be 
graphed along the axes of visibility of (so-called) masculine sexuality. 
For such a demonstration to hold up, the little girl must immediately 
become a little boy. In the beginning ... the little girl was (only) a little 
boy.,,71 
Therefore, the Girl can only be imag(in)ed in relation to the boy and the form 
given to his body and sexuality. In this comparison she lacks, hasn't got big 
enough, has nothing to be seen, is invisible, Irigaray claims: "Nothing to be 
seen is equivalent to having no thing. No being and no truth.,,72 As Irigaray 
argues elsewhere the "idea that a "nothing to be seen," a something not 
subject to the rule of visibility or of specula(riza)tion, might yet have some 
reality" is deeply threatening to the logic of the same.73 The Girl as a no-thing 
can be approached as something other than an opposite or a negative, as 
something that defies the representational logic based on solid entities and 
sameness. This calls for a critical rethinking of her relationship to femininity, 
female body and their attributes. 
As Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari argue in their discussion of becoming in 
A Thousand Plateaus (1988), it is the Girl's body that is stolen first "in order 
to fabricate opposable organisms and to impose a history, or prehistory, 
upon her.,,74 Her being is emptied of all materiality and, furthermore, meaning 
that could be rooted in the body. She appears as a virgin surface prior to any 
71 Irigaray 1985a, 48. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Irigaray 1985b, 50. 
74 Deleuze & Guattari 1988, 276. 
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recognisable form or function, and without depth or essence. This allows for 
further erasure of all matter and difference that cannot be reduced to 
dichotomies. The Girl and her disembodied being seem to be the condition 
for the significations and forms given to the subject positions and sexualities 
of boy, man, and also woman, Deleuze and Guattari suggest. Yet, her 
sexuality and subjectivity can be seen, therefore, also as a historically and 
culturally specific weak hinge in the oppositional order and the determined 
lines of progress. How can anything be based on a negation or reflection of 
no-thing? Or, how can a no-thing become something, a woman? 
If this is the first repression of the body and embodied specificity, her position 
as the foundational site of erasure allows for the deconstruction of the 
binaries in slightly different ways than the excessive feminine does, as will be 
discussed in detail shortly. The Girl as no-thing is positioned before any 
markers of female sexuality. When focusing intensely on this blank spot, 
what can be revealed? Maybe something that only unveils itself in its 
mobilising effects on others and its surroundings. 
The no-thingness of the Girl keeps jamming the machines of representation 
and creating openings within it. She is a "fugitive being"75, as Deleuze and 
Guattari argue, 
"an abstract line, or a line of flight. Thus girls do not belong to an age 
group, sex, order or kingdom: they slip in everywhere, between orders, 
acts, ages, sexes."76 
In an attempt to avoid abstraction that here threatens, again, to erase the 
unspecifiable specificity of the Girl, I focus on the openings created. This 
does not imply, however, search for a potential mode of subjectivity that may 
be waiting within the changing frames of representation and visibility. 
Instead, I examine what takes place on the surfaces that the Girl in her 
disembodiment draws attention to. She may unsettle everything and 
75 Ibid., 271. 
76 Ibid., 277. 
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everyone else too in her flight from set positions and representations. Instead 
of a potential or yet-to-be-understood mode of being the Girl may 
(dis)embody dynamics of becoming. This has to be, however, thought away 
from linear development. The Girl is intricately linked with the notion of 
becoming-woman in the thought of Deleuze and Guattari. According to 
Irigaray, then again, the Girl spins playfully creating space for herself in 
relation to the mother, the same yet other, disrupting both linearity and the 
logic of the same. Rather than as not-yet I focus on the Girl as not-quite, 
following here Irigaray in particular. This relates becoming to resemblance, to 
the openness and the spacing implied in it. It also problematises 
predetermined line of development without, however, having to do away with 
the mother.77 
I argue that the Girl poses a threat and is, therefore, given form by protective 
prohibitions that draw boundaries around her supposedly vulnerable being -
which is not, cannot, should not - covering over her indeterminacy. Thus, the 
figure of the Girl circulates in contemporary visual culture as a site of 
constant negotiation and fascination, veiling and unveiling.78 I do not 
examine, however, the numerous culturally and historically specific veils and 
bounds wrapped around her, nor what may be unveiled, but focus on 
particular figures veiled in red in Ahtila's works. Instead of trying to represent 
77 Deleuze & Guattari 1988; Irigaray 1985a. See also the argument of Cixous and Catherine 
Clement, where the Girl appears as a base for the radical potential in the feminine that is not 
captured in the oppositional logic: she is the one without a place in the family, nowhere yet 
walled-in, and from this childhood (be}come women, flying/stealing. Helene Cixous & 
Catherine Clement, The Newly Born Woman (Minneapolis & London: Minnesota University 
Press, 1986), 54 & 69. For the discussion of the complex differences and affinities between 
feminist concerns, and particularly Irigaray's thought, and the thought of Deleuze and 
Guattari see e.g. Ian Buchanan & Claire Colebrook, ed. Deleuze and Feminist Theory 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000); Rosi Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a 
Materialist Theory of Becoming (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Dorothea Olkowski, Gilles 
Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. The 
problematic associations and critical dissociations of the Girl and the mother could be 
considered in relation to those famous figures of girls who appear in literature and visual 
culture without references to or the presence of mothers, such as Pippi Longstocking and 
Heidi. See e.g. Astrid Lindgren, Pippi Longstocking (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); 
Johanna Spyri, Heidi (London: Dent, .1974). In Ahtila's works the girls appear also notably 
without their mothers. This investigation, however, remains beyond the scope of this thesis. 
78 See e.g. the exhibition Girl's Night Out and my article in the exhibition catalogue: Taru 
Elfving, "The Girl, Unmarked", in Elizabeth Armstrong, ed. Girls' Night Out (California: 
Orange County Museum of Art, 2003a). 
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the unrepresentable, my argument focuses on the ruptures the Girl creates 
and inhabits in the field of visibility. 
50 
How can something that is unmarked by the languages of representation 
(verbal and visual) be approached without locking her into yet another 
discursive model or frame. Can I think and write about the Girl without losing 
sight of her specificity, but still avoid the reduction of these problematics to 
sexual difference? Following Elizabeth Cowie's distinction between woman 
as sign (referred to in the following as the Woman) and representations of 
women, I focus on the Girl as comparable to woman as sign, i.e. not referring 
as a signifier directly to a signified, or implying as a representative figure 
some "real" beings. 79 This sign is produced and it operates in various 
discourses, from film and photography to psychoanalytical and philosophical 
traditions. At the core of my project here is the belief that it consists of 
considerable fractures and contradictions. The relation between the Girl and 
girls is interwoven in complex ways in the process of their cultural production, 
and can only be touched on in my mobilisation of various figures that in 
different ways draw attention to these sites of rupture. Furthermore, in the 
discussion of the Girl I prefer the term figure over that of the sign. This allows 
for a complex interlacing of the figures encountered in Ahtila's works and the 
figure of the Girl, as well as distinguishes these all from representations. The 
notion of the figure also navigates the opposition of meaning and matter, 
which I claim the Girl problematises. 
My aim is not to map out the relationship between the Girl and girls. Nor do I 
strive towards a corrective redefinition of the figure of the Girl. Instead, my 
argument concentrates here on three strands that entwine yet do not define 
each other: the figure of the Girl and the concepts of the stain and haunting. 
A space of mediation, of proximity yet not fusion, opens not only between the 
figure of the Girl and the concepts but also between the Girl and the figures 
79 Elizabeth Cowie, "Woman as Sign" in Parveen Adams & Elizabeth Cowie, ed. The Woman 
in Question: mlr. (London: Verso, 1990). The Girl in my project can be also understood in 
terms of Teresa de Lauretis' distinction between the historical beings called women and 
woman, the latter being a construct of various dominant discourses, functioning as both their 
"vanishing point" and "specific condition of existence". Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn't: 
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in visual culture. This space I aim to inhabit in my writing. It allows me to 
stray from a focus limited to girls, as defined by age, to a discussion of and 
with figures that can be related to the Girl in their operations and effects in 
Ahtila's works. The model of determined development between the Girl and 
the Woman can be, thus, further troubled. Moreover, I do not focus on the 
relationship between the Girl and the figures encountered and discussed, but 
explore what happens when they are associated with the notions of the stain 
and haunting as mediators. The figures are, therefore, not to be taken as 
representations or events of the Girl, or as illustrations or figurations of a 
concept. 
Writing with Ahtila's works, trying to articulate their complex dynamics, have 
led to notions that may allow me to trace the ruptures caused by the Girl, yet 
leave her still undefined, unfixed. With them the Girl is thought away from 
linear development and the determinism of becoming a woman, the 
necessity of her no-thingness becoming marked with tropes of femininity, 
female sexuality and reproductive function. These notions do not directly 
refer to the Girl, but function in my project as mediators bringing different 
figures from visual culture, i.e. particularly Ahtila's works here, and from 
theory together into a dialogue. They allow her to be thought as that, which 
stands out for the gaze yet slips from its grasp, does not respect oppositions, 
solid boundaries and stable positions. She poses, thus, also a challenge to 
my place as a viewer, thinker, writer. The key concepts are the above-
mentioned, the stain and haunting, which the following two chapters are 
organised around. 
The concept of the stain has been borrowed here from Jacques Lacan (The 
Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, 1981), yet it initially 
emerged for me from the visual dynamics of coloured washes and spots in 
Ahtila's works and elsewhere in visual culture. Stain is explored in this thesis 
as a concept that, first of all, opens up possibilities for rethinking embodied 
subjectivity in the field of visibility. Focusing on red stains and, in particular, 
Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema (London: Macmillan, 1984),5-6. 
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red shirts, I claim that the marking of female body with lipstick and blood, the 
locking of it in the surface-depth scenario, can be problematised. Could the 
Girl be actually thought of with an exclusive focus on the surface, as having 
no-thing to hide? The Girl may, then, allow for a reconsideration of what is 
excessive in the prevailing binary structures of representation and 
signification, not in terms of fluidity and materiality but never-ending 
negotiations with the smooth cultural stain that easily clots into disruptive 
stains. This takes place on the surface that appears, thus, to have depth and 
weight in itself. This poses a challenge to the notion of the feminine, as I will 
argue in more detail shortly, and disrupts both the economy of lack and of 
excess woven around femininity. 
In Ahtila's works my attention is captured by red shirts, lipstick, light - stains 
that do not leak from any veiled interior. Rather, they draw attention to 
boundaries. Stain has to be here thought away from a notion of a spill-over or 
leakage that marks the site where the hidden depth and the surface mask 
collide as their separating boundary is momentarily troubled. This demands a 
rethinking of the body away from its paradoxical role as matter: either as 
corporeal superficiality in opposition to psychical depth, or as material truth 
against surface effects of masquerade. Instead of acting the role of surface 
or depth, the body may be approached as a set of forces, linkages and 
surfaces, that does not hide an otherwise unrepresented depth, as Elizabeth 
Grosz claims in her critical discussion of the gendered body in Volatile 
Bodies (1994).80 
The concept of haunting, derived here from Jacques Derrida (Specters of 
Marx, 1994) and Avery Gordon (Ghostly Matters, 1997), allows for further 
examination of boundaries as surfaces. 81 As a haunting figure the Girl 
troubles the economy of visibility. It does not signify, refer as a mark or a sign 
to a depth or an elsewhere. As a surface effect, as I have claimed, it actually 
sets things in motion. This requires a refocus on the strategic distinction of 
80 Grosz 1994, 120. 
81 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the 
New International (New York & London: Routledge, 1994); Gordon 1997. 
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the Girl and girls that I made in the beginning. The complex entwinement of 
the sign and the lived embodiment of gendered subjects and objects in their 
production has to be emphasised. This demands a move away from the 
notion of an embodied specificity as a core and an assumption of or implicit 
reference to beings outside of this production. As stressed earlier, with a 
reference to Elizabeth Cowie's argument, the sign should not be equalled 
with representation. 82 The figure of the Girl appears then as mediation, but 
not between matter and various significations given to it, or the real and an 
image, etc. Ghosts are signs signalling that a haunting is taking place, Avery 
Gordon writes. Haunting is mediation, she continues, a process of contacts 
and the possibility of becoming.83 Do the figure of the Girl and the various 
figures in red, however, then not merely refer to a haunting but haunt 
themselves? They do not stand for something, an event, but happen 
themselves too. As ghosts they point beyond themselves yet not as 
representative figures, and not only at certain repressions etc, but to the 
multiple and ever-emerging worldly contacts that form them. I am entangled 
in this as a viewer - haunted, implicated. 
The threshold is a notion that also demands rethinking here in relation to the 
Girl, the stain and haunting, as well as the trouble they cause on and for all 
kinds of boundaries. The threshold is not to be considered as an in-between, 
or a border separating two sides, or a boundary to be transgressed, but an 
opening as well as a site to be lingered in, from where to speak, see, think 
and listen. Not only is it spatial, but temporal as well as embodied. It is a now 
and here of an encounter, where notions of immediacy, linearity and solidity 
are unsettled. Threshold is not discussed here as a passage, such as 
teenage defined as a stage in a linear progression, where childhood turns to 
womanhood in a transition marked by the leaking of the body. Neither is it an 
in-between reducible back to its defining poles, nor a line to be crossed. 
82 Cowie 1990, 133. 
83 Gordon 1997,8,19 & 142. Gordon writes also about the ghost as a symptom, 
representing something beyond itself, with a reference to a loss, something past. Ibid., 63. 
Yet she emphasizes, simultaneously, throughout her argument the present and its future-
orientation instead of roots in the past. My argument follows this emphasis and 
problematises the association of the ghost with representation. 
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Instead it is thought in terms of surfaces with thickness, border zones to be 
inhabited, points of contact and collision, mediations. The threshold allows 
me to negotiate the distinction of interior and exterior, as marking not only the 
space(s) and boundaries of an embodied subject but also as the site(s) 
where engagements between subjects may take place. Borders, limits and 
surfaces appear no longer as sites of closure punctured by points of entry or 
exit. 
Here Luce Irigaray's discussion of the threshold in An Ethics of Sexual 
Difference (1993) is useful, as she reclaims the notion as part of her strategic 
re-evaluation of the attributes and representations of the female body. Yet, 
simultaneously, she weaves it into a critical rethinking of the normative 
(phallogocentric) model of subjectivity as well as of intersubjective relations 
and communication. Closely associated with this are her thoughts on the 
feminine, excess and the viscous, which are discussed in further detail 
shortly. 84 As will become apparent, the argument shifts emphasis gradually 
towards an understanding of the threshold as a site of encounter. This 
corresponds to the parallel move from strategies of repetition and 
deconstruction, i.e. from the problematics of representation as discussed in 
the Introduction in relation to Irigaray's thought. I also move away from the 
notion of the threshold itself with its persistent associations with the feminine 
and the in-between in my rethinking of the surface. The focus lies on 
surfaces and boundaries as thresholds, or in other words, as spacings that 
make encounters possible. This is where my engagements with the stain, 
haunting and the Girl take place. 
If the Girl is to be found on the thresholds, not-yet and not-quite, I have to 
also locate myself there. What does this imply: Focus on silences, 
ambiguities, contradictions and cracks? Strategic mimesis of the operations 
84 E.g. Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference (London: Athlone Press, 1993a), 18,34-
55, 141-142. See also e.g. Walter Benjamin's notion of the threshold as discussed in close 
relation to gender by Sigrid Weigel. She draws out, for example, the role of women as 
guardians of the threshold, the complex relation between past and present, as well as the 
significance of entrances as thresholds in terms of intertwinements, not as access to 
interiors, in Benjamin's thought. Sigrid Weigel, Body- and image-space. Re-reading Water 
Benjamin (New York & London: Routledge, 1996),89-93,123. 
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of the Girl? Or, insistence on the surfaces? Can I learn from the Girl how to 
rupture, create and inhabit openings? At first I set out to rupture the codes 
and persistent conventions of language, when trying to imagine and 
articulate different modes of be(com)ing that the Girl may suggest. But as will 
become apparent, my attention was drawn from the disruptive operations to 
the spaces opened up, from attempts at rethinking modes of embodied 
subjectivity to surfaces. Can rupture be thought of as integral to encounters? 
Can disruption be reconsidered without a reference to a specific assumed 
order as such or as not in opposition to some dominant model? This may be 
where the potential of the Girl lies - not in any specific disruptive effects on 
the binary (or other) order, but in the haunting challenge she presents to all 
demands of definition and fixity of positions. My own detached analytical 
position in relation to the theoretical and visual material I am engaging with 
is, thus, also interrupted. 
The Girl has been associated with thought, as Catherine Clement argues in 
her reading of S0ren Kierkegaard. The philosopher appears, then, as her 
seducer. Yet, Clement claims, the Girl poses a danger, threatens to "smash 
the wheel of dialectical thought" with her unpredictable leaps. She leaps 
unlike a man, without deliberation and direction, without a running start and a 
set goal. 85 Neither the origin nor the destination of the leap of the Girl is 
determinable. As thought she is not definable by what she leaps from, what 
she ruptures, or where she lands. The movement itself is what matters, 
thought in action. Moreover, this suggests that she demands another 
approach to thought, another mode of engagement with her than attempt at 
capture. 
85 Catherine Clement, Syncope: The Philosophy of Rapture (Minneapolis & London: 
Minnesota University Press, 1990),87,92. She refers here, in particular, to Sf2lren 
Kierkegaard, The Seducer'S Diary (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Clement's 
notion of leap is discussed further in relation to thought here in the chapter 3a. Thinking 
Aloud. 
LEAKS 
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A young woman, Susanna in Ahtila's work Wind (2002), throws a box-
full of old lipsticks on the floor and arranges them in neat rows, upright 
and opened with all their redness on display. She sweeps a shelf 
empty, places it carefully on top of the lipsticks, and steps on it, 
crushing the lipsticks in a ritualistic, exhilarating act. She rejects a 
powerful sign of femininity, a symbol central to its mask. 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA WIND (2002) 
The paradoxes of femininity are crystallised in lipstick. The desirable and 
idealised entwine in it with the forbidden unbound flesh and sexuality. With 
lipstick a girl becomes a woman. She enters into a tricky game, where her 
status is constantly negotiated on the shaky borderline between the ideal and 
the impure, the disembodied and the pure materiality. It is a matter of careful 
choices, moderation and right timing. Yet, does the red stain need to be 
rejected in this aggressive manner? Can it be appropriated in other ways, 
following the Girl who refuses to become Woman? 
Of red stains lipstick and blood come to mind first. Matters of surface and 
depth. But can they actually be separated as such? Isn't the redness of 
lipstick a reminder, like a warning of what lies beneath the surface? What is it 
that stains here? Are there really any borders that the stains cross and 
simultaneously mark? The red stains inhabit the thresholds of inside and 
outside, depth and surface, nature and culture. They seem to point at a 
problem that lies exactly there, on the persistent distinction between inside 
and outside, which demands constant control of the differently marked 
gendered fluids. They refer to the interior fluidity of the body that breaks 
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through the veil of certain subjects, certain leaky bodies. Yet, in the following 
the red stains are distanced from their association with leaky bodies. The 
discussion here maps out the theoretical frame around the critical feminist 
discourse on fluidity and excessive feminine that, as claimed in the 
Introduction, Ahtila's works ruptured in my research. They refuse to give 
representation to excess in these terms and, thus, demand another approach 
to the stain. Excess itself is also thoroughly rethought later in this thesis, 
similarly in a different relation to the surface. 
Celebration of fluidity and excess, associated with the female body, ends up 
easily reinforcing the binaries and norms it aims to challenge while merely 
reversing evaluations and priorities. Examination of the body as 
transgressive of the limits that frame and structure the prevailing cultural 
logic and its hierarchies, does not necessarily take into account what this 
transgressiveness in the end means: that the body always slips away from 
the grasp of definitions and its place as the other, the opposite and the 
negative. In order to think the red stains away from these rigid boundaries 
the body has to be addressed as a site of constant negotiation. As Elizabeth 
Grosz stresses: 
lithe body provides a point of mediation between what is perceived as 
purely internal and accessible only to the subject and what is external 
and publicly observable, a point from which to rethink the opposition 
between the inside and the outside, the private and the public, the self 
and the other, and all the other binary pairs associated with the 
mind/body opposition."B6 
Stains of lipstick and blood become one, but always layered and constantly 
shifting, as they meet in and on the body. These red stains mark the female 
body, as other, as the one on the side of matter, that has to be veiled and 
kept in control by the mask of femininity. Stain is not just a trace (of 
something) added on like lipstick, marking a site, yet coming from elsewhere, 
either colouring this surface with cultural signification or polluting it. But 
86 Grosz 1994, 20-1. 
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neither is it simply a material proof,8? marking a site of truth of an embodied 
subject and revealing its inherent lack of control. It is neither an effect of 
surface nor of depth, but what confuses this distinction. The problematics of 
borders and embodiment are central to the notion of the stain and, therefore, 
it tilts easily towards something abject, impure, and repressed. 
Thinking about bodily substances that leave a mark, a stain, seep through 
and spread around, resist the border between inside and outside, I cannot 
ignore the concept of the abject. The abject points out how the notion of 
subjectivity is haunted by the repressed materiality of the body. Julia Kristeva 
defines the abject in Powers of Horror (1982) as: 
"something rejected from which one does not part, from which one 
does not protect oneself as from an object. ( ... ) It is thus not lack of 
cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, 
system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-
between, the ambiguous, the composite.,,88 
There is nothing abject as such without cultural evaluations and hierarchies 
that mark certain aspects of embodiment impure and polluting. Kristeva 
identifies two types of these polluting objects, excremental and menstrual, 
and emphasises that both of these are through twists of cultural logic 
attached to the feminine and the maternal. 89 The notion of abject brings 
together our decomposing bodies, reminder of our mortality, and 
reproduction. Death and birth join hands, beginning and end collide. 
Could the abject be understood as a reference to materiality and (sexual) 
difference that refuse to be contempt with their allocated side as other, 
negative, and disrupt thoroughly the carefully balanced stability of the logic of 
the same? The abject refers always to the body, to the threat that matter 
87 See e.g. Georges Didi-Huberman's critical discussion of the complex interlinking of 
indexical and symbolicliconic readings of the stain on the Turin Shroud. Georges Didi-
Huberman, 'The Index of the Absent Wound (Monograph on a Stain)", in October, no 29 
~Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984). 
8 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1982), 4. 
89 Ibid., 71. 
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presents to hierarchical binary structures. Investigations into the realm of the 
abject can lead to celebrations of the body that fail to question these 
structures thoroughly. This reverts easily to just another set of oppositions 
and to reinforcement, even if re-evaluation, of the attributes of matter such as 
fluid, indefinable, and unbound. The radical challenge that the abject 
potentially presents to these distinctions is then lost. 
The abject is that which forces us to face our materiality. It strikes a blow 
against our illusionary coherent and self-sufficient rational selves. Its close 
knit with the female body is just another desperate attempt to ward of the risk 
it presents to the supposedly gender-neutral subject. If only female bodies 
leaked, why would men care? The abject is materiality that has to be 
repressed in order to gain and sustain a subject position. It is something that 
belongs to me, but also always escapes from me, from my imaginary solid 
boundaries. As a detachable part of the body it is, nevertheless, intimately 
bound up with the subject. 90 Abject elements could be seen as marks, or 
stains, that subjects leave in their surroundings, spreading uncontrollably 
outside their borders as well as absorbing influences from elsewhere, 
through their porous boundaries. In addition to the subject's embodied 
attachment to the world, this could be thought of in terms of intersubjectivity. 
The abject reminds of our dependency and necessary openness to others, 
and to change. 
Bodily fluids, whether considered abject or not, trouble the boundaries of the 
body reminding of its openness. Due to this threat, fluids are gendered and 
accordingly valued differently. Leaky body is a sign of deviation from the 
norm, the illusionary solid boundaries of the ideal subject. All leaky bodies -
whether female, gay, sick, or child - are defined as other, and feminised. 91 In 
its relation to bodily fluids the problems in Kristeva's definition of the abject 
become pronounced. The conception of menstrual blood as abject, while 
90 See e.g. Grosz 1994, 81. 
91 This threat of bodily fluids and the otherness of all leaky bodies has been pronounced in 
the discussion around gay male bodies after the outbreak of AIDS. See e.g. Peggy Phelan, 
"Survey", in H. Reckitt, ed. Art and Feminism. (London & New York: Phaidon, 2001a), 24. 
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semen is seen as non-polluting, calls for critical questioning.92 As Grosz 
states, women have "same degree of solidity" as men, but they are 
persistently "represented and live themselves as seepage, liquidity".93 Is this 
determined position as leaky, marked by the red stains added on the body, 
what the woman in The Wind rebels against? 
Fluidity does not necessarily other the feminine as the opposite of everything 
masculine. It can also open ways to unsettle the discourse based on solid 
and stable oppositions, just like it threatens the subject holding onto its 
impenetrable boundaries. Moreover, it has been also critically rethought in 
discourses focused on otherness as well as on the dynamics of disruption 
and ceaseless change beyond the frame of sexual difference.94 The 
argument here, however, focuses on the feminist theorisations of fluidity and 
excess. Luce Irigaray, amongst others, appropriates these notions in This 
Sex Which is Not One (1985) as tools for causing trouble within the rigid 
hierarchical oppositions. The playful repetition, i.e. mimesis discussed in the 
Introduction, reveals that "disruptive excess is possible on the feminine 
side".95 Sketching out the potential of this excess she activates a number of 
attributes closely associated with femininity and the female body, e.g. 
tactility, simultaneity, fluidity and proximity. She emphasises these as 
properties that are never fixed and, therefore, never captured in the 
oppositions, but instead thoroughly unsettle their claim to solidity and 
stability.96 Rethinking the significations and values attached to these terms 
92 See e.g. Grosz 1994. In her discussion of the paradoxes in the differentiation of gendered 
fluids, she notes e.g. that "seminal fluid is understood primarily as what it makes, what it 
achieves, a causal agent and thus a thing, a solid". Ibid., 199. 
93 Ibid., 203. 
94 See e.g. the critical rethinking of seepage as an active process of spreading within the 
structures of urban global capitalism by Raqs Media Collective and discussed further by 
Lawrence Liang. They apply the notion of seepage to the people and livelihoods excluded 
from or operating outside of the official legal frames, and claim that their operations make 
the structures porous from within. This troubles the distinctions of inclusion and exclusion, 
interior and exterior, not unlike the excessive feminine discussed here. Lawrence Liang, 
"Porous Legalities and Avenues of Participation", in Monica Narula et ai, ed. Bare Acts 
~Delhi: The Sarai Programme, 2005). 
5 Irigaray 1985b, 78. 
96 Ibid., 78-9. On the challenge that Irigaray's notion of the feminine presents, see also e.g. 
Ellen Mortensen, "Woman's Untruth and Ie feminin: Reading Luce Irigaray with Nietzsche 
and Heidegger", in Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor, Margaret Whitford, ed. Engaging with 
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Irigaray does not merely reverse them from negative to positive, but enquires 
what different ways they may open up for thinking of subjectivity away from 
unity. For example, "the mechanics of fluids" suggests a mode of being that 
has its formless form in constant flux, in a web of relations. 97 Key metaphor in 
this thinking of the feminine specificity is that of the two lips, which defies 
dichotomies as neither one nor two. The two lips act as a half-open threshold 
to the viscous that now appears as an element of touch instead of horror and 
disgust. As neither fluid nor solid, the viscous complicates further the notion 
of fluidity and the threat posed by it to the boundaries of a subject and the 
notion of an entity. 98 
The strategic appropriation of fluidity as a radical tool for rethinking 
subjectivity and difference is, however, connected problematically closely to 
the tropes of femininity and the form given to the female body. Yet, the 
accusations of essentialism seem to miss their target. As Judith Butler 
stresses in her interpretation of Irigaray in Bodies That Matter (1993), woman 
cannot have nor be an essence as she is excluded from the discourse. No 
essence can be found outside of the discourse either, because what is 
excluded is also implicated in the discourse, produced by this very exclusion. 
The excluded feminine and matter appear as disruptions within.99 When 
discourse is set in motion and opened for change by mimesis, the notion of 
essence loses its position as a solid base for truth. 
Irigaray (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
97 Irigaray 1985a, 106-118. 
98 Mary Douglas writes also about the viscous as: "a state half-way between solid and liquid. 
It is like a cross-section in a process of change. It is unstable, it does not flow. It is soft, 
yielding and compressible. There is no gliding on its surface. Its stickiness is a trap, it clings 
like a leech; it attacks the boundary between myself and it." Mary Douglas, Purity and 
Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: Ark Paperbacks, 
1984), 38. More on the viscous and the urgency Irigaray claims for it, see e.g. Irigaray 
1993a, 18, 109-111. Compare to the description of female sexuality as horrifying, engulfing 
viscosity, by Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Washington Square 
Press, 1984). Fluid and the viscous are often conflated, their difference in relation to 
oppositions not considered. See e.g. Grosz 1994, 195. 
99 Butler 1993, 38-9. Naomi Schor has also, amongst others, stressed that what is at stake in 
mimesis and the sexual difference it makes space for, is not essentialism, but "difference 
within difference". Naomi Schor, "This Essentialism Which Is Not One: Coming to Grips with 
Irigaray" in Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor, Margaret Whitford, ed. Engaging with Irigaray. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994),66-7. 
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Sexual difference and feminine specificity in Irigaray's writings do not refer 
back to biology, but to female morphology, Moira Gatens argues. Morphology 
according to her is reducible neither to anatomy nor to cultural signification of 
the body, but instead it functions as a mediator transgressing this 
opposition. 1oo Therefore, Irigaray's metaphors can be understood as actively 
reworking and challenging significations attached to gendered bodies, as well 
as pointing beyond them. In the model suggested by the two lips, either-or 
becomes neither-nor or both-and. When subject appears as same yet 
different, neither one nor two, the notions of body and essence demand 
radical rethinking. This different mode of subjectivity, which does not depend 
on solid boundaries, has been modelled from female morphology, and 
specifically the maternal body, by a number of thinkers. Like the open form of 
female body, pregnancy blurs the distinction between one and the other. For 
example, the artist and theorist Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger emphasises 
these instances between subject and object, centre and nothingness, and the 
field of tangibility, where contact and separation are not opposed. 101 This 
allows us to think of a difference, which is not "based on essentialism, but on 
a webbing of links and relations", in Griselda Pollock's words. 102 
Expansive, or even excessive, possibilities are thus opened for discovering 
and creating new meanings. According to Pollock "the feminine is both the 
repressed of patriarchal culture and its excess, beyond yet inside its limits, 
100 Moira Gatens, Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality 
(London: Polity, 1991), 115. See also on Irigaray and morphology, in relation to art and 
representation, Robinson 2006, 97-124. Detailed critical discussion of the problematics of 
essentialism in relation to Irigaray's work and its reception, and the risks involved in the 
persistent distinction between essentialism and anti-essentialism, is offered by Vicky Kirby in 
Vicky Kirby, Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal (New York & London: Routledge, 
1997), 62-81. See also e.g. Christine Battersby, The Phenomenal Woman: Towards a 
Feminist Aesthetics (London: Polity, 1998); Moira Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power 
and Corporeality (London & New York: Routledge, 1996); Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual 
Subversions: Three French Feminists (Sydney & London: Allen & Unwin, 1989); Grosz 1994. 
101 Lichtenberg Ettinger 1996, 105, 107. 
102 Griselda Pollock, "Introduction to The Within-In-Visible Screen", in M.Catherine de 
Zegher, ed. Inside the Visible: An Elliptical Traverse of 20th Century Art (Cambridge 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996b), 91-2. Symbolising the moments in late pregnancy allows 
us "to imagine the coexistence of the several, each unknown to the other, neither rejected 
nor assimilated, yet mutually affecting", Pollock argues in her discussion of Lichtenberg 
Ettinger's ideas. See also e.g. Battersby 1998; Michelle Boulous Walker, Philosophy and the 
Maternal Body: Reading Silence (London & New York: Routledge, 1998). Notably the critical 
rethinking and revaluation of the maternal body in these accounts moves away from the 
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that which will radically alter the system by emerging into signification." Due 
to this paradoxical position, both transgressing and mediating the 
oppositions, the feminine heterogeneous meanings can only be recognised 
and treated as otherness. Pollock calls for the "reading of the inscriptions of 
the feminine". Instead of inventing a new language so as to be able to 
recognise and articulate the feminine, we need to excavate and decipher 
these disruptions, the yet unarticulated and un-signified from within our 
culture and its languages of representation, she claims. 103 Interpretation of 
the traces of the feminine reveals how artistic practice, and critical 
engagement with it, can actively rework the negative position of the 
repressed opening it up for re-signification. 
Flow of differences and ever-changing connections emerges from the gaps 
and silences of discursive texts, images and sentences, from within the 
various forms that masquerade as solid and impenetrable. How does this all 
relate to the Girl? Is she here merely a to-be-maternal-feminine? The girl 
appears, and disappears, in the discussion of the relation between mother 
and daughter by many of the aforementioned thinkers. Irigaray, amongst 
others, has emphasised the importance of thinking the specificity of this 
relation between the same yet other, which presents another challenge for 
the opposition of self and other. 104 But is there really no way of approaching 
her without the figure of the mother, the maternal origin and future, always 
haunting the scene? Are there no traces of the Girl to be deciphered? Or, 
does the Girl defy the very attempts at reading and direct me away from 
interpretation and re-signification? 
strict linear separation of semiotic and symbolic. 
103 Griselda Pollock, "Inscriptions in the Feminine", in M.Catherine de Zegher, ed. Inside the 
Visible: An Elliptical Traverse of 20th Century Art (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1996a),74. 
104 Irigaray discusses the importance of female genealogies, starting from the mother-
daughter relationship, throughout her writing, see e.g. Luce Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993b); Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous: Toward a 
Culture of Difference (New York & London: Routledge, 1993c). See also e.g. Boulous 
Walker 1998. 
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IMAG{IN}ING FLUIDITY 
Back to the red shirts and other stains I have come across in Ahtila's works. 
The significations and threat of red cannot be explained away with a 
reference to the red fluid that leaks the truth of the female body and locks it 
into the oppositional structures. The stain in question here is neither the truth 
of matter oozing through the masks that try to hide it, nor fluidity that haunts 
the boundaries of subjects and genders them. Nor is it mere cultural 
signification added on the surface as lipstick. Red stains trouble the 
distinctions of surface and depth, outside and inside, mask and essence. The 
no-thingness of the Girl's embodied being is no longer securely captured as 
a to-be-woman, to-be-bloodstained, as this redness is playfully repeated until 
it slips from its fluid role, both in Ahtila's works and in my writing. With the Girl 
my argument, thus, has to step aside from the discourse on fluidity and leaks 
briefly laid out above. Importantly, however, it could be described as not-
quite my critical focus. The aim here is to make space for another approach 
through resemblance, not to define it through negation. Like the no-thing, it is 
not a matter of opposition. 
As discussed earlier, Irigaray focuses attention on the Girl as a no-thing and 
suggests this has deeply disruptive implications to the logic of the same that 
privileges vision over other senses. This potential of the no-thing 
corresponds also closely with Peggy Phelan's notion of the unmarked, which 
she introduces in her critique of "the ideology of visibility" that "erases the 
power of the unmarked, unspoken, and unseen" in Unmarked {1993}.105 
''The unmarked is not spatial; nor is it temporal; it is not metaphorical; 
nor is it literal. It is a configuration of subjectivity which exceeds, even 
while informing, both the gaze and language.,,106 
Approached as unmarked the disruptive no-thingness lurking in the gaps and 
silences of representations is no longer as closely linked to female 
105 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance. (London & New York: Routledge, 
1993),7. 
106 Ibid., 27. As will become clear later, my argument shifts focus from subjectivity, which is 
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morphology, femininity and reproduction. Yet, in a similar way to Irigaray, 
Phelan appropriates the un-marked and with it draws attention to the 
contradictions haunting the oppositional structures. 107 The unmarked remains 
unmarked by all its markings, like the no-thingness of the Girl persists 
despite definitions as not-yet or not-quite. Furthermore, like the no-thing, the 
unmarked cannot be reduced back to a negation of the visible or the 
signifying. 
It is important to avoid appropriating notions such as the feminine, the 
unmarked or the no-thing as merely abstract metaphors. The disruptive 
potential of these concepts can only be activated on the line between, where 
biology cannot be distinguished from cultural Signification, matter from 
meaning. Positioning the feminine in the gaps and silences of the languages 
of representation becomes problematic if its complex relations to specific 
morphologies are not taken into account.108 The same applies to the figure of 
the Girl. This precarious balancing act is at the heart of my encounter with 
the Girl. 
So as not to lose the dynamics that the Girl as unmarked presents us, I try 
and think the stains away from determined lineage, the border crossing in all 
its ambivalence. As Elizabeth Grosz argues, the paradoxical position of 
womanhood on the border between child and adult, nature and culture, is 
marked by the stain: 
"The idea of soiling oneself, of dirt, of the very dirt produced by the 
body itself, staining the subject, is a "normal" condition of infancy, but 
in the case of the maturing woman it is a mark or stain of her future 
at the heart of Phelan's discussion of the unmarked. 
107 Phelan does also refer to the paradoxical position of the female in her discussion of the 
unmarked: 'The male is marked with value; the female is unmarked, lacking measured value 
and meaning. Within this psycho-philosophical frame, cultural reproduction takes she who is 
unmarked and re-marks her, rhetorically and imagistically, while he who is marked with value 
is left unremarked, in discursive paradigms and visual fields. He is the norm and therefore 
unremarkable; as the Other, it is she whom he marks." Ibid., 5. 
108 The complexity of the risks involved in the rethinking of the feminine is exemplified by the 
long romantic tradition, where the feminine appears as an attribute of a creative male hero 
yet has completely different significations when attached to a female. A number of post-
structuralist thinkers have been also criticised for failing to address this in their use of the 
metaphor. See e.g. Christine Battersby, Gender and Genius: Towards a Feminist Aesthetics 
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status, the impulsion into a future of a past that she thought she had 
left behind."109 
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This suggests that the stain needs to be approached differently in order to 
rupture the vicious cycle, even if it already in itself questions linear 
development. This may be allowed from the position of the Girl that is not 
simply defined by future-as-past of womanhood, as pre-bloodstain. My aim is 
here not to privilege the Girl over the feminine as a disruptive site. The Girl, 
however, offers a rather unmapped territory that is curiously often sidelined in 
theoretical accounts while her presence in visual culture, historical and 
present, is notable. I try and take a place, tentatively, in this territory of the 
unmarked, no-thing. This may be a way to mobilise oppositional logic, yet 
without having to start again from fluidity and leaky bodies, the maternal and 
material, or the abject as discussed earlier. 
With a close engagement with Ahtila's works I examine how and if the notion 
of the stain may reveal the impossibility of the oppositional distinctions of 
fluid and solid, surface and depth, external and internal, before and after. The 
stain cannot be considered as simply fluid then, but ambiguous, with weight 
and form even though unbound. The stain could be understood as something 
arising not from a certain kind of bodily specificity that can be named for 
example fluid, but from a complex web of embodied subjectivity within the 
field of representation. It would be no longer relevant only to certain types of 
bodies that leak, but to all modes of subjectivity and representation. And, as I 
will argue, it leads to questions about the viewer's implication as well as 
beyond subjectivity and representation. 
The stain as a concept allows me, therefore, to move the discussion around 
the Girl beyond sexual difference without, however, abstracting the Girl 
herself. Can these questions be approached without a direct focus on 
specific bodies in visual culture? This does not imply a choice between the 
investigation into the specificities of female sex or the focus on the cultural 
(London: Women's Press, 1994); Battersby 1998; Braidotti 1991; Grosz 1994; Grosz 1995. 
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structures of signification and performative play with identities, associated 
with the feminist practices of 1970's and 1980's respectively.11o Neither does 
it necessarily refer to the more complex investigations that appear in the 
1990's artistic production, where the bodies no longer claim truth-value, and 
where the female body as abject became linked to other, such as racialized 
bodies. 111 
Rather, a shift of attention in the examination of embodied subjectivity can be 
also detected away from the material presence of the body, as in Ahtila's 
works. Both space and time can also be seen as embodied in representation 
and narration.112 In Ahtila's works the space and time of her narratives 
appear as a layered process of connections that knot in and around the 
characters, with uncertain or constantly shifting coordinates. This allows for 
the recognition of "the space that slips away, the words that fail and images 
that melt, when one attempts to represent embodiment", that Peggy Phelan 
emphasises. Ahtila's works make me aware of the haunting "still-to-be-
interpreted" that Phelan calls attention to. This reminds of the incongruity yet 
inseparability of the body and both visual and verbal languages.113 
What strategies does moving image in installation offer here? Ahtila could be 
said to appropriate in subtle ways the strategy of repetition, mimesis, for 
example of various tropes of masculinity and femininity. The viewer's 
attention is drawn to ambiguities played out in different levels of the narrative 
109 Grosz 1994, 205. 
110 This description simplifies considerably the complexity of different practices and various 
issues at stake here in the shift that has been detected in feminist approaches across the 
two decades. For a more nuanced overview see e.g. de Zegher 1996; Jones 1998; Amelia 
Jones, "Survey", in Tracey Warr, ed. The Artist's Body: Themes and Movements (London & 
New York: Phaidon, 2000); Phelan 2001a. 
111 See e.g. Jones 2000,42; Phelan 2001a, 24. See also Catherine de Zegher's discussion 
of the abject in 90's art, a complex field of enquiry which according to her often "entails a 
restriction of subjectivity to sexuality, gender, and ethnicity and dismantles historical 
reflection", yet has also developed "a dialectic between the mnemonic dimension and politics 
of cultural representation, between human-made/technological reality and that imposed by 
nature". de Zegher 1996, 26-7. 
112 See e.g. Amelia Jones' argument that space appears as embodied in recent art: "The 
body/self is understood as a kind of social space". Jones 2000, 42. 
113 Phelan stresses the need to recognize this slippage in its complexity, which according to 
her has not been sufficiently noticed in the debate around essentialism, where "the 
relationship between verbal language and visual image played a crucial, but still often 
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and the imagery. Everything becomes marked by charged symbolism, or the 
absence of it, and seems to call for the viewer's active interpretation. 114 
Repetition of different tropes of gendered body and subjectivity turns into de-
troping as they start to appear over-coded and slightly out of place. Reading 
habits are disrupted and focus shifts to the annoying cracks and silences. As 
a viewer I cannot rely on the usual detaching devices of learned codes. 
Could this, actually, suggest a shift aside from interpretation and signification 
of the "still-to-be-interpreted", calling for another mode of engagement? 
Negotiating the field of visibility, examining its limits and mobilising its 
margins, Ahtila explores in her installation works the numerous possibilities 
cinematic narration offers beyond the conventions of mainstream cinema. 
Her works reveal how disturbances to the perfect smooth flow of narrative, its 
linear space and time where everything appears as solid entities, can allow 
for a complex weaving together of space and time, embodied subjects and 
their relations. I argue in the following that while straightforward readings are 
here denied the input demanded of the viewer can no longer be limited to 
interpretation. A kind of a fluidity that rejects clear-cut forms and fixed 
borders could be said to be appropriated here as a quality of the narrative, 
time and space, the characters and their connections, as well as of the 
viewer's role. It is no longer associated only with certain leaky bodies, or 
unbound subject positions. 115 This fluidity in Ahtila's works is, however, not a 
smooth blending of all aspects, but full of clots and ruptures. Different levels 
cannot be clearly distinguished - sounds, voices, images, colours blur 
together in a web of shifting connections. Rather than as fluid, I approach 
Ahtila's works with the notion of the stain, which activates thresholds of and 
unmarked, antagonistic role". Phelan 2001a, 37-8. 
114 This exaggeration as a strategy could be compared with Peggy Phelan'S discussion of 
Pipilotti Rist's video works, although the two artists reference different elements and genres 
of moving image. According to Phelan the accenting of colours emphasise their artifice 
creating a visual surface, where everything needs to be interpreted, even light. Peggy 
Phelan, "Opening Up Spaces within Spaces: the Expansive Art of Pipilotti Rist", in Pipilotti 
Rist (London & New York: Phaidon 2001 b), 35. 
115 This could be compared to how Elisabeth Bronfen writes about "extreme fluidity" as the 
overall impression in Pipilotti Rist's videos: "thematic and structural celebration of 
disturbances is a performance of boundary blurrings". Elisabeth Bronfen, "(Entlastungen) 
Pipilottis Fehler ([Absolutions] Pipilotti's Mistakes)", in Pipilotti Rist. (London & New York: 
Phaidon, 2001), 87. 
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within visibility as spacings that open also for me, a viewer. What is asked or 
allowed when focus shifts onto the mobile surfaces as sites of contact? 
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EIJA-LIISA AHTILA THE WIND (2002) 
The narrative unfolds on three adjacent screens. It takes place mainly in a 
domestic interior with blue walls, interspersed with images of an exterior of 
an apartment block, a hallway, clouds. In the beginning there are no 
characters in the space yet a conversation is audible: a man tells a woman 
that the draft she complains about originates in her imagination. A powerful 
wind blows from an open window and fills the room. A young woman appears 
and gradually adds to the chaos by, for example, pulling bookshelves onto 
the floor. 
The apartment is visited first by three teenage girls who never engage 
directly with the woman while she stands next to them and talks about their 
visit. A man also enters and talks for a while with the woman seated on the 
shelves turned into a bed in the middle of the room. He leaves abruptly as 
she attempts to touch him. 
Addressing her words to the camera the woman speaks about her 
insecurities, with school and with her body image. She tells about the 
reoccurring rage that makes her bite her hands and moves then on to 
frustrations with issues such as poverty. At the end the woman claims she is, 
rather than feels, anger and melancholy. She climbs up the wall to a shaded 
corner of the room. 
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28. STAINING 
RED SHIRT 
My encounter and attempt to write with Eija-Liisa Ahtila's video 
installation work Today (1996-7) drew my attention to the first red 
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shirt, the one worn by a teenage girl. A colleague pointed it out to me 
after I had in a presentation elaborately circled around the embodied 
presence of the girl. Then I noticed the faded redness of the older 
woman 's, Vera's, shirt matching the red glow of her surrounding space 
in Today. The bright red shirt appeared in a more recent work of 
Ahtila, The House (2002), where Elisa , a young woman in a red shirt, 
inhabits her house dotted with red details. In another work, The 
Present (2001), I discovered a woman in a red polo neck crawling 
over a bridge on all fours. Yet, before I came across these last two 
shirts, I was caught unintentionally wearing one myself while giving a 
paper Red Shirt. 
EIJA- liISAAHTILA TODAY (1996-7) 
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Back to the beginning then, to the girl's red shirt in Today, which also evoked 
the notion of the stain for me in the first place. The red shirt is the first strong 
visual point of contact that stays with me throughout the work. It appears as a 
kind of a surplus of the image. The girl in her bright red shirt stands out from 
her surroundings. She does not seem to be becoming a woman by slowly 
turning from pale girly pink to the full womanhood of fleshy red, from the non-
signification and disembodiment of a Girl to a wife, mother or mistress, a 
gendered subject and object. Her red shirt is a stain that disrupts the smooth 
surface of representation and signification, and places her on the threshold -
of the realm of the narrative, womanhood, visibility. What does the red shirt 
veil or unveil? Or, should I rather ask, what does it do? Maybe this veiling, 
actually, unveils knots of relations and connections, where linear co-
ordinates and binary distinctions collapse. The smooth surface of 
representation and signification is, thus, turned into a surface as a site of 
contacts. This suggests a shift from leaks and fluidity, as well as from the 
notion of boundaries as limits threatened by transgressions. These questions 
are at the heart of the following exploration. 
Once the red shirt had caught my attention I was drawn to all red stains, and 
suddenly aware of all spots of strong colour as well as the different coloured 
filters that seem to wash over images. The colour schemes in the works of 
Ahtila, and others, gain new pertinence. Maybe unreasonably much, but this 
very break with reason might lead somewhere. Colours are after all heavily 
charged with different cultural codes and associations. In art history colour 
has been opposed to the rational and controlled line, placed on the side of 
matter and feminine, threatening in its seductiveness. 116 Red, in particular, is 
tied in complex knots to gendered materiality of the body. Therefore, the 
coloured stains need to be thought away from the notion of uncontrollable 
excess and the underlying dichotomy. How can the veiling of the body in red 
do anything but reinforce the cliched associations? 
116 Critical discussion of the 19th Century views on the opposition of masculine rational line 
and feminine colour, see e.g. Anthea Callen, The Spectacular Body. Science, Method and 
Meaning in the Work of Degas (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1995). 
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The notion of the stain, appropriated from Jacques Lacan, allows for another 
approach to colour here, I argue.117 In my reading of the stain I follow Kaja 
Silverman's interpretation of Lacan's notion of the screen in The Threshold of 
The Visible World (1996) as a culturally generated image repertoire, an effect 
of the gaze, which always mediates the encounter between a viewing subject 
and an image/object. According to her, subjects are constituted and 
differentiated through the screen, which functions also as a conduit for the 
introduction of historical and social variability.118 She refers to the notion of 
the stain, which she claims can better than the screen grasp the complicated 
material relation between the body and the representations that make up the 
cultural inventory: 
"The stain metaphor accounts for that relation in three-dimensional 
rather than two-dimensional terms, and it collapses the distance 
between the body and the image which defines it".119 
Image is no longer merely a surface addition in opposition to the essence of 
the body. Their distinction is blurred by the stain, which infiltrates as material 
depth both the body and its image entwining them closely together. Neither 
can be approached outside of the stain. The embodied subject always 
negotiates one's position and sense of self in relation to it. This complex 
relation between the embodied subject and the field of visibility is also 
explored by Silverman with the concept of the pose: "Like the stain, the pose 
puts the subject who assumes it "in the picture"."120 By posing the subject 
makes oneself into a picture, anticipating how one is seen. Posing is an 
attempt to control one's body and how one is seen through it, to mould the 
body to express a certain kind of subjectivity, as Roland Barthes has 
acknowledged in Camera Lucida (2000): 
"once I feel myself observed by the lens, everything changes: I 
constitute myself in the process of "posing", I instantaneously make 
117 I refer here in particular to Lacan's discussion of the concept in Lacan 1981,67-119. 
118 Silverman 1996, 202, 135. 
119 Ibid., 201. 
120 Ibid., 203. 
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another body for myself, I transform myself in advance into an 
image."121 
Posing is active negotiation with the stain, the cultural screen, and expands 
from the body to its surroundings, as Silverman claims. The subject makes 
not only oneself, but also ones environment into an imaginary photograph 
through the representational force of the pose. 122 Simultaneously the subject 
needs to adjust the pose to fit into the surroundings, as well as to the stain, 
the available image repertoire and its ideological preferences etc. Has the girl 
in a red shirt somehow failed or chosen not to compose her pose correctly? 
Has she failed to create a representable, another, body for her(self)? Does 
one have to gain control over the body in the process of posing, so as to 
assume a subject position that can be acknowledged by others? The no-
thingness of her body may be presenting a problem here. If I follow Barthes 
and make another body for myself, there seems to persist some implicit other 
body and being, hidden behind the image. To get away from this assumption 
of an essence or the real veiled by the image and the pose, this negotiation 
with the stain has to be thought of as a complex process of interaction. 
The pose draws attention to the surface instead of material depth, yet does 
not undo this opposition of representation and origin or appearance and core. 
The stain, then again, could be seen to bring material depth into the field of 
visibility, to thicken the surface while defying attempts to refer beyond it. It 
may also allow us new perspectives on the aspiration, and even necessity, of 
the subject to be seen by others and to become a picture, and part of a 
bigger picture. Instead of a still image this picture appears more like an event 
that unfolds in space and time. It could be thought of as something not 
confined to the oppositional logic that posits representation against the real, 
but produced in a ceaseless negotiation between subject and object 
positions, both within oneself and with others. The stain may challenge the 
prioritisation of vision, drawing attention to materiality that cannot be grasped 
121 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (London: Vintage Classics, 
2000),10-11. 
122 Silverman 1996, 103. 
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and frozen into an image. The red stain teases us promising knowledge of 
the body, but in the case of the red shirt ends up merely unveiling the 
insufficiency of the modes of knowledge on offer. It does not provide 
evidence of what lies beneath the surface but defies capture and, instead, 
turns the surface into a space of interaction. It may also call for a move away 
from, or for a radical rethinking of, understanding and knowledge, as argued 
later. 
What kind of a stain is the red shirt then? As cultural image repertoire stain is 
like a unifying fluid filter, but Lacan also refers to the stain as a SpOt. 123 
Materiality of the stain appears two-fold, both smoothing and disruptive in its 
effects. Stain can be understood to function at times as a material spot that 
draws the attention of the viewer to the image. As a stain this element in the 
image becomes something excessive, without a clear place in the narrative 
and the web of meanings woven into the image. How does this two-fold stain 
appear in Ahtila's works? The narratives, the roles and poses adopted by the 
characters, their surroundings and relations could be said to be discreetly 
bound into a whole by what is here called the cultural stain. This fluid varnish, 
or a coloured filter, resides both in the images and in my response as a 
viewer. It mediates the encounter. On closer inspection, however, the 
characters stand out as points of slight disruption. These embodied subjects 
absorb the stain to various degrees, never blending into the images as 
perfectly as expected. 
The specificity of the bodies that are culturally marked can be thought in 
terms of etching, a technique that acknowledges the effect of the material 
surface in the act of inscription, according to Elizabeth GrosZ.124 Grosz 
stresses that the body is open-ended, pliable set of significations, 
"indeterminate and indeterminable outside its social constitution as a body of 
a particular type".125 But the specific modes and prevailing significations of its 
materiality, as a page of inscription, need to be taken into account in order to 
123 Lacan 1981,97. 
124 Grosz 1994, 191. 
125 Ibid., 60. 
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avoid the temptation to assume a neutral, universal body.126 This process of 
inscription is not only limited from the side of the flesh, but also from the 
functioning of representation. The materiality of the body resists its capture 
by textualization, but languages of representation are also incapable of 
articulating everything, she stresses. 127 The limitations of this process of 
inscription are not only a matter of some essential irrationality of materiality, 
but also reveal a lack in the representational languages. This implies that 
bodies, and embodied subjects, cannot be captured within the field of 
representation and visibility. They are points of resistance, which more or 
less actively interfere in the smoothness of the image and its reception. 
However, to get to grips with the particular disruptive element here, the red 
shirt, I need to strategically break away from the dichotomy of the body and 
its representation, matter and meaning. This demands a shift from both the 
economies of lack and of excess, which paradoxically entwine in the figure of 
the feminine, as argued earlier. Returning to the red shirt it can be seen as 
having not absorbed the unifying cultural stain in expected moderation. The 
red shirt, and with it the whole embodied subject of the girl in Today, has 
turned into a stain on stain. Its disruptive effect may in the end have not so 
much to do with the ungraspable body as such than with the challenge it 
presents for the languages of representation. The red shirt does not refer to 
some underlying veiled matter, but to the marking of this matter, the forms 
given to the body. The red shirt does not reclaim or rename the girl's body, 
either discovering its authentic form or creating it anew. It troubles precisely 
because it fails to do so and instead draws attention to the unmarked that is 
the Girl. As a stain it sets everything around her also in motion. It offers, thus, 
a point of entry for me, a viewer, but not only to an endless game of re-
signification. Rather than being lured by a surface into either immersive 
identification or detached reading, I am drawn to the surface, where the Girl 
appears and makes contact. 
126 Critique of many key thinkers of the body, such as Michel Foucault. Grosz 1994, 156. 
127 Ibid" 118. 
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VERA'S FADED REDNESS 
The redness of the girl's shirt is emphasised by the shift in Today from 
her part to the next screen, to Vera's story. Vera's room is flooded with 
sensuous, warm red light, but her shirt does not stand out anymore in 
its now faded redness. The girl's presence as a disruptive stain has 
been replaced by an evenly spread stain . This red colouring fits Vera 
harmoniously into the space she occupies, turning it all into a smooth 
picture plane. 
EIJA-LIISAAHTILA TODAY (1996-7) 
The different operations of the stain are mapped out here so as to allow for 
further reflection on the potential of the emphasis on the surface. This is 
tightly woven together with the enquiry into the possibilities of engagement 
beyond interpretative description that the colour red may offer me, a viewer, 
with the works. Following my reading of the girl and the woman in Today as 
the same person, the older Vera's shirt seems to have lost most of its 
colour. 128 The redness of the young girl's shirt has now spread to her 
128 The girl's development seems thus to go against the expectations: instead of gaining 
stronger presence and attributes of female sexuality, she has lost them. But this could be 
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surroundings, or maybe the space has absorbed the colour from her. The 
boundary between Vera and her space has blurred. Has Vera followed her 
father's model, and his mistakes? In the third part of Today, titled Dad, the 
father's bedroom is bathed in blue tones, which reflect both his shirt and his 
sorrow, and perhaps also his challenged masculinity. The light blue tone of 
his T-shirt is deepened by the wet patch of tears that stain it. His embodied 
being seems to be marked by a battle (neither clearly internal nor external) 
between the signifiers of masculinity (the colour scheme as the most obvious 
sign) and the breaking down of this masculine subject position as the wet 
stain of tears and his howling cries trouble the solidity of his boundaries and 
deem him uncontrolled, irrational and even hysterical, i.e. feminised. His 
attempt to fit in with the stain, to become part of a harmonious picture as a 
coherent masculine subject, is shattered by these contradictions. 
Vera and Dad have nearly become one with their surroundings, smothered 
over by the stains, red and blue. How can I think about this blending of the 
subject and the inhabited space? Could it be some kind of a desperate 
attempt to secure solid boundaries for the illusionary coherent self? I may be 
witnessing a confusion between a subject and his/her environment, where 
their borders become blurred as s/he becomes part of the space. Is it a 
subject formation gone wrong or just another example of the impossibility of 
a unified and centred subject position? 
This could be approached with the notion of mimicry, as introduced by Roger 
Caillois in his study of the camouflage of certain insects in his article Mimicry 
and Legendary Psychastenia (1984). Instead of defence function, Caillois 
claims this imitation of one's environment is sometimes luxurious 
"exaggeration of precautions"129 or a temptation by space, a disturbance in 
the perception of space and one's distinction from it: 
"It is with represented space that the drama becomes specific, since 
the living creature, the organism, is no longer the origin of the 
read in terms of Vera's age as well. She has past the age of reproductivity and thus her body 
has lost the values attached to feminine sexuality. 
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coordinates, but one point among others, it is dispossessed of its 
privilege and literally no longer knows where to place itself."130 
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Caillois' notion of mimicry has been discussed further in terms of 
representation and subjectivity by, amongst others, Elizabeth Grosz and Kaja 
Silverman.131 Silverman relates mimicry to subject's attempt to approximate a 
photograph, or to become part of a picture, by taking a pose. She writes 
about stain mimicry, referring to Caillois' notion of morphological mimicry as 
"a reproduction in three-dimensional space with solids and voids: sculpture-
photography". 132 The term stain refers us here back to the cultural screen or 
stain that defines the limits for the representation of the self, and provides the 
colours and forms to choose from and to adapt to. Does the space then 
determine the subject's pose? As mentioned before in relation to the pose, 
Silverman emphasises the representational power of the pose that turns not 
only the body, but also the space into an image. She claims that the pose, 
"the positioning of a representationally inflected body in space", generates 
both a frame, which marks off all representation from the "real", and a mise-
en-scene, a "conversion of that space into a "place"."133 
Space becomes a place of a certain narrative, a setting for the formation of 
subjectivity. This could be a fitting description of the domestic spaces of both 
Dad and Vera. Have the spaces become like the inhabitants, or the 
inhabitants like their spaces? Or is the process mutual to the point where one 
can hardly be distinguished from the other? The place seems to be a crucial 
element in the constant reconstruction of the self as an entity moulded by 
one's specific embodied relations to one's surroundings, past, other people 
etc. Subject is, thus, entwined with the occupied space - constantly locating 
and presenting oneself as a fitting part of it, yet never totally absorbed into it. 
The embodied subject adapts to the limits of the inhabited space, but in its 
turn it also affects the representation of the space. This relation has to be a 
129 Roger Caillois, "Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia", in October, no 31 (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 1984),67. 
130 Ibid., 70. 
131 Grosz 1994; Grosz 1995; Silverman 1996. 
132 Silverman 1996, 201; Caillois 1984, 65. 
THE GIRL: STAINING 80 
constant process, where active and passive roles cannot be distinguished. It 
must be always open for challenge as well. 
What does this inseparability of subjects and their spaces in the field of 
visibility mean then? According to Elizabeth Grosz, in mimicry the borders 
and the unity of the subject blur as slhe identifies with the space and tries to 
become part of it mimicking its forms and colours. She argues that coherent 
identity and ability to manipulate own body in space depends on our position 
as a "point of perspectival access to space and as object for others in 
space".134 She links mimicry to psychosis: 
"The subject is captivated and replaced by space, blurred with the 
positions of others. ( ... ) both the psychotic and the insect renounce 
their rights to occupy a perspectival point, abandoning themselves to 
being spatially located bylas others."135 
Space presents, thus, a lure and a threat to the unified and centred subject. 
Grosz points out in Space, Time, and Perversion (1985) that in some cases 
of psychosis the "meshing of self and body" fails.136 This failure to recognize 
one's body as an integral aspect of one's subjectivity, could be seen as an 
extreme symptom of our culture's hierarchy of mind over matter. Even if Vera 
and Dad are not portrayed in Today as psychotic, this could be underlying 
the sense of repression they articulate: Vera, for example, cynically observes 
that in society "what's not immediately comprehended is forbidden", whereas 
Dad remembers bitterly how his deceased father did not want to be touched. 
What happens to my perspective when faced with this merging together of 
the characters and their spaces? It troubles not only my readings of the 
representations of these embodied subjects. Instead of simple aesthetic 
layers these coloured washes may also affect my engagement with these 
characters and their spaces. Furthermore, rather than leaving my embodied 
position temporarily and being absorbed through identification in the 
133 Silverman 1996, 203. 
134 Grosz 1995, 92. 
135 Grosz 1994,47. 
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cinematic narrative, I have to negotiate my place in the installation amongst 
multiple screens as well as in relation to the non-centred characters and their 
pictured spaces. May I get lost here too, in the constantly shifting, complex 
spatial coordinates? As argued earlier, the unifying cultural stain resides not 
only in the images but in the viewer's engagement with them. The stain, as 
coloured filter, appears to tie the characters and the inhabited spaces 
together to the point of nearly blurring their distinction and, therefore, denies 
customary readings of their positions. My perspective as a viewer is not 
unsettled here simply through identification with the characters. Rather, it is 
only in our encounter that their positions become troubled instead of being 
reconfirmed. I am implicated in the stain , which mediates our engagement. 
Could this refer beyond signification and representation? 
ELISA'S RED SHIRT 
Psychosis takes me to another red shirt. In The House Elisa inhabits 
her house in a red shirt, surrounded by various red objects and 
details. Shelves in the kitchen and stripes of the curtains make her just 
another red spot in the interior. Meanwhile she talks about the 
collapsing boundaries of her house as well as of herself. 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA THE HOUSE (2002) 
Elisa's body does not offer her a rooted point from which to map her position 
in relation to others, the surrounding space and its objects. Her embodied 
being becomes a space for the others to occupy. According to her own 
words, first just sounds from other places, such as her car and an unknown 
136 Grosz 1995, 89. 
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boat, but towards the end other people also take over her body. Space loses 
its borders and order. While physically in one place she is simultaneously in 
other places in her head. She is not just part of space or merged into it, but a 
site, where all spaces and places collapse into one. 
The relation between subject and space is in this work investigated with an 
intense attention to collapsing boundaries, which may also give me further 
clues on my challenged position as a viewer of the work. Following Roger 
Caillois, Elizabeth Grosz relates mimicry closely to the representation of 
space: 
"The primacy of one's own perspective is replaced by the gaze of 
another for whom the subject is merely a point in space, and not the 
focal point around which an ordered space is organized. The 
representation of space is thus a correlate of one's ability to locate 
oneself as the point of origin or reference of space.,,137 
Elisa cannot place her embodied being in space - she cannot claim her own 
perspective. On the one hand, all boundaries blur, around her and in relation 
to her, to the extent that she becomes one with the space. On the other 
hand, she appears as a disrupting stain, out of sync with her space. Many 
red elements in the interior of Elisa's house stand out, corresponding to her 
presence, but she has not merged together with the interior like older Vera 
has. Perhaps she has not adapted to the uniform cultural stain, the mode of 
subjectivity given to and expected of her. She feels awkward in her own 
house, occupying it according to learned patterns. She has not managed to 
secure the borders of her space and this may be why the external world 
manages to seep in. She tries to interpret the world and her place in it by 
mapping the visual. But looking just seems to confuse matters further. The 
world fills her with its multiple sounds, and clear distinctions disappear. 
In a series of works that partly share the same material - the 5-monitor 
installation The Present, the 3-screen installations The House and The Wind 
137 Ibid., 90. 
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(2002), and the feature film Love is a Treasure (2002) - Ahtila focuses on 
psychosis exploring this loss of coherent subjectivity from various angles. 138 
The fictional case studies refuse to function as models, hypothesis, or 
answers of any kind. Instead they raise questions about the blurry boundary 
separating normal from abnormal, balanced from disturbed. Significantly 
Ahtila does not give straight forward representations of the collapsing 
boundaries in The House or in the other works. Instead, as a viewer I am 
denied a coherent centred point of view, both in the space of the house Elisa 
tries to inhabit and the space of the installation the House. I have to negotiate 
a multiplicity of changing spatial and temporal perspectives. I can neither 
assume a distanced and empowered viewing position in relation to these 
spaces, nor form a fixed representation of them. 
Focusing on Elisa's failing attempts to gain control though observation and 
description, and witnessing her inability to achieve desired coherence, I feel 
the same myself. Looking through her eyes in one image, at her in another, 
and from her side in the third, my viewpoint keeps shifting. Elisa herself 
escapes from my view at times, and then suddenly becomes two. At times 
her voice breaks free from her image. As a viewer I join Elisa in her frustrated 
struggle to grasp a unified, solid perspective on the surrounding space and 
her place in it. However, this is not simply due to identification, or the 
impossibility to assume her perspective. My descriptions and interpretations 
also fall short of achieving clarity. I cannot occupy a position of perspectival 
access to the space, or a point from which it is defined. The reading of the 
representation of Elisa and her space as disjointed can be seen as an 
attempt to reclaim a centred perspective, yet this fails to gain closure. 
Another approach is needed. 
138 Ahtila's earlier work Anne, Aki and God (1998) also focused on psychosis, this time of a 
young man. The complex installation consists of a number of monitors and screens with 
what appear to be auditions for the roles of the main character Aki and the figure of God as 
well as for Aki's imaginary girl friend Anne, who is played by a young woman actually 
present in the gallery. The work unsettles thus, in rather different ways than the more recent 
works, the distinctions of the positions and the realms of fictional characters, performers and 
viewers. This work is not discussed any further in my thesis, but for a close reading and 
presentation of it, see Kaja Silverman, "How to Stage the Death of God", in Maria Hirvi, ed. 
Eija-Liisa Ahtila: Fantasized Persons and Taped Conversations (Helsinki: Crystal Eye & 
Kiasma, 2002). 
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FAILURES RED AND BLUE 
EIJA-liISAAHTILA TODAY (1996-7) 
The girl in a red shirt, Vera in her faded red shirt and room, Dad in his wet 
blueness and finally Elisa. I have mapped out different kinds of failures to 
become part of an image as a coherent subject. In this mapping I have also 
revealed my own disrupted attempts to fit the red shirts into theoretical 
models. The characters slip from the conceptual frames I keep constructing. 
The embodied presence of the characters resists capture by representations, 
both by my descriptive accounts and conceptual readings. Perhaps the 
above attempts to frame the figures with the notion of mimicry are similarly 
unconvincing. They do not succeed in capturing the operations in the works. 
Are these failures taking me somewhere? 
What failure means here, in the context of mimicry and stain(s), needs in 
itself to be questioned. As outlined earlier, mimicry is approached by both 
Elizabeth Grosz and Kaja Silverman in relation to representation and subject 
formation, which are inseparably tied together here. But what the former 
associates with psychosis is considered by the latter as a seemingly normal, 
or even necessary, function for the subject. This brings us to the paradox at 
the heart of subjectivity. Mimicry is a process, where the subject in order to 
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be recognised negotiates one's position within the field of visibility in relation 
to the cultural stain. As will be argued here, in this process what is 
considered normal seems to hold hands with the abnormal, ideal being 
inseparable from its other. 
Lacan also links stain to mimicry, stressing that the subject situates oneself 
in the picture as a stain.139 He focuses on Caillois' discussion of mimetic 
activity in terms of camouflage: 
"The effect of mimicry is camouflage, in the strictly technical sense. It 
is not a question of harmonizing with the background but, against a 
mottled background, of becoming mottled - exactly like the technique 
of camouflage practised in human warfare."140 
According to this, mimicry is not a blending in with the surroundings as such, 
but an act of taking on and emphasising certain attributes of one's 
environment. In terms of human subjects and the cultural stain this could 
mean assuming qualities that frame a specific kind of a subject. Mimicry 
refers, thus, to the imitation of the subject's environment and, in my 
understanding, also to culture, its codes and norms. The embodied beings 
appear in the visual sphere as material stains that more or less successfully 
fit into the picture. They attempt to become part of the representation of this 
space without, however, being totally absorbed into it. They try and adapt 
themselves to the stain that creates an illusion of order, harmony, stability 
and transparency of reality. When this mimicry somehow fails the stain 
becomes a site of disruption, a material spot that ruptures the unity of the 
surface, a stain on stain. 
On the other hand, mimicry always fails to some extent. Repetition, miming, 
is never perfect copying, as underlined by Irigaray's mimesis (discussed in 
depth in the Introduction). It causes inevitably some, however slight, shifts 
and leaves a gap or a residue. All of the cases discussed above could be 
seen as suitably imperfect examples of this failure. This inevitable inability to 
139 Lacan 1981,98. 
140 Ibid., 99. 
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reach perfection and to create stability causes endless repetition. The 
smoothness of the stain demands constant layering to cover up any alarming 
fractures. Yet, in this process the stain can at any moment form a troubling 
point of thickness, making a reference to something unmarked by the picture. 
Mimicry reveals, thus, that solid borders are an illusion reinforced by the 
attempts to fit into the cultural stain so as to gain a subject position that can 
be recognised by others. Therefore mimicry simultaneously undoes what it is 
constructing. The illusion of stability seems to be achieved only at the cost of 
this very solidity. Miming can be seen as a constant struggle between the two 
poles of the stain, the unifying filter and the disruptive clot. Merging in totally 
to the smooth surface of the cultural stain one risks losing oneself, one's 
borders and unity, and becoming part of the space, exchangeable with any 
other object in this plane of representation. As one resists this absorption 
one's presence becomes a material spot, a stain that disrupts the 
transparency and may slip out of the grasp of signification. 
Vera, Dad and Elisa would seem to be at the other extreme in the process of 
mimicry from the girl in Today, who appears as a disruptive stain in her red 
shirt. But these two poles cannot be opposed quite this easily as Elisa's case, 
in particular, makes clear. Vera, Dad and Elisa are all caught up in this 
precarious and rather unbalanced equilibrium, which may, in the end, be the 
closest we get to any kind of stability in the representation of subjects. Are 
these characters all just examples of the ultimately psychotic nature of the 
subject positions on offer? Elisa, Vera and Dad deal with the blurring 
boundaries, between inside and outside, self and other, by different means. 
Vera and her father aim to secure the boundary between their domestic 
spaces and the external world, private and public. They have become one 
with their own spaces and the boundaries of their selves seem to have 
shifted to the borders of these spaces. Elisa darkens her house, closing off 
the visual, in order to get away from the confusing distinctions vision 
presents her. In the dark simultaneity is allowed and borders do not matter 
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anymore. She may, thus, inhabit the sphere of the unmarked, where exterior 
and interior cannot be strictly separated. 141 
Where do we draw the borderline between normality and psychosis, 
successful subject position and a failure, here? Have these characters all 
been devoured and replaced by the surrounding spaces? Or, by the cultural 
demands posed on gendered subjects? These may be cases of human 
subject's experience (in schizophrenia) of depersonalisation, which Caillois 
links to mimicry: 
"He tries to look at himself from any point whatever in space. He feels 
himself becoming space, dark space where things cannot be put. He 
is similar, not similar to something, but just similar."142 
Are Vera, Dad and Elisa yet "just similar", even if their mimicry has taken 
them close to blending in with their spaces? They seem to be still similar to 
something - the cultural stain, such as the gender roles and attributes that I 
can recognise. Similarity, thus, both promises a shared ground that makes 
the characters readable and differentiates them slightly from the cultural 
points of reference. They are not quite the same but similar to aspects of 
their surroundings, to the gendered attributes, or to the concepts I apply to 
them. Their similarity to something marks a space of resemblance, a spacing 
that allows for engagement, yet not for fusion. They are not fully captured 
and merged together with their surroundings, the positions of others, the 
coloured fields, or the conceptual frames proposed here. Rather than failure, 
this may point at a rupture, a potential opened up and kept open by similarity. 
141 The threat that darkness poses for the opposition of a being and its environment, is also 
discussed by Caillois. In contrast to light space that is eliminated by objects, darkness 
touches, envelopes and even penetrates the subject, he claims.141 This threat is alluded to in 
various ways in the cases of Vera and Elisa. Blueness seems to take over as Vera sleeps 
and her embodied being is literally naked, without the cover of the soothing red stain. Her 
voice-over refers to collapsing boundaries while the image moves out to a cityscape. Elisa in 
contrast chooses to retreat to darkness, to its borderlessness. 
142 Ibid. 
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RESISTING RED 
Susanna in The Wind crushes lipsticks, cuts up a red quilt, shies away 
from the redness that slowly takes over her otherwise blue room. She 
seems to resist all things red, possibly recognising their staining effect. 
Her relationship to both the colour red and to her space is troubled, 
charged with anxiety and defiance. 
EIJA-li ISA AHTILA THE WIND (2002) 
I leap away from the red shirts for a moment, focusing rather on the 
resistance to red. This is not only a matter of accident and pure chance, nor 
is it determined by a body that does not conform. The stain and its absorbing 
power can also be actively resisted. This carries the risk of leading to a fall 
out of the safety net of signification and representation.143 It is a matter of a 
creative balancing act in order to remain within the reach of the cultural stain 
and its languages, but still effectively undoing and reworking them. One is 
also inevitably dependent on others, their willingness and capacity to rethink, 
when the expectations are not quite fulfilled. 
Mimicry is limited to what is recognisable and readable at a given time, i.e. to 
the existing image repertoire and its codes. Otherwise one fails to gain 
ratification as a subject, as Silverman claims. 144 According to her, resistance 
of imaginary capture by images allows one to work with them, but: "active 
position in the field of vision entails, as well, a constant disruptive and 
transformative labor at the site of ideality". Awareness of our ideological 
baggage is crucial. Instead of denial or avoidance of this powerful imagery it 
143 Further focus on communication and signification in the chapters 3a . Thinking Aloud and 
3b. Witnessing. 
144 See e.g. Silverman 1996,204-5. 
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needs to be tackled, exposing our desire to fit the ideal mould(s} and, 
simultaneously, deconstructing this desire and its object(s}.145 
89 
Like all repetition, mimicry always carries with it elements of change and 
potential of subversion, as argued earlier. It can be thought away from 
passivity as well as from the reinforcement of certain power structures etc. It 
also challenges the understanding of surface and surface effects such as 
resemblance as opposed to a core or an essence. Mimicry can, thus, be 
seen also as a strategy, "at once a mode of appropriation and of resistance", 
as Homi Bhabha claims in The Location of Culture (1994). Inactive repetition 
turns to agency, "the disciplined to the desiring".146 Referring to Lacan he 
stresses that "mimicry is like camouflage, not a harmonization or repression 
of difference, but a form of resemblance". Its in-built threat lies in the possible 
"prodigious and strategic production of conflictual, fantastic, discriminatory 
'identity effects"', which reveal there to be no hidden essence. 147 Mimicry 
functions as constant repetition of the same yet it depends on a production of 
its difference, excess or slippage, Bhabha argues. He offers another spin to 
the critical reading of the logic of the same and unveils more weak hinges in 
its workings, as he argues that in colonial mimicry the other is not produced 
as an opposite, a mirror like the sexual other, but as a subject of difference, 
recognisable as not-quite-the-same.148 This allows for a reconsideration of 
not only otherness but the production of subjectivity in terms of the repetition 
of the same that appears to be based on a subtle displacement. This 
"culture's double bind" that Bhabha refers to haunts mimicry.149 To be 
recognisable one must be nearly the same, so as to remain distinguishable 
as an individual. To become a picture, but still subtly stand out from it. Failure 
145 Ibid., 206. 
146 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London & New York: Routledge, 1994), 120. 
147 Ibid., 90. Bhabha writes about mimicry in the context of post-colonial discourse. He refers 
to colonial mimicry as "one of the most elusive and effective strategies of colonial power and 
knowledge". He discussed mimicry thus as a strategy of power that, however, hides within it 
possible sites of disruption. Ibid., 85. See also the notion of seepage as considered in post-
colonial discourse, e.g. Liang 2005, and leakage in the context of sexual difference as 
discussed here in the chapter 2a. No-Thing Leaking. Post-colonial and feminist rethinking of 
mimicry allow for potentially productive overlaps and slippages, yet a detailed comparison 
remains outside the scope of this thesis. 
148 Bhabha 1994, 86. 
149 Ibid., 137. 
THE GIRL: STAINING 90 
appears as both the norm and the exception. Instead of perfect copying and 
posing the unspoken ideal seems to be a perfect unnoticeable failure. 15o But 
where goes the line between a successful failure and a disruptive one? 
This line may be treaded as well as crossed to the side of disruption in The 
Wind, where the young woman and her space, or her interior states and her 
room, blur together. Notably, this does not take place simply in terms of a 
coloured smooth stain. Instead of passive submission to the unsustainable 
expectations and models she is offered by the cultural stain, she is fighting 
back. The room appears to have become the externalised internal space of 
her subjectivity, yet more of a battle ground than a fortress. Here anarchy 
creates new structures, and the distinction of order and disorder is thoroughly 
questioned. Is this externalised internal sphere actually a challenge to the 
notion of subjectivity where mind and body are in an uneasy imbalance? 
Susanna in The Wind presents us with a model of the self as a space where 
embodied relations to others are internalised, and these internal elements 
again externalised - where outside and inside, body and mind are not 
opposable and separable, but woven intricately into each other. Everything 
appears visible and to do with relations - to the surroundings and to others. 
Here her embodied being occupies the space of her subjectivity, which 
appears to us as her room. She lets the outside in, to her self/space, instead 
of barricading the boundary. Whether this openness is voluntary and 
productive remains unclear. Can a failure to keep boundaries intact be a 
mode of defiance in itself, or does it escalate into reactive refusal? 
150 Pose can at times reveal awkwardness, a disjunction between the aspiration to become 
an image and the resistance presented by materiality. This appears to be appropriated by 
many of Ahtila's characters. They often address the camera slightly too directly, and then at 
times stand out, reach out to us and step on the hazy borderline that is supposed to 
distinguish the fictional realm and the viewer's space-time. As the Girl in Today speaks to 
the camera, standing still and addressing us, this immobility in the moving image makes 
strange the act of posing. It makes the girl stand out from her surroundings even more. In a 
way she turns her surroundings into a picture, or a stage, by not fitting into it smoothly. See 
also Barthes' claim that the pose is denied by the continuous series of images in cinema. 
Barthes 2000, 78. 
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Susanna's relation to her own body appears, however, polluted. The world 
stains her hands, in the form of newspaper ink, and she cannot put her 
hands in her mouth, she complains. Crushing lipsticks, making her own order 
out of chaos, she challenges the norms, but her resistance may be merely 
reactive. She cuts a red quilt into strips proclaiming triumphantly that in 
psychosis she really feels able to rebel against and change the reality she 
does not accept. In the parallel image next to her the strip appears to be 
folding back into the whole. Her action appears to have no lasting effect. The 
same redness creeps into her space and surrounds her in an intimate 
moment with a man, an intellectual companion, who rejects her desire to get 
closer to him. A corner of the room, where three teenage girls are gathered, 
baths in red sensuous light in the same scene. Is she rejecting the red stain 
of femininity, the fate and ideals projected onto her, as well as their effect on 
her? In the end of The Wind Susanna strikes to the heart of the matter. Is 
she one of the many that are dirty and need to be kept in check, or even got 
rid off: 
"Then I told him what he wanted, that what is polluted is dirty; it is 
worthless and even dangerous, it leaves a stain - like lots of us - and 
doesn't deserve respect. I mean who really are the guilty ones here? 
He should concentrate on that, when he's in that sort of position, how 
the trash is being sold to the Third World and how they manage to 
carry it there." 
As worthless and dangerous, unclean, does she threaten borders, the order 
he, who is referred to here, wants to sustain? "Filth is not a quality in itself, 
but it applies only to what relates to a boundary", Kristeva writes following 
Mary Douglas's argument in Purity and Danger (1984 }.151 If Susanna is one 
of the others that leave a stain, she is allocated the material side of 
oppositions that flows over in its irrationality and needs to be controlled. She 
may be miming this position until it escapes from its frame and reveals its in-
built contradictions. Or, perhaps she refuses to carry this dirt appointed to 
her, this role of the feminine - the role that is being sold to all others. 
151 Kristeva 1982,69. See also Douglas 1984. 
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She climbs to a dark blue corner of her room, while the space gains more 
intense tone of red. She refuses to be(come) a woman, to blend in with the 
redness. Repetition, mimicry, turns into refusal. She becomes a stain, she 
stains. Yet, does she set things around her in motion, as a stain on stain? Is 
her defiance in the end creative and productive, or merely reactive? Does 
she end up literally cornered, locked inside her space and within the frames 
of representations she resists? There must be other modes of resistance that 
activate the potential of resemblance in mimicry, rather than revert to 
negation. 
ON THE BRIDGE IN RED 
A woman, lines, crawls with determination over a bridge in a red shirt, 
dragging her red bag along. Having passed the water and safely 
above solid ground again, she stands up, straightens her clothes and 
walks on. Defying the judgement of others she continues to do what 
she feels necessary: "I realised that I looked mad. That that's where 
the madness is. Or is it just me? I don't know. Still, they let me do what 
I'm supposed to." 
EIJA- liISA AHTILA THE PRESENT (THE BRIDGE) (2001 ) 
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If madness is in the field of visibility, it must also be open for challenge. If the 
border between sanity and insanity is crossed in the visible, what remains 
invisible? When lines consciously chooses to act in a manner that looks mad, 
what do I actually see, witness? Does madness lie in the visual evidence 
itself? This draws attention to the boundaries of and in the visible. In The 
Bridge, a part of Ahtila's installation Present, lines takes me onto the 
borderline of visibility and sanity, defying demands to keep it intact, to either 
cross it or stay on one side of it. Rethinking the possibilities of resistance and 
mobilisation of the rigid oppositions I return to the abject (discussed earlier, in 
the chapter 2a. No-Thing Leaking). I try and think it away from horror that is 
persistently attached to threatened boundaries. 
Whereas lines challenges this border within the visible, Elisa in The House 
leaps out of the visible altogether. Are their problems and reactions rooted 
somehow differently in the limits of subjectivity and the abject, unbound 
relation to the world? In the case of Elisa's break away from the normative 
model of subjectivity, she seems to become a space for the world to fill, a site 
where all orders collapse. But this does not have to be seen as passive 
victimhood. Elisa actively reconfigures an alternative way to relate to and to 
understand the reality she is entangled with(in) while looking seems 
increasingly unsatisfactory. Even if not a cause for unquestioned celebration, 
this reaction to the unbearable limits of the available modes of symbolization 
that have no means to deal with blurring boundaries, can be seen as active 
and creative. Elisa attempts calmly to ward off this confusion by eliminating 
the field of vision, as this is where the blurring boundaries cause most trouble 
and where they also seem to stem from. Her method suggests that the 
subject may not completely disintegrate together with the blurring 
boundaries. 
Elisa and lines don't seem to have to fight against the loss of clear 
boundaries and keep reinforcing them anymore. A subjectivity of some kind 
may also be gained through other relations to the boundaries. Non-
distinctiveness of boundaries and borders passable in both directions are 
linked to the beginning, or before, of subject formation in Kristeva's 
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discussion of the abject. 152 This mode of being one with the world is 
threatening as passivity, loss of clear form and even of being.153 If this state 
of fluid boundaries is, however, thought of as something ever-present in 
subjects, it cannot be reached through some act of return or by stripping 
away all the attributes of subjectivity one has gathered around oneself. If it is 
always a haunting possibility, a hidden condition of the subject, how else 
could it be thought? According to Kristeva jouissance, that exhilarating 
be(com)ing one with the world, demands an abjection that cancels out 
identity.154 Isn't this opposition again another example of the fundamental 
paradox the prevailing model of subjectivity is built on? Does the experience 
of blurring boundaries necessarily pose such a devastating risk for one's 
identity? Or, does it demand rethinking of subjectivity in terms of an intimate 
entanglement with the world rather than in terms of identity?155 Failures and 
resistances in the negotiation with the stain could be seen as ways of 
constantly remapping one's borders and relation to the world, even if 
admitting that one cannot survive total and permanent loss of boundaries. 
The notion of stain allows for a shift away from both the linear model of 
development and the threat of unintelligible matter that haunt the abject. 
The conceptual frame of the abject does not describe sufficiently the 
complexity of the cases of the women in red shirts. What is at stake here, I 
claim, is a different kind of a challenge to the limits of visibility and 
intelligibility. Defying the economy of visibility they may be referring to the 
problematics of no-thing ness instead of fluidity and operating, therefore, as 
disruptive stains which cannot be reduced to the excessive matter and/or 
feminine that the abject is closely associated with. 
152 E.g. Kristeva 1982, 61. 
153 Kristeva writes e.g. about "the temptation to return, with abjection and jouissance, to that 
passivity status with the symbolic function, where the subject, fluctuating between inside and 
outside, pleasure and pain, word and deed, would find death, along with nirvana." Ibid., 63. 
154 "the advent of one's own identity demands a law that mutilates, whereas jouissance 
demands an abjection from which identity becomes absent." Ibid., 54. 
155 See discussion later, in the chapters 3a. Thinking Aloud and 3b. Witnessing on e.g. Jean-
Luc Nancy's notions of being-with and community, Nancy 2000. 
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At the level of the stain we find, according to Lacan, the tychic point, the point 
of encounter with the real. 156 The point that escapes from the structures of 
the symbolic order could be thought of as a space of jouissance. This implies 
that the stain, which separates representation from the real and mediates all 
of the subject's relations, carries also with it some fractures, openings out of 
the ali-encompassing frame of representation. These openings are, however, 
not to be understood here in my argument as bridges to some true essence. 
The stain has to be thought in the never-ending process of mimicry as not 
merely remaining on the level of constant re-signification and re-
representation. Boundaries can be considered in terms of another notion of a 
surface. Thinking through the paradoxes of the stain subjectivity may be 
approached as something flexible, with borders to be negotiated, not 
barricaded - or, boundaries as sites of contact to be inhabited. My bounds, 
as no longer those of a detached viewer or reader, are entwined in this 
negotiation. 
All of Ahtila's characters discussed above hover on the borderlines in their 
own distinct ways. I have been tempted to distinguish the productive modes 
of resistance from reactive ones, only to discover how counterproductive this 
is. Ahtila's works can be said to present the many forms and processes that 
subjectivity goes through on these borderlines. They question in various 
subtle ways how normality can be distinguished from the pathological. Yet, I 
argue that they neither claim to define nor call for interpretations of any 
problematic, prevailing or possible modes of subjectivity as such. Perhaps 
they simply invite the viewer to inhabit the boundaries too. Is this were my 
encounters with the works as well as my critical thought take place? 
My RED SHIRT 
It is time to direct the focus to my own red shirt, which was listed amongst the 
other red shirts in the beginning of this chapter. After presenting my paper on 
156 Lacan 1981,77. 
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the red shirt I was congratulated on the performative gesture, the way I had 
discreetly woven my own embodied being into the discussion of the Girl. I 
was caught in action - the red shirt I unintentionally wore revealed my failure 
to bridge the analytical distance between the object of my study and I. I was 
not writing with, but about the work of Ahtila. Or, I was unaware of actually 
writing with the work. The artwork and my work were secretly 
communicating, as if behind my back, and making their mark on me. Old 
habits die hard and so I did not only add this unplanned performative aspect 
to my presentation once, but twice. This failure to acknowledge my own part 
in the multifaceted process of engagement also revealed a level of success, 
of which I could not take all the credit for myself. There was no denying, I had 
been absorbed into the parade of red stains under investigation. 
What is my position in relation to the stain, as a viewer and a writer? The 
stain is necessary for an image, or any object/subject, as it would not be 
comprehensible without this filter that resides not only in the object itself but 
also in its encounters with the viewer. Both the smooth workings of the stain 
and its sudden interruptions are made possible in the viewer's engagement 
with the image, in the exchanges that are never quite the same. The stain is 
to some extent a shared screen of cultural codes that makes communication 
possible. Yet, it may point towards sharing on another level than that of 
signification too, as the disruptive stains, in particular, suggest. 
My relation to the red shirt cannot be considered here without a reference to 
Roland Barthes's notion of punctum. Barthes defines two different elements 
that direct his reading of photographs: studium and punctum. Studium in its 
references to education, knowledge and civility seems like the cultural stain 
or image-repertoire through which one has to negotiate one's access to 
subjectivity and signification, and to an illusion of mastery.157 Punctum, then 
again, is something that breaks the studium, "rises from the scene, shoots 
157 Barthes writes about the studium: "it is culturally (this connotation is present in studium) 
that I participate in the figures, the faces, the gestures, the settings, the actions." Barthes 
2000,26. 
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out of it like an arrow, and pierces me."158 Barthes describes it, referring to 
the term's Latin roots, in rather fleshy terms as a sensitive point, a wound, or 
a sting, a speck, a cut, a little hole. It is not something the viewer consciously 
looks for or can master, but an "accident that pricks me (but also bruises me, 
is poignant to me)".159 In all its materiality, punctum seems to work very much 
like the disruptive stain. The relation between studium and punctum could 
also be understood in similar terms as the two aspects of the stain: It is a 
"matter of co-presence", without any set rules of connection, Barthes 
emphasises. 16o 
Studium is always culturally coded, but punctum is something 
unnameable. 161 It is often a detail, the preference of which reveals something 
about the viewer. According to Barthes there is even a risk of "giving myself 
Up".162 There is a tendency in Barthes' description of punctum to idealize, or 
even romanticise, the relation between punctum and the subject as some 
kind of a way out of the straight jacket of culture to a "primitive", pure 
vision. 163 But instead of a link to a core or truth of the subject, as Barthes 
seems to suggest, punctum could be also understood in terms of production 
of the subject within an intersubjective web of connections. This reading is 
encouraged, for example, when Barthes describes punctum as an addition 
that defies the logic of linearity and collapses oppositions of absence and 
presence, active and passive. Punctum is something the subject adds to the 
image, but which nevertheless is already there. 164 The redness links, then, 
my subjective point of view into a wider sphere of cultural signification. 
Moreover, the idea of punctum as having a "power of expansion,,165, or as a 
"subtle beyond,,166, that directs beyond the visible, opens up new paths for 
158 Ibid., 26. 
159 Ibid., 27. 
160 Ibid., 42. 
161 Ibid., 51. 
162 Ibid., 43. This could be also compared with the notion of exposure discussed throughout 
this thesis in terms of the focus on the surfaces, edges and outward orientation of 
communication and encounter. 
163 8arthes writes: "I am a primitive, a child - or a maniac; I dismiss all knowledge, all culture, 
I refuse to inherit anything from another eye than my own." Ibid., 51. 
164 Ibid., 55. 
165 Ibid., 45. 
166 Ibid., 59. 
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thinking further this encounter with the unnameable, or the unmarked. 
When something stands out for me, the viewer, the dynamics of the image 
shift dramatically and I cannot restore the smoothness of it anymore. Material 
stain disrupts and possibly alienates the spectators, but it can also call for re-
significations as well as other modes of engagements. Like punctum the 
disruptive stain marks a site of radical singularity, irreducibility to the logic of 
the same and its desire for universality. It may invite re-naming, yet it may 
also suggest other ways of taking part in the processes of readjustment 
following this rupture. This encounter is crucial to the workings and potential 
of the stain, which in both of its functions, conforming and disrupting, depend 
on the others. To understand the dynamics and potential of this engagement, 
we need to unsettle also the opposition of individual and shared. Kaja 
Silverman writes about this transformative relation to the world, as world 
spectators, that demands openness between the perceiving subject and the 
perceptual object: 
"To be open in this way means to renounce all claim to be the master 
of one's own language of desire. It means, indeed, to surrender one's 
signifying repository to the world, to become the space within which 
the world itself speaks."167 
Perspective is not only a feature of the viewing subject, but also determined 
by the objects, she adds. The world calls for "never-ending symbolization", 
but this is a constant reciprocal negotiation, Silverman argues. 168 However, it 
is not only a matter of signification, I claim. Throwing myself into this process, 
I seem to risk my detached perspective and the comfortable unquestioned 
location in relation to the surrounding space and the works encountered. This 
is the challenge that the stain presents. It is not only a mediator between one 
and the other but also a common ground where they are dependent on each 
other. 
167 Kaja Silverman, World Spectators (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2000), 
144-5. 
168 Ibid., 146. 
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Disruptive stain takes me somewhere unpredictable, like a cast of a dice that 
Barthes also refers to in his discussion of punctum. 169 In order to follow it I 
have to let go of a position of mastery. I need to give up the illusion of 
sovereign and detached perspective in order to get into contact with the stain 
in its complex appearances because, as Lacan claims, the stain "always 
escapes from the grasp of that form of vision that is satisfied with itself in 
imagining itself as consciousness.,,17D Therefore, to ask why the disruptive 
stains appear, and to try and define the operations of the stain, is beside the 
point. I can recognise my own deep-rooted desire to catch the Girl in a 
complex conceptual net of stains. I have, however, failed in this. The 
investigation triggered off by the girl in a red shirt has not only given me more 
evidence of the disruptive potential that the unmarked being of the Girl 
presents. Instead of focusing my attention on the no-thingness of her 
embodied being, the red shirt mobilised all the other characters as well as 
myself, with or without red shirts. In the process all unquestioned 
assumptions and meanings attached to various visual details were opened 
for challenge. No-one, no-thing, seems to fit in perfectly anymore. 
The red shirt in Today, an element not central to the narrative or culturally 
valorised in any particular way, has drawn my focus to it. It has disrupted 
both the flow of linear narrative and the culturally assigned position of the 
viewer as a distanced reader of the image. It makes space for are-evaluation 
of the borderlines and offers different strategies for inhabiting the supposedly 
impenetrable solid structures and boundaries within the field of vision, yet 
without the necessity to rely on some notion of matter outside and/or before 
representation. The red shirt works as a potential point of departure, if I have 
the courage to explore the unmarked, and to refrain from naming it too 
eagerly. Maybe the red shirt has set in motion a process of becoming, in 
Gilles Deleuze's and Felix Guattari's terms: 
"We can be thrown into a becoming by anything at all, by the most 
unexpected, most insignificant of things. You don't deviate from the 
169 Barthes 2000. 27. 
170 Lacan 1981,74. 
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majority unless there is a little detail that starts to swell and carries you 
Where is this little detail carrying me then? Red begins to stand out from 
more and more places. The red shirt and red stripy curtains in The House, 
the red quilt and light in The Wind .... Am I forcing too loaded, too far-fetched, 
meanings onto details that are just arbitrary and unintentional? Or, am I 
simply discovering aspects built into the visual works, finding the clues 
hidden there for me to uncover? Or, tapping into a vein of cultural 
unconscious that is shared to some extent by the work and I? These 
questions are misleading, as it does not seem to be a matter of interpretation 
or unveiling of what is in the work, in me, or in our common cultural ground. It 
is a matter of being called for and of responding to this address. It is to be 
haunted, as discussed in the next chapter. 
Attempt at capture is not an answer to this call. The argument has developed 
in this chapter through close, rather descriptive, readings of Ahtila's works. 
These engagements with the characters have not, however, illustrated 
conceptual models of subject formation in the field of visibility. Nor have they 
caught the operations of the works in specific theoretical frames. The 
readings have rather kept my thought on the move thanks to the very 
resistance the works have presented to the reductive explanations in the 
proposed terms. These accounts may have, thus, opened up a space of 
resemblance between the art works and the theoretical concepts and 
questions. Something emerges there - not merely an understanding of 
resistance in mimicry, but resistance itself, in action. Mimicry gestures here, 
in my descriptive accounts, beyond the frame of representation. My 
implication in the stain is not only a question of signification, but involves a 
challenge to enter this space of resemblance and rupture - to be drawn onto 
my bounds, into a sudden proximity. 
171 Deleuze & Guattari 1988, 292. 
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EIJA-LIISA AHTILA THE HOUSE (2002) 
In the three-screen installation a woman drives to a house in the middle of 
the woods. On entering she describes the house in relation to its 
surroundings and to her routines in it. Her observations map a gradually 
increasing confusion of boundaries. First the sound of the car follows her 
inside the house, she claims. A dog seen outdoors through the window runs 
suddenly in the house, while the woman talks about the room having lost its 
walls. 
She tells us that sounds are crossing bounds and losing their coordinates in 
the visual. Her voice fluctuates between a voice-over and direct address of 
the camera. At times she is mute in one image while speaking in another, or 
viewed in adjacent images from two distinct perspectives and in slightly 
different moments. 
The woman proceeds to darken the house with black curtains. She walks 
around with weights strapped to her ankles after a brief flight outdoors. She 
continues to talk about her deepening sense of uncertainty, also of her own 
position, as voices from elsewhere and of other people fill her. As her last 
words she states: "good, really good". At the end we are left with images of a 
farm, a grouping of buildings. 
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2c. HAUNTING 
THE POSSESSED 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA TODAY (1996-7) 
The figure of the Girl is often closely related to ghosts and other supernatural 
phenomena. The Girl as the ultimate figure of innocence is emphasised to 
the point of extreme cliches in horror film tradition. Uncorrupted by bodily 
desires and drives, still pure soul and clean spirit, she attracts all perversion 
and evil. Thus, she reveals her vulnerability and need of protection. She is 
the little poor (no}thing, the possessed, that from an innocent angel 
unexpectedly turns into an evil, destructive spirit become flesh (e.g. The 
Exorcist, directed by William Friedkin, 1973). She draws evil spirits to her like 
a magnet (e.g. Poltergeist, by Tobe Hooper, 1982). Sometimes she 
possesses telekinetic and other powers that turn her into a destructive 
monster in the face of repression (e.g. Carrie, by Brian de Palma, 1976). Or, 
she returns to haunt as a dispossessed soul, who cannot leave the material 
world for good and rest in peace until the evil done to her innocent embodied 
THE GIRL: HAUNTING 103 
being has been paid for (e.g. Shining, by Stanley Kubrick, 1980). Yet these 
figures of girls as ghosts and monsters in cinema, and other horror stories, 
often aim at exorcising the ghost that the Girl actually is. They give her form 
and frame her so that these figures end up reinforcing the paradoxical 
position of a disembodied embodiment of innocence and virginity. 
So, what do girls do in horror? They smooth over any potential ruptures but, 
simultaneously, dwell in the threat and fascination of collapsing boundaries. 
These monstrous girl-ghosts haunt and are haunted. They appear as sites, 
where boundaries are challenged, and reinforced again with renewed vigour. 
They act as further proof of the necessity to guard the limits around and 
within the girls. Simultaneously these figures betray the worrying fragility of 
these borders and the order supported by them. These ghostly figures may 
be too perfect a match for the Girl: formless form, disembodied body, not-yet 
and not-anymore. Can these figures be appropriated somehow in the 
exploration of the disruptive potential of the Girl? 
I will focus first specifically on the possession story. In the narratives of 
possession girls before puberty, when their sexuality has not yet been 
awakened and the reproductive function of their embodied being established, 
provide material for appropriation and inhabitation. The body of the 
possessed girl is an open container, a passive and easily occupied vessel, or 
a tool for someone else's self-expression and action. When they have 
reached womanhood, they serve as nursing containers in the reproduction of 
demons and angels alike, such as in another horror classic, Rosemary's 
Baby (by Roman Polanski, 1968). But does not the Girl offer a very different 
kind of a vessel than the figure of the Woman? The strong presence of the 
girls in horror films seems to attest to some specificity that makes them fitting 
for this genre, and particularly for certain roles in it, distinguishing them from 
women? Therefore, it is surprising to discover how very little has been written 
about these girls in horror films. When they do appear in the discussion their 
distinction from adult femininity, female body and subjectivity, is hardly under 
scrutiny. 
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In the most renowned version of the possession story in horror film genre, 
The Exorcist, a young girl's, Regan's, body is a site of violent 
transformations, a battle ground. I sacrifice here to some extent Regan's 
embodied being, the singularity of which has been sacrificed already anyhow 
within the conventions of horror film, and appropriate her in my own story of 
the Girl, where many of the introduced figures in red shirts will get to play the 
leading roles. 
The transitional phase of teenage, and menstruation as its most charged 
symptom, figure often in horror films. In The Monstrous-Feminine (1993) 
Barbara Creed draws attention to the significance of Regan's age, as she is 
just about to turn thirteen and hovers, thus, on the threshold of puberty. 
According to Creed we are witnessing a representation of a struggle between 
subject and abject, the site of which is the girl's body, "a body in revolt".172 Is 
there any way of thinking away from this reinforced separation of body and 
subject? Here the body is a trap that captures and becomes possessed. The 
girl herself, Regan, appears to be a subject trapped, somehow tied to yet 
separate from her body. Or, maybe she is merely the body, nothing more 
than her no-thing ness. 
Carol C. Clover claims in her discussion of the possession genre in Men, 
Women, and Chainsaws (1992) that "some women are more open than 
others", referring to the long history of various mystical and medical believes 
regarding the openness of female body during menstruation to possession 
and other effects of threatening forces. 173 But is the Girl's openness really 
comparable to that of the Woman? The Girl seems to be portrayed in horror, 
as well as in its critical interpretations, again as merely a to-be-woman. Or, is 
it the Girl's indefinability that deems her more open for possession? In 
teenage she gains a signifiable body as a woman, but before that her 
disembodiment may be the actual lure and promise of free entry. The Girl 
here appears as an empty territory to be occupied either by forces from 
172 Barbara Creed, The Monstrous-Feminine: Film, Feminism, Psychoanalysis (London & 
New York: Routledge, 1993),40. 
173 Carol J. Clover, Men, Women, and Chainsaws: Gender in the Modem Horror Film 
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outside or by the awakening internal forces of female sexuality. She herself 
remains a passive, innocent victim, but her vulnerability to these possessions 
may, however, also unveil the threat she poses. 
In The Exorcist the girl seems to be pure matter for the demon to occupy. 
When possessed, she can only express herself by calling for help in faint 
handwriting that appears just above her belly button, in flesh pushing against 
her skin from inside the body. This could be read as a sign of the active role 
of the body, as a reminder of the importance of embodiment as inseparable 
part of subjectivity, never totally occupied nor repressed. Or, is this just 
another example of the Girl's body as pure unmarked matter, waiting to be 
given form and function as maternal-feminine? 
In her reading of the scene Clover argues that the female body is in this 
genre of films put to trial and made to "speak its secrets". After all kinds of 
trials from medical tests to religious protocol Regan's body finally "becomes 
readable", her "skin is made to speak the truth about what it hides".174 But is 
this really just any female body? And what is the truth that the skin could 
speak here? It could be the truth of a girl becoming captive in her own body 
and the signifying form given to it in teenage. Whose truth is this? 
Barbara Creed's reading of this scene emphasises that the girl is "trapped 
inside her own body, a prisoner of her own carnality".175 Her possession is 
overtly sexual and touches on a number of taboos around female sexuality. 
Creed argues that she becomes both a "castrating girl/woman" and "a figure 
of extreme abjection as her body is transformed into a playground for bodily 
wastes". She claims that the girl "is possessed not by the devil but by her 
own unsocialised body". 176 The Girl and the Woman are conflated here 
problematically into a single castrating and abject figure. Is it not the 
~Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 77. 
74 Ibid., 80-82. 
175 Creed 1993,41. 
176 Creed 1993, 40. In the heart of Creed's discussion is a claim that the girl is actually 
possessed with "an incestuous longing. Regan's descent into the realm of abjection enables 
her to speak her desires". Ibid., 41. 
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Woman's unsocialised body that is actually marked, and socialised, exactly 
as abject, too close to nature? The Girl's body could be seen as something 
else, predating this marking, still unmarked. This no-thingness haunts the 
possession story. It resists all attempts to make it readable. All we get is the 
heavily masked monster-look or the innocent girl before and after the attack. 
Or a red shirt. 
Maybe the red shirt of the girl in Today (1996-7), who appears to be also on 
the verge of puberty, functions then as a mask, as an impenetrable surface. 
It refers to the body and draws the girl out as a disruptive being, a material 
stain. It is not simply the body that cannot be represented in its dynamic 
processes and fleshiness, but the embodied being. The menstrual blood is 
often taken to encapsulate the painful shift, the discovery of the gendered 
body, its demands and limits. Yet here we only have a representation of this 
representation, the code of redness disentangled from its intimate link with 
flesh and the interior of the body. 
GHOSTLY STAINS 
The girl haunts her father's story in Today as a red stain. In the 
corners and doorways, she hovers at the edges of the scenes. She 
looks at and speaks about her father, but he does not seem to notice 
her presence. As a narrator in her father's and grandfather's tragedy, 
involved yet detached, she inhabits the border, where the fictional 
realm and the time-space of the viewers meet. She is a mediator, 
neither here nor there, present nor absent. Is she a ghost? 
THE GIRL: HAUNTING 107 
EIJA- liISA AHTILA TODA Y (1996-7) 
The smoothness of the stain is haunted by the possibility of a disruption, an 
appearance of a point of material thickness, a stain on stain. This stain is like 
a ghost, whose sudden reappearance sends tremors through the harmonious 
order and balance of things. It cannot be exorcised, neither anticipated nor 
appropriated, but it keeps returning in new ruptures. The stain could be, thus, 
associated with Jacques Derrida's notion of the ghost, or the specter(s). 
Derrida's specter is always more than one, and no more one.177 It haunts all 
structures of hegemony, solidity, and order, setting all oppositions in motion 
and resisting constant attempts from all directions to conjure and exorcise it -
critical analysis and observation battles with it, either trying to domesticate it 
within clarity of forms or to deport it. 178 
Is the specter just another conceptual tool for approaching the unnameable, 
the unmarked, that threatens the binary order? That which has been here 
already named, in an effort not to name, both abject and stain. The 
appearance of the ghost, like that of the stain and of the abject, does not fill 
the criteria of flesh. Instead, they reveal the inadequacy of the prevailing 
177 Derrida refers to the spirits as "the more than one/no more one [Ie plus dun]". Derrida 
1994, xx. 
178 E.g. Derrida 1994, 165. 
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understanding of the body and matter as the negative of the mind. The abject 
reminds of the irreducible fluidity and uncontrollable force of matter to 
change, to cause change, to overflow. The stain also allows this radical 
materiality of all embodied subjects to not exactly come into view, but to 
disrupt the whole notion of a view by performing yet another effortless 
escape. The specter could be seen to play with this same disappearing act, 
as Derrida argues: 
"For there is no ghost, there is never any becoming-specter of the 
spirit without at least an appearance of flesh, in a space of invisible 
visibility, like the dis-appearing of an apparition. For there to be a 
ghost, there must be a return to the body, but to a body that is more 
abstract than ever."179 
Derrida's ghost calls for abstract materiality that collapses the order of 
oppositions. Appearing as an apparition, instead of a solid formed matter, it 
seems to tease the viewers, laughing at our inability to see matter - like the 
Girl, whose embodied being escapes from the grasp of representations. Are 
the girls in red shirts, thus, appearances of no-thing? 
The abject seems too closely defined, given formless form, in its association 
with the porous borders of the body. The stain, then again, allows us to think 
this haunting on the boundaries of the embodied subject, while the notion of 
the ghost inhabits all areas of knowledge and vision, the in-between of all 
structures and orders. The stain may allow me to rethink the Girl away from 
both the determined to-be-womanhood as well as from the abstraction of the 
line of flight. 18o Maybe the red shirt, or the stain, as it appears in my 
investigation here, is a kind of a ghost. It may be one of the many specters, 
but also more than one, no more one. As a ghost it haunts the borders of 
representation and threatens all attempts to take possession of the world and 
one's place in it through a centred perspective. As Derrida claims, to possess 
179 Ibid., 126. 
180 See discussion of Deleuze's and Guattari's notion of the Girl as a line of flight and a 
fugitive being in the chapter 2a. No-Thing Leaking. Deleuze & Guattari 1988, 271, 277. 
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the specter means to be possessed by it.181 Trying to grasp some kind of hold 
of the Girl I am haunted by her with increasing intensity. 
As Ahtila presents these ghost-like figures that slip from the viewer's grasp 
time after time, she denies me a coherent viewpoint and my vision begins to 
stumble. A ghost does not seem to respect, or maybe even know of, any 
manners and rules that hold the boundaries erect, untouched. Is Elisa in The 
House (2002), then, a ghost as well as a red stain? Boundaries collapse 
around and within her. I see her sewing black curtains, but next to this image 
two scenes are haunted by her absence. When the visible is finally being 
closed off by her, we see her simultaneously welcoming the darkness in a 
corner of her living room and letting the curtains down by the window. She is 
more than one, and none. The blurring of boundaries and loss of unity is 
emphasised by her experience of being a site for the world, different places 
and people, to inhabit: 
"I meet people. One at a time they step inside me and live inside me. 
Some of them only for a moment, some stay." 
EIJA-liISA AHTILA THE HOUSE (2002) 
This occupation by others can be seen as a reference to the insurmountable 
contradiction the prevailing models of subjectivity present for a female 
subject. The prioritisation of mind over matter in the leading strands of 
Western thought presents a model of identity as a self-contained unit, where 
the role of the body is that of a passive container or facade for interior depth, 
the subject. But as female sex is closely associated with nature and matter, 
defined in terms of its reproductive function and maternity, the only female 
subject position offered in this oppositional logic seems to be one as an 
181 Derrida 1994, 132. 
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envelope or container for others. 182 As Luce Irigaray has argued, the 
"maternal-feminine" is a place without a place. 183 She cannot take her own 
place as her body is marked as a place for others. Maybe Elisa has taken 
this role to an extreme, now revealing in her symptoms the absurdity of this 
position? 
Elisa's symptoms refer to possession. She is not possessed by evil or any 
other supernatural forces, but by others and the world around her. As Clover 
points out, the similarities between occult horror story and psychological 
drama are obvious. Exorcism is, thus, comparable to talking cure. 184 
Normative subjectivity is disrupted by possession, but here she is not forced 
to go through exorcism. 185 There are no demands to re-stabilise her, to fit her 
into the so-called normal female subjectivity, or to make her body speak its 
truth. Is she still a victim of the paradoxical demands for her as a female 
subject to occupy the body as a subject, while also being a female 
receptacle? Or, maybe this hints at a different embodied mode of being a 
vessel: neither the maternal-feminine nor the psychotic, who has lost her own 
perspective in space. Openness to the world may not have to mean passivity 
as a vessel or a victim. 
182 In her reading of Plato and particularly his cave metaphor Luce Irigaray drew attention to 
and challenged the definition of the female sex and maternity in terms of "chora" as passive 
matter that offers a place, a receptacle, for (re)production without contributing anything to 
this process itself. Irigaray 1985a, 243-364. This has influenced a number of thinkers, 
particularly in the rethinking of the body in the 1990's. E.g. Christine Battersby discusses 
critically the model of subjectivity, where the body functions as container for the subject, in 
relation to patterns of gendered identity and embodied subjectivity. Battersby 1998, 38-60. 
Elizabeth Grosz maps out the binary of the body and mind, and the sexes, from Plato and 
Aristotle through Cartesian tradition to contemporary notions of the body as passive matter, 
an object, a vessel, or a signifying medium. Grosz 1994, 5-10. Judith Butler discusses also 
the association of maternal body and the feminine with "chora" and the suppression of it as 
passive matter, and compares here Julia Kristeva's and Irigaray's readings of "chora". Butler 
1993,27-55. 
183 Irigaray 1993a, 10. Irigaray also writes about woman as being naked without her own 
place. She has not and cannot use the surface and/or envelope that she is, so she has to 
create artificial ones, with her clothes, make-up, and jewellery. This tempts me to weave 
another link to the red shirts, which I cannot, however, develop further here. 
184 Clover 1992,67. Clover argues that "the "talking cure" film is a realistic and secular 
calque on a tradition represented in something closer to its archaic form in possession 
horror". Clover 1992, 110. 
185 See later: speech is thought away from expression of interiority in the chapter 3a. 
Thinking Aloud. 
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Female embodied subject as a vessel is vulnerable for possession by all 
kinds of trouble, by evil and insanity alike. According to Creed, "woman is 
constructed as possessed when she attacks the symbolic order, highlights its 
weaknesses, plays on its vulnerabilities".186 Is Elisa attacking the order in her 
own way? She seems to adapt to the impossible role given, challenging 
subtly its meanings and the expectations of normative mode of subjectivity in 
the process. What is at stake in this appropriation? Judith Butler examines 
critically the notion of the feminine-maternal receptacle and the dangers and 
difficulty in reclaiming it. Butler stresses that when the figure of the receptacle 
is made to stand for the excluded it excludes everything else in the feminine, 
which remains unfigurable by the figure of the receptacle. 187 Therefore the 
model of gendered subjectivity as a vessel has to be mobilised revealing its 
complexity. 
"Fine, I don't want to be in your economy anyway, and I'll show you what this 
unintelligible receptacle can do to your system", Butler captures, thus, 
"Irigaray's response to this exclusion of the feminine from the economy of 
representation" without losing sight of the troubling playfulness that entwines 
with the radical challenge it presents. 188 With strategic repetition Irigaray sets 
in motion the figure of the feminine-receptacle in its many contradictions and 
opens it for re-evaluation, which affects other figures and dichotomies 
attached to it as well. Does Elisa effectively do the same? Failing her 
mimicry, her attempt to fit into the envelope of female subjectivity Elisa 
becomes a disrupting stain. She may be proposing another way of 
understanding form, matter, in-between and boundary, shifting their relations 
as Irigaray calls us to do. 189 Failing mimicry may be read as mimesis, or at 
least as having the same effects as strategic repetition might have. 
186 Creed stresses that in this attack "she demonstrates that the symbolic order is a sham 
built on sexual repression and the sacrifice of the mother." Creed 1993,41. Is Creed not 
here, however, sacrificing the Girl, repressing her specificity? 
187 Butler distinguishes between Kristeva's and Irigaray's takes on the chora: "Whereas 
Kristeva insists upon this identification of the chora with the maternal body, Irigaray asks 
how the discourse which performs that confiation invariably produces an "outside" where the 
feminine which is not captured by the figure of the chora persists." Butler 1993, 41-2. 
188 Ibid., 45. 
189 Irigaray 1993a, 12. 
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Woman threatens with what she lacks - her own place, claims Irigaray.19o 
This may also be the threat revealed, but disavowed, in possession stories: 
the complexity of this vessel, which is not simply explainable with reference 
to the maternal and its already multiple readings from castration to nurture, 
but is entwined with even more significations, fears and ideals. Elisa's case, 
for example, may suggest a mode of subjectivity, which in its openness to the 
outside defies unity, yet is neither passive nor destructive. It could be seen in 
relation to the feminine and the maternal, but is here not specifically 
associated with them. 191 
Like a ghost Elisa seems to have a rather strange sense of space and time. 
In its indefinability the ghost relates to its environment accordingly in this 
radically borderless and unbound way. This reminds of Caillois' notion of 
mimicry and the loss of one's perspective, of becoming one with the space as 
the boundary between the subject and the space merges. Could the ghost 
provide us an example of this merging, but as another way of negotiating 
one's being in space? Being a ghost, more than one and none, challenges 
the notion of possession and allows us to think about the collapsing 
boundaries and loss of unity not only in terms of passivity and the vessel-like 
body. The ghost may entwine together the two extreme poles of the stain. 
The stain, both as cultural and as disruptive, is ghost-like, a "disappearing 
apparition", an event.192 Even while losing her perspective and merging with 
the multiple space(s) Elisa remains a disturbing stain. Like a ghost she is 
capable of letting borders and orders shift without losing herself completely in 
this process as expected. Appearing and disappearing, and letting go of the 
visual, she does not seem to be dependent on single centred perspective 
anymore, or on seeing and being seen. 
190 Ibid., 11. 
191 See discussion of the feminine in the Introduction and the chapter 2a. No-Thing Leaking. 
192 Derrida refers to the screen, which could here also be named the stain, as imaginary, 
something absent and phantomatic. The visibility of the invisible, the specter, is amongst 
other things what one imagines and projects onto this screen. But the screen always has a 
structure of disappearing apparition itself. Derrida 1994,99-101. This supports my argument 
in its emphasis on the viewer's implication and active role despite the lack of mastery or 
control. 
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"Not-to-see is defect penury thirst, but not-to-see-oneself-seen is 
virginity strength independence.,,193 
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Does Helene Cixous offer us here a way to think anew the Girl's virginity, and 
maybe even the so-called innocence, as strength? This suggests a position 
not tied to the never-ending power game of looks, the dialectics of seeing 
and being-seen. Has the Girl got, without having to be blind, "blindwoman's 
lightness, the great liberty of self-effacement"?194 No-thingness, virginity and 
vessel may be rethought as no more in terms of a lack, as they escape from 
the economy of visibility. Elisa's loss of the perspectival position in space and 
her deliberate closure of the visual, could be seen as a way of holding onto 
this Girl's independence. Not as a retreat back to something lost, but as a 
reclaiming of this position. lines, who crawls over the bridge acknowledging 
she must look mad, and Elisa both seem to defy the demands to take a post 
in the battle between seeing and being-seen, framing and being framed, 
where boundaries need constant reinforcement. Instead they hold onto a 
ghostly perspective in a suspended space of encounter and desire, between 
I and the world, always open for surprises and in a state of wonder instead of 
capture. 195 
STAINED MASKS 
In If 6 Was 9 (1995-6) a group of teenage girls share their stories that 
all trace sexual awakening in different ways. Some of the narratives 
refer directly to holes of the body while in the images of urban 
landscapes the focus lies on passages, gates, doorways, gaps. Entry 
into womanhood appears symbolized by openings, yet nothing leaks. 
There is not clear direction or linear development to be detected. 
193 Helene Cixous, "Savoir", in Helene Cixous & Jacques Derrida, Veils (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), 12. 
194 Ibid. 
195 See Cixous' reference to being between two worlds, blind and seeing. Cixous 2001, 12-
13. Compare with Irigaray's notion of wonder, and the emphasis on mediated immediacy or 
distanced proximity in the chapter 3b. Witnessing and the Conclusion. Irigaray 1993a, 12-13, 
72-82. 
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EIJA-LIISAAHTILA IF 6 WAS 9 (1995-6) 
The occurrence of supernatural powers is often linked to the first appearance 
of menstrual blood. One of the most notorious cases of this is Carrie. 196 
Creed sees this focus on the transitional period of puberty and the rite of 
passage of menstruation in relation to a dramatic shift from passive to active 
in the victim of possession that is often highlighted in horror films.197 Before 
menstruation girls tend to be represented as inactive, in waiting. As Carrie 
then, after the massacre she has just carried out at the school ball, returns 
home and washes away the blood and make-up from her body, she returns 
from adult to child again, argues Creed. 19B As a child she retreats back to 
innocence. All the threat and evil is associated closely to the tropes of female 
sexuality, the feminine red stains of blood and lipstick. This cliched emphasis 
particularly on menstrual blood, and the female reproductive body it refers to, 
covers over anything else that might be the actual cause of horror and 
underlying these accepted explanations. Could this be read as an attempt to 
disavow the threat of the unmarked, the Girl? 
Similarly menstrual blood is in horror films linked to hidden powers according 
to Clover. 199 In the possession story the female body is an object of 
fascination due to its difference, its inner life that escapes from vision. From 
this stems the desire to make her body speak and the preoccupation with 
196 Both Creed and Clover point out the association of woman's blood to supernatural 
powers, which links closely to the mythical and historical representation of woman as witch. 
In Clover's words: "supernatural and psychosexual intersect". Clover 1992,71; Creed 1993, 
79. 
197 Creed 1993, 65. 
198 Ibid., 81. 
199 Clover claims that menstrual blood does not, thus, seem to have much to do with loss or 
lack and castration. Clover 1992,78. 
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evidence and signs, Clover argues.200 This suggests that before 
menstruation there is nothing happening inside the Girl's body. Or, even 
worse for this order of the visible: that this in-out formula does not fit, there 
are no signs, no-thing visible. 
The women and the girls in Ahtila's works do not bleed. Instead they hold 
onto their masks, let no-thing leak. Their bodies do not, therefore, become 
marked with fluid femininity and the troubled boundary of inside and outside 
of the female body. They refuse to enter into this economy that demands 
visible signs of their difference originating in a hidden interior. They may 
suggest a mode of embodiment that escapes from this model of femininity as 
a leaking and nursing fleshy vessel. Is this threat of another, 
incomprehensible mode of embodiment, what is at the core of the fascination 
expressed and disavowed in horror films? Could openings, points of entry 
and exit, be approached in another way, not only focusing on the evidence 
that is expected to flow from them? They may also come to life and stop us, 
"provoking a different kind of encounter and recognition", as Avery Gordon 
points OUt.201 Maybe the passages and holes of all kinds that populate If 6 
Was 9 suggest that something else than leakages take place on the 
boundaries. 
The girl in Today does not leak either. She witnesses instead her father's 
flowing tears that according to her threaten to fill their house. Both male and 
female bodies can be seen as vessels, Mary Douglas has argued. This 
notion of body as vessel is, however, gendered with differently operating and 
valued vital fluids: 
"Females are correctly seen as, literally, the entry by which the pure 
content may be adultered. Males are treated as pores through which 
the precious stuff may ooze out and be lost, the whole system being 
thereby enfeebled.,,202 
200 Ibid., 109. 
201 Gordon 1997, 67. 
202 Douglas 1984,126. 
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In Today these distinctions become confused in subtle ways. The girl does 
not allow us any entry nor does she leak evidence of her pure contents, her 
inner truth. Dad then again oozes considerable amounts. He may be 
enfeebled even more as this precious stuff is not linked to sexual powers. 
Neither semen nor tears are defined as polluting by Douglas and Kristeva, 
but in Dad's case tears are very close to being abject.203 They stain and 
thicken, becoming inseparable from the ambiguous, viscous stuff coming out 
of his nose. Together with the convulsive body these fleshy fluids trouble his 
masculine subjectivity and its solid, rationally controlled boundaries. His 
daughter is here the one who lets no-thing enter or exit her embodied being, 
but calmly observes as if from a distance the spectacle of his father's 
embodied grief that borders possession. 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA THE PRESENT (THE BRIDGE) (2001) 
The woman in The Bridge (part of The Present, 2001), lines, points out that 
madness is in its visibility. This can be compared to Creed's argument that 
"horror emerges from the fact that woman has broken with her proper 
203 Douglas claims that: "Tears are like rivers of moving water. They purify, cleanse, bathe 
the eyes, so how can they pollute? But more significantly tears are not related to the bodily 
functions of digestion or procreation . Therefore their scope for symbolising social relations 
and social processes is narrower." Ibid ., 125. See also discussion of Kristeva's definition of 
the abject and the exception of semen and tears from its frame in chapter 2a . No-Thing 
Leaking. 
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feminine role" and "made a spectacle of herself,.204 Possession and 
madness, like femininity and sexual difference, depend on visible signs on 
the body and behaviour. Could the cases of Elisa and lines be read as 
mimesis, appropriation and defiance of this visible difference, and not simply 
failed attempts at mimicry, as I suggested earlier? Am I witnessing 
"spectacular resistance" that Homi Bhabha links to "moments of civil 
disobedience within the discipline of civility,,?205 Subtly breaking the codes 
and conventions, becoming a spectacle, they blur the visible and deny us 
any clear signs. All the evidence I have is a collection of red shirts and some 
crushed lipstick. What can I do with these red stains that do not seep from 
any hidden interiors? These signs address me without referring to anything 
beyond them, to any truth or essence. Instead they direct my attention to the 
boundaries. 
Surface can be reconsidered as a model for subjectivity, where its 
inscriptions and movements create all effects of depth, Elizabeth Grosz 
argues. Subjectivity could be understood as fully material and materiality as 
inclusive of operations of signification. 206 What does the surface, thus, mean? 
Instead of surface becoming a new "essence" and the notion of depth false, 
just an effect in a reversal of the order, could this be considered as surface-
as-depth? Subjectivity appears as an ongoing negotiation with the stain, as 
already argued. As a material effect, a mediator, stain spreads within the 
fabric of the surface, but also stands out. As a cultural filter it infiltrates 
everywhere blending different elements together and reinforcing the 
oppositional structures in the continuous process. This is how it can also be 
troubled from within, and clotted in stains to mark the sites of fractures in 
these structures. The stain in its both modes of operation weaves through the 
materiality of the surface giving it depth. It confuses any sense of direction 
between inside and outside making the boundary itself material with 
204 Creed 1993, 42. 
205 Bhabha 1994, 121. The father in Today could also be seen to be making a spectacle of 
himself and, thus, causing horror as he unsettles the expectations and solid boundaries of 
rational male subjectivity in his visceral mouming. In contrast to Elisa in The House and lines 
in The Present he does not, however, appear to actively search for alternative ways of 
dealing with the impossible demands of the modes of gendered subjectivity on offer. 
206 Grosz 1994, 210. Grosz refers here to Mobius strip as a model. 
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thickness that defies solidity. The two functions of the stain are not distinctly 
separate or opposites, but woven together. Neither aspect of the stain is 
stable, but they are products of constant negotiation where borders always 
get confused, shift, and may even cease to exist. 
To challenge the persistent logic of surface and depth, the stain has to be 
thought of in relation to the notion of the mask. Silverman points out that in 
addition to the stain Lacan uses other metaphors for conceptualising the 
screen, or the relation of subject to representation: envelope, double, mask, 
and thrown-off skin. According to her, mask "implies self-concealment behind 
something which is worn, but not psychically assumed".207 The mask seems 
to emphasize the surface, the effect of the cultural screen as not affecting 
psychical interior. Silverman prefers the stain over the others as it allows, for 
example, for a better specification of the agency available to the subjece08 
The body is not mentioned here. Is it also assumed (in terms of mask, 
envelope, double, or thrown-off skin) to be just surface, or that which hides 
behind? The notion of the stain can problematise this opposition that the 
other terms tend to leave intact and reinforce in their role as additions or veils 
on the surface. Stain questions both the free play with masks as well as 
determinacy (of the body). 
Yet when mask is thought of in relation to stain it starts to gain weight and 
depth. The mask does not hide anything as such but, actually, reveals that 
there is nothing to see behind it. It is no longer a veil that needs to be, or 
could be, stripped away. Lipstick is where we have to start from, not from the 
redness of blood, or flesh. This is where Susanna's rebellion begins in The 
Wind (2002). She resists tropes of femininity without, however, attempting to 
retreat to some nostalgiC childhood innocence like Carrie. Maybe she 
becomes here the Girl that is unmarked by the veil of innocence, the defiant 
Girl or a fugitive being. 209 Or a defiant fugitive, who does not escape, but 
207 Similarly the other terms suggest exterior or surface effects according to Silverman: 
Envelope contains the subject, double indicates identification with a distance and thrown-off 
skin refusal to wear. Silverman 1996,202. 
208 Ibid., 196. 
209 See discussion of Oeleuze's and Guattari's notion of the girl as a fugitive being in the 
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instead tackles the demands to take her place in the field of visibility and 
unsettles this whole field as a result of her spectacular resistance. 
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EIJA-liISA AHTILA THE WIND (2002) 
Susanna's room may be her mask. Is it haunted? Is Susanna the one who 
haunts, or is she haunted herself? This inseparability of haunting and being 
haunted reveals the complexity of the position of the girls in horror. Haunted, 
or possessed, they end up reinforcing the ideal of innocent, passive 
receptacles. But simultaneously their no-thingness, the unmarked, keeps 
haunting these narratives. While haunted by their individual tragedies they 
also haunt referring to wider cultural repressions.21 o As in Susanna's 
externalised internal space, haunting always collapses distinctions, such as 
between private and public. Susanna's space is like a room full of ghosts that 
need to be reckoned with. Here any detail can suddenly call and take me, 
with Susanna, somewhere. 
The ghost is compared by Avery Gordon to Roland Barthes' punctum, the 
"little but heavily freighted" detail that haunts and "enlivens the world of 
ghosts".211 In his discussion of punctum Barthes claims that the "mask is the 
meaning".212 This may suggest that all we ever reach at is just another mask. 
Yet finding the image of his mother as a girl, he celebrates the vanishing of 
the mask. He seems in the end to be searching for an essence, a truth, from 
behind the surface effects. The ghost appears again as a girl , but as in most 
ghost stories, her haunting is cut short by unmasking. 
chapter 2a. No-Thing Leaking. Deleuze & Guattari 1988, 171-277. 
210 See e.g. Gordon 1997, 140-1 . 
211 Ibid., 108. 
212 Barthes 2000, 34. 
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Punctum is in this context problematic as it tends to refer to some depth that 
breaks through, or to a truth of the viewing subject and/or photographed 
subjectlobject.213 Punctum could, however, also suggest a way out of the 
prevailing structures of signification if it really manages to prick the viewer, 
not from behind the masks, but by giving the mask(s) unexpected substance. 
Can it be thought of as a rupture of signification and representation that does 
not, however, need to refer to something individual as truth and origin in 
opposition to the shared cultural veils? According to Gordon punctum, like 
the ghost, is "a highly particularised, if also a fully social, phenomenon". 
Instead of some personal truth punctum, like a ghost, evokes "the blindfield" 
and the necessity of finding it.214 Yet, it does not necessarily call for a search 
of a cultural blind spot and for its revelation, naming. It functions as a 
dynamic site of connection, not unmasking. 
In terms of masks Caillois' notion of mimicry appears also problematic. 
Silverman critiques Caillois for reverting back to the opposition of surface and 
depth when contrasting humans and the rest of nature. In this comparison 
the masks worn by human subjects do not seem to threaten subject's being, 
whereas the morphological transformations deem the insects inauthentic and 
inessential in their essence.215 Humans can apparently play with masks, but 
nature gets absorbed into them. Lacan gives similarly humans, as subjects of 
desire in their essence, this ability to play with the function of the screen, the 
stain, without being captured in it.216 And those who do get absorbed must be 
mad? Or, women and other feminised others, whose subjectivities are 
considered to be mere surface effects and whose being is actually tied to 
nature anyway. When thinking of mimicry as a negotiation with(in) the stain, 
subjectivity emerges as an embodied process on the borders of signification. 
Subject's being is constant becoming, without a solid core any more than 
insects do. This is why women threaten with what they lack, their own place, 
and why Irigaray's playful repetition of the mimetic feminine role can be so 
213 This raises also questions about truth as/of woman/mother, and the innocence of 
child/girl, problematised here with the figure of the Girl. 
214 Gordon 1997, 107-8. 
215 Silverman 1996, 134-5. 
216 Lacan 1981, 107. 
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troubling. They reveal that it is all about mimicry, or failures of mimicry, on 
the boundaries, surfaces. 
SUPPING MASQUERADE 
The stain reveals what the mask tries to hide, or to express, depending on 
how one looks - the lack of depth and flesh. Like failing mimicry the effort to 
become (part of) a picture is ruptured by stains. Masquerade of femininity 
could be said to escalate here into an exaggerated attempt to conform to the 
expectations and models of femininity on offer. The influential notion of 
masquerade was introduced initially by the French psychoanalyst Joan 
Riviere in her article Womanliness as Masquerade (1989) as a notion that 
theorised the way women could cover up their "masculine" characteristics, 
such as activity and independence, in a veil of femininity in order to gain a 
recognised and acceptable female subject position. Furthermore, she argued 
that womanliness could not be distinguished from masquerade.217 The notion 
has been developed critically by amongst others Mary Ann Doane in 
Femmes Fatales (1991), who emphasises that it reveals femininity to be a 
mask without substance, sustained by inessential decorative layers and 
gestures that veil only the absence of any "real" femininity as such.218 
According to Doane masquerade is a radical challenge to the conception of 
the female body as present-to-itself, which she links particularly to Freud's 
"distinction between the immediacy of knowledge (in relation to vision) in the 
little girl and its delay or distancing in the little boy". Doane emphasises the 
constructed ness of femininity as closeness and is critical of its appropriation 
by feminist thinkers, such as Irigaray.219 She sees masquerade as allowing 
for the distance needed for the production of knowledge, breaking the tight 
bind of female subject to her body and its image.22o 
217 Joan Riviere, "Womanliness as Masquerade", in V. Burgin, J. Donald & C. Kaplan, ed. 
Formations of Fantasy (London & New York: Routledge, 1989),38. 
218 Mary Ann Doane, Femmes Fatales: Feminism, Film Theory, Psychoanalysis (New York & 
London: Routledge, 1991),25,34,37. 
219 Doane stresses here that Freud's "statements about female subjectivity are symptomatic 
of a larger cultural configuration". Ibid., 8, 22. 
220 Doane refers to the body as a disguise that women can use and claims that "masquerade 
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The implicit assumption of an underneath is, however, left in the air. This 
notion of the mask and the need of distance does not address the body and 
its role in much any detail. 221 Are we just further removed from the body, 
which nevertheless remains unthought and possibly unthinkable under the 
layers of masks, or representations? Masquerade does not structurally 
disrupt the binary logic.222 In the end it does not destabilise the dichotomies 
such as femininity and masculinity, surface and depth, or proximity and 
distance. Can the mask be given depth and materiality that does not 
necessarily assume an underlying essence - whether something to be 
revealed or something always out of reach? 
Due to its dependence on the definition of masculinity, "femininity is in 
actuality non-existent", Doane claims. 223 This reminds me of the claim posed 
by amongst others Irigaray, who does not, however, accept that the only 
possible mode of subjectivity and agency is by definition masculine. Irigaray's 
strategic repetition, mimesis, seems to open different possibilities than 
masquerade in its appropriation of closeness. Acknowledging the risks 
involved in the reclaiming of the notion of proximity, Irigaray stresses that 
"the desire for the proximate rather than (the) proper(ty)" can be understood 
to "imply a mode of exchange irreducible to any centering".224 She aims to 
open cracks in the oppositional logic for a different sense of proximity, 
instead of accepting that distance is necessary for subjectivity. 
So what are Ahtila's women doing with their masks of femininity, such as the 
red shirts? Instead of attempting to adapt while hiding those other aspects of 
femininity that do not fit in to the prevailing normative modes of being, they 
may be strategically repeating cultural codes and conventions to the point 
that they start to fracture. This can be thought of in Irigaray's terms as 
doubles representation". Ibid., 25. 
221 Ibid., 26. 
222 Doane acknowledges that masquerade "makes femininity dependent on masculinity for 
its very definition. Thus, although it may not secure a feminine "essence" it does presuppose 
a system and a logic dictated by a masculine position, once again subordinating femininity." 
Ibid., 38. 
223 Ibid., 34. 
224 Irigaray 1985b, 79. 
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mimesis, which according to Naomi Schor is a strategy for "transforming 
woman's masquerade, her so-called femininity into a means of 
reappropriating the feminine".225 This performance escalating from 
masquerade to mimesis begins to undo itself, giving rise to questions of what 
escapes from this frame of femininity and the impossible subject position it 
offers. The binary oppositions appear intertwined, vulnerable and unstable. 
Doane points out, but fails to explore further, an interesting slippage in the 
notion of masquerade that seems useful here: "In Riviere's analysis, "normal" 
femininity is a masquerade, but masquerade, as in the case of her female 
patient, is pathological. ,,226 Does this make femininity also pathological? This 
seems like a reinforcement of the age-old link between femininity and illness, 
both physical and psychical, as well as with deceit. Yet the difference here 
lies in the denial of essence, where femininity in its pathological traits could 
be rooted. Do the women in Ahtila's works The Present, The Wind and The 
House challenge this link between femininity and pathology more 
productively, in more complexity, as they appropriate the feminine role as a 
vessel, yet refuse to be passive victims of possession? Their symptoms 
reveal more about the ideological structures that define them as ill and 
unfitting to the limits of sanity, than about femininity or female embodied 
subjectivity. 
What escapes from the frame of femininity has been strategically called the 
feminine by Irigaray and others, as discussed earlier. According to Judith 
Butler, the feminine has ended up monopolizing, thus, the sphere of the 
excluded in a problematic way: 
"the feminine is "always" the outside, and the outside is "always" the 
feminine. This is the move that at once positions the feminine as the 
unthematizable, the non-figurable, but which, in identifying the feminine 
with that position, thematizes and figures,,227 
225 Schor 1994, 66. 
226 Doane 1991, 33. 
227 Butler 1993, 48. 
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The non-existence of femininity, as presented by masquerade, remains 
within the logic of the same, reveals its logic and operations but does not 
suggest any ways to change it. The feminine, and particularly the maternal-
feminine receptacle, as the non-figurable, seems to also persist in complex 
knots tied to the dichotomous sexual difference, unable to unsettle its 
foundations. 
Could the no-thing ness of the Girl offer possibilities for developing the radical 
potential here further? Notions of closeness and immediacy are connected to 
innocence, and other attributes of childhood, and particularly girlhood, as well 
as to everything and everybody considered natural, or primitive, etc. These 
notions need to be rethought so as to problematise the hierarchies attached 
to them as well as the linear model of development. When innocence of the 
Girl is problematised, how might proximity and presence (t%f the body) 
appear then? How can the no-thingness of the Girl be thought away from 
purity and blankness that waits to be given form and meaning as maternal-
feminine receptacle? Does the red shirt, as a stain and a mask, help me 
here? 
The red shirt in Today could be seen to function as a mask that 
simultaneously lifts the girl's embodied being from the inhabited space, the 
realm of the narrative, and makes her the point of focus within it. The shirt 
gives her form and presence. The opening image in Today with the grinning 
mask may be not just accidental. The mask is plain surface without the 
expected (material) depth that is needed as its opposite in order to place it 
within the binary structures of signification and representation. As an 
unmarked the Girl does not fill the place of depth and/or content - so the red 
shirt becomes a stain marking the site of disruption that the embodied 
subject of the Girl is. As a mask it is not a plain surface then anymore, but 
has its own thickness and materiality, with no-thing to hide. It can be now 
recognised as oriented outward, instead of referring persistently back to what 
it covers up. 
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This points to the inevitable failure of masquerade, the impossibility of 
keeping the oppositions intact and separate. As the mask becomes a stain 
on stain, the unmarked begins to take space for itself. Yet, central to my 
argument here is that it does not emerge as something previously hidden, 
but as a mobilising effect on the positions both defined and repressed by the 
binary structures. Thinking about these masks as stains allows us to move 
away from both the notions of the abject unbound matter and the endless 
surfaces of masquerade. The disruptive stain does not bring into view some 
true materiality, or give a glimpse of any authentic subjectivity that lies 
beneath the cultural smooth stain. Instead it reveals a gap, a space that 
cannot be mapped. The unmarked embodied subjectivity of the Girl escapes 
from us, and with it all other embodied subjects slip from our grasp, while 
they could be said to turn toward us instead of referring back to within 
themselves. The mask appears as a surface of contact. 
FINALLY: MEDIATIONS 
Lucia, a tiny baby girl in red, embodies a border between her parents, 
simultaneously separating and binding them inseparably together. She 
is a silent witness of her parents divorce in Ahtila's Consolation 
Service (1999). Irreducible to, yet indistinguishable from them, she is a 
site where all clear distinctions collapse. Baby girl, whose name refers 
to purity and whiteness, in a bright red jumpsuit. A no-thing, a knot of 
connections, a mediator. 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA CONSOLATION SERVICE (1999) 
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In its challenge to unity and the oppositional logic the ghost shares clearly 
something with the notion of the feminine, neither one nor twO. 228 What 
happens then, when we shift attention from the figure of the Woman to the 
Girl unmarked by the tropes of femininity? The Girl's "stolen body" (in theory 
and visual culture alike) as ghostly, a no-thing, leads us to the cracks in the 
foundations of binary sexual difference and the morphologies encoded 
there.229 However, as I have argued in this chapter, this does not necessarily 
call for a closer scrutiny of these openings and what may emerge from there 
- such as another model of embodied subjectivity or order of signification. 
Starting with an operation similar to Irigaray's mimesis of female morphology, 
I strategically repeated the unmarked form allocated to the Girl and found no-
thing, only not-yet and not-quite. This demanded a rethinking of the veil that 
covers nothing. The figure of the Girl together with the red shirts as stains on 
stain guided my focus onto the surfaces. Not unlike, yet not quite like the 
feminine, it also called for a reconsideration of proximity and similarity, 
disentangled from their associations with the female body and the feminine 
yet without doing away with the notion of embodiment as such. 
The figures wearing red in Ahtila's works have emphasised for me that 
embodiment cannot be defined within the binaries of body and mind, surface 
and depth, proximity and distance. They remind me of the constant process 
of embodiment, and that "bodies themselves, in their materialities, are never 
self-present, given things, immediate, certain self-evidences", as Elizabeth 
Grosz puts it.23o Instead of focusing on the body and its specificities so as to 
give form for the characters, the embodied subjects are mapped out in an 
228 See discussion of the notion of the feminine in the Introduction and the chapter 2a. No-
Thing Leaking. 
229 The no-thingness of the Girl, as the ultimate disembodied body, could be argued to 
challenge the "disembodied body of masculine reason", as discussed in its contradictions by 
e.g. Judith Butler. Butler 1993, 49. See also Grosz' claim that: "what remains unanalysed, 
what men can have no distance on, is the mystery, the enigma, the unspoken of the male 
body." Grosz 1994, 198. The opposition of distance and proximity becomes questionable 
a~ain here. 
23 Grosz 1994, 209. Grosz argues that this is due to embodiment insisting on alterity. This 
could be compared with the discussion of the thinking subject as fundamentally dialogic in 
the next chapter. Self-difference appears thus to characterise subjectivity both in terms of 
the body and the mind, or, the embodied being in its complexity. Furthermore, alterity does 
not then refer to the body as that which is other, but embodiment as being a process, 
entwined within the world, and therefore resisting capture by definitions etc. 
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unfolding web of relations within the narrative and its many layers in Ahtila's 
works. The figures in red, and many of the other characters, are points of 
connection within the narrative as well as between the viewer and the 
fictional realm. They act as mediators, like Lucia, between all the pairs 
associated with the opposition of mind and body.231 Yet, crucially mediation 
here neither leaves the oppositions intact as an in-between, nor does it undo 
them by opening space between the binaries as such for something beyond 
them to emerge. Instead it draws attention to what happens on the 
boundaries, on the edges, in the encounters. 
The key shifts that can be detected in this chapter could be summarised as 
moves from questions around possible modes of embodied subjectivity to 
concerns about its formation in singular contacts. Or, from the possibilities of 
unveiling what has remained an unmarked mode of embodied being to 
surfaces that do not hide anything as such. For my approach this has meant 
a shift from interpretation and re-signification, from attempts at marking the 
unmarked, to critical encounters, which are examined in closer detail in the 
following chapters. 
These moves go hand in hand with the turn away from repetition as either 
mimicry or strategic mimesis, both of which negotiate the field and limits of 
representation. This is connected with the shift from masquerade in its 
implied persistence on the oppositions of surface and depth. The notion of 
similarity has arisen here in relation to all of these terms and, notably, been 
disentangled from sameness. Resemblance is, therefore, not a surface effect 
in opposition to an original or a depth. Instead, it opens a space of mediation. 
It allows for contacts but not for fusion, on the surface. Revisiting Roger 
Caillois' reference to loss of self in becoming "just similar", similarity to 
something suggests a sense of location yet no fixed position. Similarity 
allows for proximity as and on the surface that defies marking and reduction 
231 On the binaries associated with the opposition of mind and body, and their 
problematisation, see the chapter 2a. No-Thing Leaking, and e.g. Grosz 1994, 20-1. 
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to an assumed core. Proximity is, moreover, no longer immediacy, 
associated with certain types of bodies or embodied subjects. 232 
128 
Similarity does not simply operate in the field of representation that refers 
elsewhere. This takes me back to the Girl as a figure and demands further 
consideration of what it may mean for this figure to no longer figure, i.e. to 
function as a representation. Following Jean-Luc Nancy, this is then a figure 
that does not stand for anything else than itself. It weighs in itself, as an 
event.233 It happens. It is not a signifier referring directly to a signified yet 
neither does it operate as, for example, a metaphor. Instead, as a figuration it 
may be what Rosi BraidoUi claims to be a marker of a situated position. For 
her this allows for temporally and spatially situated narratives that destabilize 
the certainties of the subject. 234 In terms of the unmarked, this may 
emphasise positionality as not rooted in an interiority, a body or an identity, 
but as situated ness in relation to others. While taking cultural and historical 
coordinates into account it defies any sense of fixity or ground as such. The 
figure of the Girl may operate as this kind of figuration in my engagement 
with the figures in Ahtila's works: they call for entangled micro narratives not 
only of themselves but also of others, myself included, in each encounter. 
The figure of the Girl has to be also distinguished in its operations from the 
feminine and the problematics of it having become in itself a figure that 
232 See the earlier discussed Doane's critique of the reclaiming of the terms associated with 
the feminine, e.g. in Irigaray's work, as reinforcing the collapse of femininity and female 
subjectivity into the body. This view is problematised in the following chapters with a return 
to proximity e.g. in relation to the challenge posed on the notion of presence by Jean-Luc 
Nancy's emphasis on the "to" as a space of mediation at the heart of the notion presence-to-
itself. Doane 1999; e.g. Nancy 1997, 77. 
233 Figure is closely associated with signification and the critical reconsideration of meaning 
that will follow in the next chapters. As Nancy writes, the figure exposes "the inapprobriable 
gravity of meaning", i.e. in it meaning weighs. Nancy 1997, 82. See also in the next chapters 
references to Deleuze and Guattari's rethinking of language, speech and writing away from 
sense - as both proper sense and figurative sense. Furthermore, this distinction in itself 
already suggests that figuration has mediation built into its operations, yet, in a metaphor the 
space between remains a gap defined by what it mediates, i.e. the metaphor and what it 
stands for, and not a space of contact and emergence. 
234 Braidotti 2006a, 90. Braidotti's notion is related to her ongoing critical rethinking of 
subjectivity as nomadic, whereas my emphasis lies not on the modes of subjectivity reflected 
or produced in the figurations and the situated narratives but on the intersubjective 
engagements at the heart of them. See also in the chapter on witnessing further discussion 
of Braidotti's notion of situated ness in relation to accountability and empathy. 
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stands for all exclusion, which was discussed earlier. As Braidotti argues, the 
feminine can be understood as a project and a movement geared towards a 
non-binary notion of interrelation.235 The movement of the feminine has been, 
however, often halted both strategically and mistakenly into a representative 
figure, as Butler amongst others argues. 236 The Girl may be a figure that 
allows for this movement to go on, taking the project further. Instead of a 
figure of unmarked or of disembodiment that is open for universalisation, it 
focuses here on singular engagements that take place on the surfaces, 
points of contact, where subjects are in a constant process of becoming. 
Crucially, this does not ignore embodiment but gives the surface its 
weight.237 Embodiment appears then as an entwinement within the world. 
The figure of the Girl is characterised by an outward orientation, instead of a 
reference back to within itself. This is how it happens, in the present and for 
the future. 
The outward move that characterises the turn to the surfaces is discussed in 
further detail in the following chapters in terms of, for example, exposure. 
The shift that has taken place in my journey with the Girl could be also 
sketched out as a rethinking of excess as exposure. The surfaces and edges 
I have been drawn to are not just thresholds of spaces or boundaries of 
subjects, where transgressions take place. They are sites of communication 
and, as such, of orientation toward the others. Mediation does not, thus, 
equal a medium, a bridge between another world and us. Rather it is a space 
that can never be fully crossed or closed. This is where haunting takes place, 
as an address and a call for a response. Haunting is itself mediation, Avery 
Gordon argues. 238 It is a process of contacts. 
In a way, the Girl as unmarked and the red shirts as disruptive stains have 
addressed me as well as urged me to think what actually happens when I am 
addressed. Following Lucia and the others, trying to address them in turn, 
235 Braidotti 2006a, 183. 
236 See e.g. Butler 1993, 36-49. 
237 Compare discussion in the chapter 3a. Thinking Aloud on thought as weighty, which 
further undoes the binaries of mind and matter and interiority and exteriority. 
238 Gordon 1997, 19. 
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writing ghost stories - I am haunted. Focusing my attention to these 
hauntings, these contacts that haunt, I am drawn into them. I become 
involved, alerted to the necessity to do something. I am no longer immersed, 
nor detached. More than one and no more one, I am pulled to the middle and 
to my edges like a ghost that weaves together things individual and shared. 
Haunting is "neither premodern superstition nor individual psychosis", as 
Gordon stresses. It is a particular way of knowing what is happening and has 
happened. Being haunted is a "transformative recognition".239 It is a rupture 
caused by similarity. Thinking, seeing, writing with the Girl, I may be 
discovering other ways of knowing that do not demand solidity and stability of 
distinctions, positions and naming. 
239 Ibid., 7-8. 
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EIJA-LIISA AHTILA CONSOLATION SERVICE (1999) 
The installation of the work is a cinematic setting, yet the screen is split into 
two images. The main protagonists, a couple going through divorce, are 
mainly pictured on separate images, which offer slightly different 
perspectives into the same narrative scenes. The narration is carried forward 
by a voice-over and sequences of dialogue between the characters. As the 
voice-over narrator tells in the beginning, the story is comprised of loosely 
distinguished three parts: the first provides instructions on how to end a 
relationship, in the second this 'happens, and the third is characterised as a 
consolation service. 
With their tiny baby the couple visits first a counsellor, who guides them 
through the emotions and practicalities associated with divorce. The 
estranged couple then party with a few friends and end up crossing a bay 
covered by spring ice that breaks under their weight. The underwater scene 
turns from the characters' initial panic to a calm image of floating bodies with 
a poetic voice-over. At the end the woman sits at home on her own when her 
ex-partner appears out of a cloud of pixels in the hallway. After some failed 
attempts she no longer tries to grab hold of him but responds to his silent 
bow with another. He smiles, disappears and does not reappear again. 
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3A. THINKING ALOUD 
FIRST: SPOKEN TO 
The ceaseless flow of loud headlines in the media demand my attention with 
their messages. They appear to provide me with information yet fail to help 
me make sense of much. I feel that I am left with no space for thought, no 
space for response. My writing is here driven by a desire to overcome the 
sense of incapacity to do anything when faced with the seemingly never-
ending tragedies, whether in fiction or in news reports. Tired of being a 
consumer, consumed by overwhelming emotions that do not tend to allow for 
anything beyond the tears of sadness, anger, or joy, I search for ways of 
crafting out space between myself and what I see or hear. This does not 
imply detachment but gestures towards a space of mediation where sharing 
and empathy no longer mean identification, as erasure of difference. There 
emotion does not cancel out signification, and understanding is not the only 
conceivable result. There silence does not merely equal acceptance, 
witnessing reception, thought withdrawal. 
"Instead of getting upset over the gigantic (or so they say) growth in 
our means of communication, and fearing through this the weakening 
of the message, we should rather rejoice over it, serenely: 
communication "itself' is infinite between finite being ( ... ) 
communication takes place on the limit, or on the common limits 
where we are exposed and where it exposes US."240 
Jean-Luc Nancy urges us in Inoperative Community (1991) to celebrate the 
excessive means of communication. As the message gets hazy in this 
cacophony, the modes of address and my position as the addressed become 
240 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community (Minneapolis & London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991), 67. 
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increasingly important. This implies a shift from message to the means, yet 
no longer as methods predetermined by their aim. Communication is then not 
an end, not a closure. It is not exchange of messages or production of 
meaning, as will be argued in depth here. The various modes of address 
draw attention to communication that takes place between, on our limits, as 
Nancy writes above. The liminal space we are drawn to in communication is 
not an end in itself either, and it knows no end. There the exposure, which 
Nancy refers to, is not a revelation but an opening forward and outward, 
following the orientation of speech. This space I aim to examine and inhabit 
with a focus on the event of speech and its movement. What matters here is 
not understanding but encounter. When I am spoken to I am not simply 
given, shown or told, but called for. 
The various modes of speech that address me in contemporary media as 
well as in Ahtila's works have drawn my attention to the unsettled boundary 
between documentary and fiction as well as, in close association, that of 
showing and telling. The overlap of the conventions of documentary and 
fictional narration, and the blurring of the distinction between monstration (i.e. 
showing) and narration, call for a rethinking of the related notions of 
immediacy and mediation, description and event (mimesis and diegesis). 
This entwines with the shift from the questions of what is shown or told to the 
enquiry on how and for what effect. Showing or description appears to be a 
matter of distribution of information. Meanwhile, telling tends to emphasise 
mediation, interpretation and production. Yet their clear-cut distinction does 
not hold, I will argue in this chapter, as I shift focus further, onto the 
possibilities of communication opened up by different modes of address. This 
I attempt to reflect also in the diverse modes of description and narration, 
throughout the thesis, that aim to disallow oppositional distinctions in their 
dialogue. 
Furthermore, when focused on as modes of speech neither showing nor 
telling needs to be approached in terms of knowledge or understanding. 
Neither promises immediacy any longer. They both operate in and open up a 
space of mediation that troubles, amongst others, the separation of internal 
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and external realms. They both take place on the limits, where 
communication can also happen. When stepping aside from the media 
headlines, the messages demanding to be heard, making sense has to be 
thought anew as well, away from closure - no longer as solitary interpretation 
but not inter-production of meaning either. Meaning is no longer an end of 
communication. How can I then respond when addressed? 
My engagement with Ahtila's works has led me to examine communication 
and speech as complex events, where a space necessary for dialogue is 
constantly under production. Communication is not transmission or 
exchange, but sharing, as Luce Irigaray writes in The Way of Love (2002).241 
A driving force in Irigaray's thought is the critique of conventions and 
institutions that paralyse this movement: 
"Dialogue then is limited to a complicity in the same saying, the same 
world, and not considered as a novel production of speech determined 
by the context of an exchange in difference.,,242 
How do we achieve this creative space of dialogue in difference called for by 
Irigaray? According to her this space necessary for communication is created 
by listening, by silence, and by the reaching out of speech towards the other. 
This opens up an in-between, a space of mediation, not of immediacy, she 
argues in I Love to You (1996).243 The space is produced in dialogue, yet it is 
also that which makes communication possible. In dialogue, both the 
speaker and the listener as well as the space of their encounter happen, 
together. This is where communication takes place, both in front of the works 
and within this article. 
While the boundary between documentary and fiction blurs in media, the 
immediacy of transmitted reality is questioned and its performative nature 
emphasised, the viewer may be challenged to take an increasingly active 
241 Irigaray 2002,27. 
242 Ibid., 35. 
243 Irigaray 1996, 109-119. 
THE ADDRESS: THINKING ALOUD 136 
role in its construction. 244 I claim that Ahtila's moving image installations 
appropriate modes of narration familiar to us from other media and, thus, 
allow for a rethinking and re-experiencing of viewership. I focus here 
particularly on the characters' mode of speech in the works - to each other, 
to themselves and to us viewers. The works reach out towards the viewer 
with numerous audiovisual means, but here I focus specifically on speech 
and the problematics related to it, only touching on different visual, spatial 
and temporal aspects as they entwine with speech. These all take part in the 
production of a space of communication and I examine the other aspects in 
more depth elsewhere in this thesis, such as the address of the visual in the 
chapter on the Girl.245 I stress, however, that the modes of speech I focus on 
here are not solely a matter of the aural. Bodily gestures, for example, are an 
integral part of expression, which I hope to emphasise in the following 
examples. 
My discussion of the characters' modes of speech in Ahtila's works can be 
said to generalize as well as to ignore some of the complexity and diversity of 
her oeuvre. However, my aim is not to provide a complete appraisal of her 
practice nor even of individual works. Instead, this discussion of speech 
draws from my ongoing dialogue with the works and is geared beyond 
description or analysis. What I call the modes of speech in Ahtila's works are 
not something residing simply in the works, but more accurately could be 
characterized as my impressions that allow for me to assume the position of 
the addressed. As Barbara Johnson has written in her critical account of the 
244 This thesis sets out to unsettle on many levels the assumed distinct realities of the work 
(fiction) and of the viewer. See e.g. the problematisation of the notions of immersion and 
detachment in relation to cinema and installation art in the Introduction. This is at the heart of 
my attempt to rethink spectatorship as an active engagement, an encounter. What the 
construction of reality may mean is at the core of this enquiry and points towards co-
production in communication, where the notions of producers as well as the product are 
thoroughly questioned. 
245 See also e.g. Taru Elfving, "The Girl", in Maria Hirvi, ed. Eija-Liisa Ahti/a: Fantasized 
Persons and Taped Conversations (Helsinki: Crystal Eye & Kiasma, 2002), 205-208; Elfving 
2003a; Taru Elfving, "Seeing Red" in Parkett, no. 68 (NY & Zurich: Parkett, 2003c); and texts 
published in Finnish: Taru Elfving, "Thinking Aloud", in Taru Elfving & Katve-Kaisa Kontturi, 
ed. With Art: Steps Towards Participatory Research (Helsinki: The Society for Art History in 
Finland, 2005), 21-33. Taru Elfving, "Puhuteltuna, todistajana: Eija-Liisa Ahtilan 
videoinstallaatiot ja vuoropuhelun tila", in Olli-Jukka Jokisaari, Jussi Parikka, Pasi Valiaho, 
ed. In Medias Res: Hakuja mediafilosofiaan (Tampere: Eetos, 2008), 95-125. 
THE ADDRESS: THINKING ALOUD 137 
address in A World of Difference (1987), direct address is related to "the 
desire for the other's voice".246 My reading of the characters' speech as an 
address can, thus, be seen to be driven by a desire on my behalf to make 
contact. Yet I problematise any sense of directness of the address here and, 
therefore, shift attention from the voice and its capture towards the space of 
encounter opened up. 
The characters appear to occupy uncertain positions as speakers, as will be 
examined in detail shortly. This is echoed in who can occupy the place of the 
addressed and how. Narration, where the distinct positions of both the 
speaker and the addressed are troubled, "suspends the certainty of 
references not by erasing these differences but by foregrounding the 
complex dynamism of their interaction", Johnson writes.247 Focus shifts not 
only from what is said and how the speaker is positioned in her speech, but 
also from who appears (visually and otherwise) to speak and from how I find 
myself as the addressed. The space of address appears as a space of 
difference and of communication. This is where my attention lies here: not on 
what is spoken and from what perspective, or who speaks or who mediates 
what is shown and told, but on what this mediation allows for. 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA THE HOUSE (2002) 
With Ahtila's works, time and again, I find myself suddenly staring at a 
speechless face, expressionless yet full of charge. These faces seem to 
gaze into nothing while their voices continue emanating from elsewhere. Or, 
at times a character is silent in one of the adjacent images while speaking in 
another. Then they gain familiar kind of unity again: they speak to the camera 
246 Barbara Johnson, A World of Difference (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1987), 185. 
247 Ibid. , 183. 
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and, therefore, to me, a viewer. The voices and the images of the characters 
are in flux, constantly changing their connections ever so slightly. The 
boundaries of the characters and their realm, their own coherence and their 
relation to me, are unsettled by this wandering voice as well as the multiplied 
images. Who is addressing who? 
The speech as well as the gaze of the characters both tend towards bridging 
the void between their reality and mine, yet never quite close that gap. Or, 
actually, they may question this very distinction as well as the assumption 
that the characters inhabit and communicate their own reality. While 
appearing to draw closer they simultaneously hold onto a distance. This 
initial impression of distanced proximity (returned to in depth later) is largely 
due to the characters' wandering voices and mode of speech that in all its 
awkwardness, nevertheless, seems to be addressed to the viewers. Both the 
source and the destination of their words remain unfixed. The sentences flow 
smoothly, but as if recited. The matter-of-factness of speech matches 
curiously well the lack of expressions, which adds to a sense of 
disjointedness even when the image and the voice of a character meet. This 
mode of speech detaches the characters from what they speak and unsettles 
the conventions of both fictional and documentary narration, cinematic 
illusion and truth claims, mediation and immediacy. 
I have been trying to address this mode of speech for some time now. From 
early on in my research I saw it as one of the strategies Ahtila uses in her 
works to unsettle the boundary separating the fictional realm of the 
characters from the space of the audience. At some stage along my 
exploration I happened upon the notion of thinking aloud as a descriptive 
term amongst others that were all geared towards gaining hold of the works 
and their operations. If the characters were thinking aloud, that could 
perhaps explain at least the inexpressiveness and the unfocused direction of 
their speech. The layers and disjunctions apparent in the speech could be 
more plausible on the plane of thought. Am I listening to thoughts spoken 
aloud, materialised in words? As I will discuss in detail in what follows, 
thinking aloud did indeed allow me a point of contact with the works. It did 
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not, however, explain anything, but drew me into the space opened up by the 
speech in the works, their address and my attempts, in turn, to address them. 
This chapter works in tandem with the next one on witnessing. Thinking 
aloud has, as a notion, allowed me to examine the mode of speech in Ahtila's 
works as an address that opens up a space of communication. Furthermore, 
it focuses on both speech and thought as calls for engagement. Witnessing, 
then again, examines more closely what happens in this space and how, in 
particular, I may as a viewer inhabit it, or how I may respond to the address. 
The wandering voices of the characters are central to both of the chapters. 
They drew my attention, at first, to the distinction of visual and aural, where 
sound is often understood as more freeform and unbound than the structured 
and ideologically infused realm of the visible.248 In Ahtila's works the images 
appear at least as unfixed as the voices in their complex choreography 
across multiple screens. The works can also be said to disrupt the 
conventions of narration structured around the positions of seeing and 
speaking.249 They play with the inbuilt mobility of these positions and push 
them to the breaking point, where they no longer guarantee the characters 
nor the viewers secure places of seeing, speaking or listening. I discuss in 
more detail the entanglement of images and voices of the characters in 
relation to witnessing. Thinking aloud troubles, however, also this opposition 
as it entwines together with another similar binary, that of speech and 
thought. Conventionally thought is defined as more open or freeform than its 
counterpart, like sound in relation to image. I argue here that thinking aloud 
makes tangible how speech does not simply solidify free-flowing thoughts, or 
externalise something previously internal. It also problematises other 
persisting dichotomies such as immediacy and mediation, that are 
associated with thought and speech, respectively.25o 
248 See e.g. Michel Chion, The Voice in Cinema (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999); Kaja Silverman, The Acoustic Mirror: the Female Voice in Psychoanalysis and 
Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988). 
249 See e.g. Mieke Bars text on narration and focalization. Bal 2006, 3-39. 
250 The problematisation of the distinction of immediacy and mediation is at the heart of my 
enquiry, discussed later in detail. This could also be related to the opposition of absence-
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The investigation here does not tackle the question of voice, although this 
does deserve its own in depth examination elsewhere. Instead of asking 
what this becoming-audible in thinking aloud may imply, I focus on this 
movement as a move outward, forward and toward. Becoming-audible 
breaks away from representational operations: speech does not represent 
thought as a sharing of something subjective, or a mediation of something 
essentially irreducible. Moreover, audibility in thinking aloud does not refer to 
an end of some kind but signals movement. This same shift is present in the 
following discussion of witnessing as well, as a step aside from the gaining or 
giving of voice, which implies an existing and representable identity to be 
voiced. Rather, my argument is geared towards an understanding of both 
thinking aloud and witnessing as dynamic and open-ended processes. Both 
notions allow me to focus on the space of this reach and movement that, I 
claim, characterises the address. They respond, thus, to the key questions 
posed at the end of last chapter regarding haunting: they explore mediation 
in terms of becoming, knowing as a transformation, and haunting as an 
address, as an entwinement with/in wordly contacts. 
With both of the notions I shift attention from what is said to the reach of 
saying, silences, seeing and listening. Not only speech but both thought and 
witnessing are invested here with the potential of action and, more 
specifically, not interaction as much as co-action. Both chapters sketch out 
how my writing - and my thought and witnessing - may act as a response, 
taking responsibility. I aim to map out the emerging space of communication 
while placing it, simultaneously, at the heart of the acts that give rise to it. For 
example, what is considered internal, i.e. thought, is opened outward from 
within even before becoming speech, because a thinking subject is always 
already in dialogue with(in) oneself, as I will argue. 251 This is yet another 
presence, e.g. in the distinction of written and spoken languages, yet this is beyond the 
scope of my research here. See e.g. Jacques Derrida, "Signature, Event, Context" in 
Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
251 See discussions later in this chapter on Arendt's thoughts on conscience, Nancy's notion 
of presence-to-oneself, and Johnson's emphasis on self-difference. See e.g. Hannah Arendt, 
The Life of the Mind (San Diego, New York & London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1971), 
188,193; Nancy 1997, 77; Johnson 1987, 164. 
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reason why communication cannot be defined as an end, a product of some 
kind. It is entangled inseparably with the means themselves. 
THOUGHT - A LEAP, AN ACT 
An elderly woman, Vera, unloads the dishwasher in her apartment 
and, once finished with the task, pours herself a drink. Meanwhile she 
keeps on talking, as if to herself, about contemporary society, 
sexuality, alienation, commodification. Or, actually, her voice 
continues at times as a voice-over, while she no longer appears to 
talk. 
EIJA-liISA AHTILA TODA Y (1996-7) 
Vera and her monologue in Today (1996-7) gave me the notion of thinking 
aloud. She seems to be absorbed in her own thoughts, as if thinking aloud 
yet not addressing anyone as such. Her thoughts are, however, really too 
carefully articulated to be just that, random thoughts. What kind of freedom, 
flow or formlessness do I expect of thoughts? Here they appear not so much 
as leaps from the constraints of communication as above the conventions of 
THE ADDRESS: THINKING ALOUD 142 
society, as leaps to the position of an observer. Simultaneously they seem to 
flee from her internal, enclosed realm, outward. 
"What is a leap, if thought is indeed a leap? What sort of escape from 
g ravityT252 
Following Jean-Luc Nancy's question posed in The Gravity of Thought 
(1997), what is thought a leap from? As a leap thought is distinguished from, 
amongst others, immanent matter and speech. Instead of an opposite, 
however, thought is closely entwined with its counterparts. Nancy alerts us to 
the persistent oppositions such as material and immaterial, thing and 
meaning, that the notion of thought carries with it. The definition of thought as 
weightless and free, transcendental, can be and has to be problematised. 
For Nancy, a condition of the activity of reason is the "weight of a localized 
body".253 Yet this does not tie thought down, but instead it "can be only by 
being open to the thing" that is thought.254 Thought as a leap appears then 
entwined with the heavy and light matter of things. It is never purely internal 
or immaterial, but always already connected. It arises from and addresses 
the world. 255 
A leap implies thus movement, orientation. It may, furthermore, imply a 
departure and a return, yet it also instigates change. The world one comes 
back to is never quite the same as that which one leapt from, as Catherine 
Clement stresses in her discussion of syncopes, which was also referred to 
earlier in relation to the Girl.256 She suggests that a leap is a rupture and, as 
such, both "a matter of shattering and reuniting".257 If leap is a rupture, then 
neither the direction of the leap nor the return follow the coordinates and 
distinctions of in and out, here and there, familiar and strange. The unknown 
252 Nancy 1997, 76. 
253 Ibid., 77. 
254 Ibid., 79. 
255 See affinity between thought and the address here: both are located yet move outward, 
beyond their location. 
256 Clement 1990,1. 
257 Ibid., 88. 
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one leaps to with thought is not simply elsewhere but also here. It is a rupture 
in what is known, in one's position in and perspective on the world. It is an 
opening that always leaves a trace, a shift not only in the world, but also in 
the one who leaps. 
Thoughts are, therefore, potentially dangerous, as they can rupture the 
order(s) of things. As leaps they reach towards the unknown, the 
unpredictable. They are capricious, they flee. Clement writes about thoughts 
as young girls, who escape from the grasp of (male) analysts and 
philosophers, vanish and transform, threatening the order of dialectical 
philosophy.258 As also discussed earlier, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
associate similarly change and movement, becoming and the in-between 
with the figure of the girl, which they describe as fugitive and a line of 
flight. 259 The notion of line of flight could be further compared with the leap as 
both break out of the boundaries of solidity and unity as well as of the 
dualistic order. Thus leap has no longer to do with the swiftness associated 
with thought as immaterial and transcendent.26o 
As a realm of leaps, thought allows for experimentation and play with all 
kinds of logics. Yet, simultaneously, it does not surrender to anyone's 
mastery. Is my thought then no longer my thought, if I am not its master? 
Does it pose a potential danger not only to the discursive order of language 
or the conventional understandings and uses of speech, but also to my 
position and boundaries as a thinking subject? This challenges the Cartesian 
subject, whose self-presence relies on thought. I am not interested here in 
the internal splitting or decentring of the thinking subject as, for example, in 
psychoanalysis and the theories of the unconscious.261 Neither am I 
concerned with undoing the linguistic model(s) that deem everything outside 
258 Ibid., 85-93. 
259 Deleuze & Guattari 1988, 232-309. 
260 See Arendt 1971, 44. 
261 See e.g. Avery Gordon's critique of Freud's theory of the unconscious for rooting all 
hauntings inside the individual, in the unconscious, denying thus their origins in the 
encounters between the self and the world. Gordon 1997,48. This resonates with my 
interest in the outward orientation of the thinking subject and the dialogical nature of thought. 
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the structures of language and beyond our reach. 262 Instead of replacing 
these critical models my approach relies on them yet attempts to make a 
move aside: as discussed in the Introduction, Luce Irigaray's work has 
allowed me to move from strategic repetition - a mode of critical intervention 
that aims to open up the structures of binary discourse, or "the logic of the 
same", and of language to that which is excluded within it - and from the 
investigation of the excluded to the inquiry on the nature of communication 
itself and, furthermore, to the inhabitation of the space of communication. 
Thought as a leap suggests to me a move outward, an opening of the interior 
and the integrity of the subject out, towards the world and the collective 
realm. 
Therefore, I am not interested in a return implied by a leap, nor in the change 
that affects the one who leaps with thought, as much as in the space opened 
Up.263 If thoughts are leaps, and ruptures, what happens when they are 
spoken aloud? The plane of thought seems to allow for contradictions, 
complexity and simultaneity not accommodated by speech. Thinking aloud 
draws attention to a point, where these leaps gain temporary tangibility and 
tentative forms. It appears to inhabit a threshold between thought and 
communication, internal and external, and challenges their distinction. 
Thinking aloud does not simply bridge a pre-existing gap or boundary, but 
actually makes space for this in-between. Furthermore, it locates both 
thought and speech there. Both are entwined with(in) the world yet also carry 
rupturing potential as leaps. Thinking aloud appears to give weight to thought 
and to send speech to flight. 
262 The move away from the problematics of representation, as discussed in the Introduction, 
implies also critical positioning in relation to the linguistic model, yet direct in-depth 
consideration of this remains outside the remit of this thesis. See e.g. Simon O'Sullivan's call 
for a step beyond textual reading strategies which he associates with a turn from the 
linguistic, O'Sullivan 2006, 4-5. 
263 See later, Nancy's notions of exposure and meaning that shift focus from an implied 
return and the thinking subject to the movement itself and the spacing created, marked by 
"to": "There is sense only once this being -to itself no longer belongs to itself, no longer 
comes back to itself." Nancy 2003,8. This is discussed in the next chapter on witnessing in 
closer relation to community and the notion of "being-with". 
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As Vera's voice wanders, detaches itself from her as its source, it shifts 
emphasis from the origins of speech and thought to their movements. 
Simultaneously, the wandering voice questions its immediacy: the speech 
lacks spontaneity and directness as well as clear direction. In order to focus 
on the spacing created here, thinking aloud could be translated to a closely 
associated notion of speaking to oneself. This suggests the narrative trope of 
soliloquy, the cinematic conventions of which Ahtila appears to follow at 
times: the characters speak, but with their lips closed, and appear to address 
an audience, while the other characters seem oblivious to their speech. 
Seymour Chatman claims that in non-naturalistic narratives soliloquy 
consists of formal declamations, explanations or comments, which merge 
speech and thought. 264 This resonates with the speech of Ahtila's characters, 
even though it breaks in complex ways with the criteria set for soliloquy. This 
mode of speech troubles the assumed distinction of internal and external 
realms, and it has to be distinguished from interior monologue. 
If Vera and the other fictional characters in Ahtila's works are talking to 
themselves, their speech is oriented outward, even though towards 
themselves. Thinking aloud, then again, expresses this movement without an 
assumed audience, without a set address. Neither thinking aloud nor 
speaking to oneself, however, have to be understood as closures, as turns 
inwards. Instead, they may both suggest openings, or even calls for dialogue. 
Emphasis shifts from the interior onto the edges of the thinking and speaking 
subject. I place the weight of my thought here on the outward movement that 
characterises thinking aloud. This is also a move toward, a space or distance 
of "to", as Nancy writes: 
"the distance of the presence-to-itself of an existence whose existing 
means precisely this presence-to - a to of being (presence) itself, the 
to of a sending, of a sending back, of a throw, a projection, a rejection, 
the to of a yet-to-come, of an expectation, an attention, a call" 265 
264 Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (Ithaca & 
London: Cornell University Press, 1978), 181. See also Chatman's definition of soliloquy: 
Ibid., 178-9. 
265 Nancy 1997, 77. 
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The weight of thought lies in its outward reach, towards the future and 
towards the world and others, in its address to what lies beyond the here and 
now. Yet, as Nancy argues in A Finite Thinking (2003), the "to" is an opening, 
a gap or a fissure. It is not to be considered as a relation, but as an event.266 
It is not determined by its origin, nor its destination or direction, nor by the 
relation between the two. It is a matter of exceeding these positions, of 
excess as exposure. 267 
Exposure carries the significations of unveiling or disclosure. Yet it does not 
only refer to a revelation or a showing of whatever pre-exists the act, as in 
the service of knowledge production or transferral of meaning. Exposure also 
endangers as well as initiates contact. 268 Associated with excess it begins to 
resonate with emergence of something not predetermined or anticipated. The 
disruptive excess, which Irigaray calls for with strategic repetition (mimesis), 
is made space for by "jamming the theoretical machinery" of dualism that 
claims to produce univocal truth and meaning (see discussion of mimesis in 
the Introduction). She underlines that this is not a matter of (women) 
becoming (men's) equals in knowledge or constructing an alternative logic.269 
This excess does not allude to the realm of the material, the feminine, the 
irrational. Instead, it opens onto an unmapped terrain, ungoverned by the 
order that opposes meaning and matter, internal and external. It calls for 
novel notions of, amongst others, subjectivity and communication. 
Associated with exposure and excess, thus, the movement of thought 
reaches to and beyond the boundaries of the thinker and of thought itself. 
Thinking aloud highlights the outward orientation of thought. Thought acts in 
the world, and this act is where the spacing of "to" happens. Thought, the 
"soundless dialogue" with ourselves, is no longer conceivable as passive 
contemplation like it has been understood, Hannah Arendt argues in The Life 
266 Nancy 2003, 7. 
267 Nancy 1997, 78-9. 
268 See e.g. Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000-). 
269 Irigaray 1985b, 78. 
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of the Mind (1971).270 She claims that instead of being opposed to doing,like 
theory to practice, thought is action yet unlike knowledge. In her examination 
of the supposedly lone activity that is thought, she turns to Kant's distinction 
of thinking and knowing, reason and intellect. 271 The role of thought in 
knowledge production is that of a means to an end, whereas reason asks 
"unanswerable questions of meaning".272 What thought aims at, then, is not 
determined, yet this does not deem it aimless action. The notion of meaning 
that appears to drive thought here, as distinguished from knowledge, I will 
return to later. What is at stake here, first of all, concerns the relation of 
thought to the world. Thoughts can neither present nor represent reality, 
Arendt claims.273 Thought is not observation that leads to understanding of 
the world. Arendt withdraws thought from direct engagement with the 
sensible world, the world of appearances, yet insists that this is not a 
question of transcendence.274 She relies here on the phenomenological 
understanding of appearance that does not allow for the separation of the 
spheres of ideas and matter, or mind and body: we are all appearances and, 
furthermore "we are of the world and not merely in it", she writes. 275 
How are thoughts, then, of the world? Thought is geared towards 
appearances: it expects something to appear to it, Arendt claims, yet it also 
anticipates its own appearance as it is "conceived in speech even before 
being communicated".276 The act of thought is, thus, characterized by 
emergence. Thinking is always already turned forward and outward, towards 
communication, sharing and becoming. Thinking suggests here, to me, that 
to be of the world is not so much a matter of origin as of orientation. Thought 
is, according to Arendt, dependent on being spoken - either in silence, with 
ourselves, or aloud.277 Thought opens out, towards dialogue. Yet, it is not 
270 Arendt 1971, 6. 
271 Ibid., 14. 
212 Ibid., 54, 62. 
273 Ibid., 64. 
274 Ibid., 45. 
275 Ibid., 22. 
276 Ibid., 24, 32. 
277 Ibid., 99. The sense of outward orientation and dialogue is also supported by Arendt's 
emphasis, discussed towards the end of this chapter, that thought is not built on previous 
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necessarily geared towards a presupposed destination, an audience, she 
stresses.278 Thinking is a withdrawal from the company and communication 
with others, yet in doing so opens up the thinking being for a dialogue with 
oneself, she argues. This is what makes it an activity.279 As I argue here, this 
withdrawal does not lead to a closure or a turn inward, but unsettles the very 
opposition of interior and exterior. Dialogue, speaking and being with, is at 
the heart of thinking and the thinking being. 
This brings me back to Jean-Luc Nancy. He also refers to Kant's distinction 
of reason and understanding when he writes about thought as not-knowing, 
yet not an opposite or negative of knowing. 28o For him, this thinking is a 
matter of a passage, the "to" or toward, not of intention, end, or content.281 
Not unlike Arendt, he stresses that the thought, the not-knowing, cannot be 
appropriated: in its openness it does not allow for its mastery as a means to 
an end.282 Instead he weaves a link between thinking and the "urgency of 
communication".283 It is a "response to what never ceases to call" US. 284 For 
me this resonates with the ethical question posed by Arendt about thinking 
as action that works against evil-doing. Conscience is a by-product of 
thought, of dialogue with oneself, she argues. One needs to stay friends, to 
live in peace with oneself.285 The space of the movement of thought, of the 
"to", emerges as a space of "with". This emergence, the space of appearance 
and of exposure, may be the very aim and act of thought. 
thought, indebted to and determined by it, like knowledge, but takes place in complex 
intersections within the world as action. See Ibid., 212. 
278 Ibid., 98. She distinguishes here thought further from appearance, which she claims 
depends on a spectator. 
279 Ibid., 185. 
280 On Kant see e.g. Nancy 2003,36-7,42. Not-knowing, according to Nancy, "isn't to 
postpone final knowledge until a later date or to a higher register, but to enter into the 
obscurity and the opacity of what is no longer a matter of knowing in any way, shape, or 
form." Ibid., 37. 
281 Nancy writes about this "concealed thinking" as a "thinking that appeals to its passage to 
the other alone, without intention, beyond all intention, for nothing, nothing except our being 
between us, nothing except our being in the world." Ibid., 41. 
282 Ibid., 47. See also Nancy 1997,10,81. 
283 Nancy 2003, 42. Nancy refers here also to community and generosity, which I will return 
to in the chapter 3b. Witnessing. 
284 Ibid., 297. 
285 Arendt 1971, 188, 193. She writes, "conscience is the anticipation of the fellow who 
awaits you if and when you come home." Ibid., 191. 
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The movement of thought, such as becoming-audible in thinking aloud, is 
what founds my attempts at bringing Ahtila's works into dialogue with 
philosophical questions in this thesis. If her works are approached as thought 
in action, as I claim in the Introduction, they do something in the world. This 
does not call for articulation, interpretation or translation of what they do, but 
encourages the weaving of connections between the operations of the art 
works, those of philosophical works as well as of my own writing. These 
encounters, moreover, give rise to further thought, communication, action. 
ON RECITATION AND THE ADDRESS: WHO SPEAKS? 
In the work Gray (1993) three women seem to be reciting the same 
text together. They do not really address each other, nor directly me, 
the viewer. They may be thinking aloud, sharing the same 
thoughtscape. Or, maybe they co-inhabit a text, a shared plane of 
discourse that here refers to some post-catastrophe scenario with all 
its collectively internalised fears and plans of action. 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA GRA Y (1993) 
The characters in Ahtila's works do not always appear to be so much thinking 
aloud as reading aloud. They often address their words to the camera in a 
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matter-of-fact mode familiar from documentary narration. Yet, much of the 
time they seem to be reading aloud a script, as if speaking out someone 
else's thoughts and words. Ahtila's works could be seen to unsettle both the 
conventions of documentary and fictive narratives as well as the distinction of 
the two. Furthermore, they seem to resist my conceptual frame of thinking 
aloud. However, the notion of thinking aloud does not aim to describe the 
way the characters speak. Thinking aloud is a starting point as well as a 
node, which allows for different departures. It allows me to bring various 
critical questions into play with the works, as well as focuses attention on the 
address of the works and my encounter with them. 
A retake is thus due. I had already once wrapped all the different 
observations regarding the characters' speech neatly together in my 
argument, or so I thought: they all emphasize the outward orientation and 
dialogic nature of both thought and speech. I focused on language and, 
particularly, its use as if it was not one's own, which underlines its role as 
mediation.286 Collective and individual, internal and external entwine further 
together. The language used could then be seen to function as a rather 
inadequate yet necessary tool of mediation, which only hints at the 
complexity it aims to encapsulate. This investigation of mine, however, still 
assumed a particular subject using language strategically or unable to use it 
as her own. It also referred back to the production and transferral of 
meanings as well as to deconstructive approaches to dominant structures or 
orders, such as the binary logic. Both the speaker and the notion of 
mediation call now for another kind of examination, no longer in terms of 
specific uses of language(s) and transmission of messages. 
286 My emphasis was earlier on the appropriation of language(s), associated with Irigaray's 
mimesis, i.e. strategic repetition. See e.g. an early version of this chapter, published in 
Finnish: Elfving 2005. I referred then also to Deleuze and Guattari's as well as Trinh T. Minh-
ha's thoughts on being a stranger in language, which is no longer here discussed in terms of 
subjectivity but in relation to the senselessness of speech and mediation. Gilles Deleuze & 
Felix Guattari, Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature (Minneapolis & London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986); Trinh T. Minh-ha, When the Moon Waxes Red (New York & 
London: Routledge, 1991). 
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The question now posed, first of all, concerns the origins of thought and 
speech: who is thinking or speaking here? The artist could be said to be 
present in this awkward, performed speech of the characters. The 
disjunctions between image and speech of the characters, i.e. the wandering 
voice that at times appears like a narrator's voice-over, could also be 
explained away as the author's voice. Yet, the words, however scripted, are 
not mere messages transported by the characters, or the actors, as 
mediators. Furthermore, who and what addresses me here is not reducible to 
the artist as an origin. Narratology distinguishes different narrative levels of 
address: author addresses reader, implied author implied reader, narrator 
narratee, character other characters. 287 I claim that in Ahtila's works this 
order is subtly disrupted. As in thinking aloud, the distinctions of interior and 
exterior, not simply of the fictional realm and the viewer's reality, but of intra-
and extradiegetic levels or of story and discourse, are blurred. Viewer's 
position as the addressed becomes then also uncertain. 
To get to grips with what happens with/in this mode of speech, I shift focus 
onto the address, careful however not to conflate the two. Who is addressing 
me, a viewer, in the works? Or, who is addressed here, in this speech with 
uncertain coordinates? The address does not originate in someone or 
somewhere as such. As Vivian Sobchack has argued in The Address of the 
Eye (1992), address refers both to a location and the activity of projecting 
outward (see the Introduction). For her, address is always situated in a body, 
but also able to extend beyond it. Based on this understanding an 
intersubjective engagement appears to be built both on the address that 
locates one while it reaches towards the other(s) and on the recognition of 
the address of the other as that of another subject. 288 With Ahtila's works, 
however, I cannot locate an embodied subject that addresses me, except 
possibly as the cinematic installation itself. This view is supported by 
Sobchack's emphasis on the engagement between the viewer and the film 
as an embodied being. Sobchack grounds this on the distinction of primary 
foundations (the film/work as an embodied being) and secondary structures 
287 See e.g. Chatman 1978, 147-151; Ba12006, 14. 
288 Sobchack 1992, 25 & 55. 
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(e.g. discursive) and codes (e.g. narrative). Even if these both are 
understood in terms of mediation and as simultaneous, like Sobchack 
stresses, for me this raises further questions about recognition: when I 
cannot identify the origins of speech in the works, I am denied the possibility 
to reduce the other (the depicted characters as much as the work) to what I 
already know. Neither can I then define the works or the characters as fixed 
entities nor position myself in relation to them. 
Identifying who addresses me seems beside the point. Focus shifts to the 
space opened up by speech, the space of address. Here the recognition of 
the source of address is not a priority, or even of much relevance. The notion 
of interpellation, as introduced by Louis Althusser in Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatuses (2001) (see also the Introduction),289 is useful here even 
though it also focuses on the production of subject positions as well as on the 
processes of recognition. Interpellation draws attention to how subjects are 
called into being by recognition and misrecognition of themselves as the 
addressed. Moreover, the subjects are hailed by ideology, not an embodied 
subject. As Althusser argues, ideology does not merely hail, but it is this very 
hailing.290 To consider, thus, the address itself as discourse that is in constant 
production in the very acts of address means, first of all, to locate both the 
address and the discourse in all the subjects involved in the process of 
addressing each other, whether the cinematic work, the filmmaker, the 
character on film, or the viewer. Secondly, this implies that it does not make 
sense to distinguish between some modes of address as pre-discursive and 
some others as discursive. This appears to be in line with Sobchack's 
emphasis on mediation, if understood as denial of access to any immediate 
experience prior to or beyond discursive structures such as language.291 The 
discourses are within as much as without me, and, therefore, I do not have 
conscious access to all the aspects of my embodied subjectivity and the 
discourses it is constituted by or with/in. Neither can I map out exhaustively 
any subject position either as the origin or the destination of the address. 
289 Althusser 2001. 
290 Ibid., 117-8. 
291 Sobchack 1992, 11-13. 
THE ADDRESS: THINKING ALOUD 153 
This reinstates that I should not scrutinize what I mis/recognize, i.e. the 
subject positions or what is re/produced in the address. Instead the focus lies 
here on how the address takes place, and returns later to the question of 
recognition, as recognition of irreducibility. 
My attempt to sidestep questions of mis/recognition is supported by Donna 
Haraway's emphasis on interpellation as interruption. As she argues, hailing 
ruptures momentarily the order of things and opens all the parties briefly for 
reconsideration, not necessarily for mere reconfirmation (see Introduction).292 
Address is, thus, an event that unsettles for a moment all the parties as well 
as their relations. It takes place between, in a space of encounter, and is no 
longer retraceable back to whoever speaks, produces speech, or responds to 
it as a call. Situated in the world and, simultaneously, oriented towards it, 
address is a process of entanglement, not unlike thought as a leap. The 
same applies then to discourse. It no longer makes sense to try and locate 
the address or the discourse, whether these are understood as one or not. 
Instead, my attention is drawn to the encounters, in which they are produced 
interlinked with speech, text, narratives and various subject positions.293 
EIJA-liISAAHTILA GRAV(1993) 
292 Haraway 1997, 49-50. 
293 My view on the address, as being produced in the encounters, differs thus here from e.g. 
Irit Rogoffs reading of the address in Kutlug Ataman 's work, where she claims the speakers 
are using the viewer, as the addressed, in the production of their subjectivities. Irit Rogoff, 
"De-Regulation: With the Work of Kutlug Ataman", in Third Text, No. 97 (London: Routledge, 
2009). 
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Perhaps I, a viewer, also co-inhabit the texts with the women in Gray (part of 
a three-monitor installation Me/We, Okay, Gray). The words are then not 
recited as something fully pre-existing the acts of speech. As the notion of 
co-inhabitation suggests, the speakers are in a process together with each 
other and withlin the text. This brings me to the performativity of speech.294 
An act of speech takes actively part in the process of reinforcement and 
reworking of linguistic conventions and codes. Speech is never completely 
immediate and direct transmission of messages, yet it is not mere repetitive 
copying or representation (of thoughts or the real) either. The mode of 
speech that reminds of quoting or reading a script can be seen, first of all, to 
draw attention to the impossibility of direct translation or transferral. Reading 
aloud and its potential does not, however, have to be understood only in 
terms of its operations as appropriation or strategic repetition that unsettles 
conventions, established points of reference and familiar fields of 
significations. The way the women in Gray and, for example, the girls in If 6 
Was 9 (1995-6) speak together focused my thought on the sharing of speech 
over production of meaning and the operations of language. As Judith Butler 
argues in Excitable Speech (1997), a choir of others always speaks in my 
speech.295 Thanks to the reiterability of language, speech can communicate 
and make sense. But also due to this reliance on repetition, "the past and the 
future of the utterance cannot be narrated with any certainty", Butler 
claims.296 The operations of speech are marked by excess that resists 
capture. How speech acts is never completely determined by the speaker. 
Moreover, speech is an outward act, as J.L.Austin suggested in his 
introduction of the notion of performativity in How to Do Things With Words 
(1962}.297 It acts on the world. Its event takes place between us. Neither the 
294 On performativity, see J.L.Austin 1962. As mentioned earlier, my understanding of the 
notion has been, in particular, influenced strongly by Judith Butler. See Butler 1990; Butler 
1993; Butler 1997. 
295 Butler refers to inheritance, yet notably my argument steers away from any such 
reference to determinacy as well as from the problematics of subjectivity being produced in 
and through speech: "In some sense, it is an inherited set of voices, an echo of others who 
speaks as the "I"." Butler 1997, 25. 
296 Ibid., 3. 
297 Austin emphasises that the words act in performative utterances. Their act is not 
dependent on e.g. internal processes of thought accompanying the utterances, although e.g. 
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openness and outward orientation nor the excessive nature of speech, 
however, only concern signification. Here my focus on how speech acts 
differs considerably from those of both Austin and Butler. I will claim that 
sharing is to be found at the heart of speech and communication, yet not only 
in terms of its aim and ability to signify. The question does not concern who 
speaks or what is spoken. Ability to speak is dependent on self-difference, 
not self-identity, as Barbara Johnson claims in her discussion of address and 
narration?98 This resonates with the notion of thought as opening one for 
dialogue within and without. Thinking and speaking are geared towards and 
founded on sharing. Furthermore, meaning and sharing entwine together in 
complex ways, as I argue in what follows. This implies a shift of attention 
from both signification and origin of speech to the engagements allowed by it. 
SPEAKING TO 
In Consolation Service (1999) the couple going through divorce bark 
at each other. Standing apart, facing each other, one starts and the 
other joins in, barking back. The space between the couple is filled 
with louder and louder barks. They may well be venting anger at each 
other but, simultaneously, they appear to be making contact. 
EIJA- LIISA AHTILA CONSOLA TION SERVICE (1999) 
non-commitment to what is said can make the speech acts "unhappy", i.e. misleading etc. 
Speech acts take place between us. Words are our bonds, he states. See e.g. Austin 1962, 
10. 
298 Johnson 1987, 164. 
THE ADDRESS: THINKING ALOUD 156 
Speech takes place to and with someone. This may sound commonsensical 
yet deserves closer consideration. Luce Irigaray has written about the 
orientation of speech and described words as "paths going from one to the 
other".299 According to her the direction taken can be even more important 
than what is said. Communication is about searching for and making 
connections, she states. She underlines the nature and function of speech as 
a mode of reaching out. 300 Yet speech is characterised by the move toward 
and the sharing implied by "to" and "with" even if the other remains 
indeterminate. Speech makes space as it moves away from the speaker, 
towards the other and, at times, back again, as expressed by both the 
notions of "thinking aloud" and "speaking to oneself'. The direction out and 
towards, together and apart, opens up a space of com-munication and co-
existence, as Nancy writes. 301 The other, however undetermined, addressed 
in speech is crucial for the orientation of speech, its act(ion). Responding to 
speech as a call, taking up a place as the addressed is to allow for it to act. 
Yet this does not define the space opened up. 
Communication between the barking couple in Consolation Service could 
then be seen as neither transmission nor reception of messages or 
meanings. Barking may turn the void separating the couple into a space 
where encounter is possible. Even in all its aggression the barking reaches 
out towards the other, like a call or an outstretched arm. The estranged 
couple express in their conversation with a therapist how the accusing words 
have no longer offered paths towards but instead have attempted to define 
and capture the other. The barking may return them to the space of 
communication, the space of the "to", where speech reaches out and not 
merely signifies. 
Barking focuses attention in dialogue to its mode of operation, the acts of 
speech, instead of its content. I do not approach it as a symbolic or 
299 Irigaray 2002, 15. 
300 Ibid., 15; Irigaray 1996,113. 
301 Nancy 2000,62. More later on Nancy's notion of "being-with", referred to here by"co-
existence" . 
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metaphorical element that breaks with realism in the work. This would 
suggest that it is just another signifying layer to be interpreted. The 
oppositional distinction of realism and fantastical is also highly 
problematic. 302 Barking is not an expression that completely does away with 
the verbal here either. Hence the representational function of language, i.e. 
its referential relation to the real determined by conventions, in the service of 
sense, is bypassed. 303 It does not, however, leap beyond signification, to 
what is dualistically defined as material and irrational - the side of the body 
and the uncontrollable, the feminine. 304 Nor does it lead to the realm 
associated with nature, emotions and drives as opposed to the rational. 
First of all, barking may not be used here strictly as a mode of speech, but it 
is not immediate or instinctual guttural noise either. The emphasis on the 
outward orientation and the performativity of speech aims to break away from 
this problematic opposition of matter and meaning, as well as the distinction 
of the real and its representation.305 Words, or in this case woofs, may push 
their way to the boundaries of signification, where new possibilities open up 
302 See e.g. Robert Stam, Literature through Film. Realism, Magic, and the Art of Adaptation 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005a), 13. Stam problematises the distinction by e.g. 
pointing out that cinematic narration always merges the realistic and the fantastical together 
in complex ways, such as in its deployment of monstration and montage. 
303 According to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari the so-called common use of language is 
symbolic and representative, in the service of sense rather than the senses. Deleuze & 
Guattari 1986, 19-20. See also e.g. Barbara Johnson, who refers to Paul de Man's thought 
in questioning "purely representational view of how language works". She writes about a 
residue of operations that cannot be interpreted as signs. Johnson 1987,6-7. J.L. Austin, 
then again, stresses the need to distinguish sense and reference in relation to meaning, 
while emphasizing the distinction of force and meaning. Austin 1962, 100. However, as will 
be discussed here these distinctions do not hold as clear-cut oppositions. The sense of 
sense appears unfixed as meaning itself is rethought. 
304 The distinction of signification and materiality runs the risk of reinforcing their opposition 
and, furthermore, other related binaries such as mind-matter, masculine-feminine. E.g. 
Barbara Creed has written about this in her examination of horror films and particularly the 
gendered embodiment in them. According to Creed the body takes control over the female 
victim as she screams and her expression fails to signify. She loses her sense, her 
subjectivity. Barbara Creed, "Horror and the Carnivalesque", in Leslie Devereaux & Roger 
Hillman, ed. Fields of Vision: Essays in Film Studies, Visual Anthropology, and Photography 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1995), 144. Here it is 
important to distinguish the use of sounds that defy the conventions of speech and 
predefined signification in Ahtila's works from this mode of aural expression predetermined 
as material and meaningless. 
305 Similarly, as discussed earlier, the notion of thinking aloud troubles these oppositions 
drawing attention to a mode of materialisation and movement that refuses to fix and pre-
assume signification. 
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for expression. What is at stake here does not concern what is expressed, or 
the possibilities of expressing what was previously inexpressible, but how 
expression takes place. Barking may actually rupture the priority of 
representation and signification - in its "senselessness" speech begins to 
express differently, intensely, as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari write in 
Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature (1986).306 Barking could be seen to push 
to an extreme the economical use of language that according to Deleuze and 
Guattari turns poverty of signification into a wealth of intensity: 
"Language stops being representative in order to now move toward its 
extremities or its Iimits. ,,307 
EIJA-liISAAHTILA TODAY (1996-7) 
Speech does something here. As an example of intense use of language 
Deleuze and Guattari mention repetition and particularly children's way of 
repeating a word "to make it vibrate around itself' until it loses its points of 
reference, its signification.308 This makes me think of the way the father in 
Today repeats various bits of sentences as if thus trying to make sense of his 
troubled relationships with his own father and his daughter. He reiterates his 
306 Deleuze & Guattari 1986, 21-22, See also O'Sullivan 2006, 70, 
307 Deleuze & Guattari 1986, 23, 
308 Ibid" 21 , 
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words in his speech, but some of them are also visually reproduced, or 
materialised: for example, his trousers fall to his ankles after he tries to 
articulate his feelings in this very metaphor. Similarly the images in Ahtila's 
works are often multiplied on the adjacent screens, and even subtitles are 
repeated across all of them. Instead of clarifying matters the various kinds of 
repetitions, however, tend to complicate things. The seemingly simple 
statements and other repeated elements gain more and more complex 
resonances. Yet the repetitions do not merely undo conventional readings or 
demand re-signification. They make me increasingly aware of myself as a 
viewer, not just in my attempts to decipher and capture it all, but as the 
addressed. This senselessness of speech is no longer an opposite of sense, 
as this opposition is already defined within an internal logic of language and 
its representational function. 309 Moreover, as Austin states, speech cannot be 
nonsensical only, for example, vague or void. He differentiates speech here 
from language, which in its failure may end up as nonsense.310 This 
emphasizes the acts of speech over speech as messages. In speech, 
however, different modes of communication coexist. As Austin suggests, acts 
of saying something are always also acts in saying something.311 
For me, the intensity and senselessness does not, then, allude here to some 
kind of an embodied mode of communication as opposed to the production of 
meaning, but to a call of a kind. What does this call do? Language stripped to 
its bare bones may reveal contradictions and blind spots within it, but it may 
also make it do unexpected things, in unexpected ways. Deleuze and 
Guattari relate this awkward use of language to being a stranger, which also 
309 See also Nancy's claim that thinking inscribes the limit of signification in language, yet 
this limit does not verge on nonsense, as this is itself a form of signification. Nancy 1997, 69. 
This could be linked with his emphasis on thinking of the limit, not of limitation - not of the 
abyss or of nothingness, but of "the un-grounding of being". Nancy 2003,27. See in relation 
to his association of sense with touch, the limit and the between, Ibid., 39-40. 
310 Austin 1962,98. 
311 Ibid., 94-100. Austin distinguishes the act in saying from the act of saying, or illocutionary 
act from locutionary act, the latter of which has meaning while the former has a force. Yet, 
he claims that to perform a locutionary act is always also to perform an illocutionary one. 
This suggests to me a possible shift away from the prioritisation of signification. Austin 
focuses, however, on analysing different modes of communication/operation in speech acts, 
whereas my investigation centres on the space of communication opened up by speech. 
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Trinh T. Minh-ha has written about in When the Moon Waxes Red (1991 ).312 
As a stranger in the language one uses, one's position is never secure nor is 
the transferral of meaning to be taken for granted. As the other, the stranger, 
can no longer be positioned either quite inside or outside language, a space 
for her opens up on the border. From here it becomes impossible to merely 
reflect on the content without simultaneously questioning how, by what 
means, it is materialised and how its meanings are inter-produced in the 
process, as Trinh stresses. 313 The question of "how" refers to the role of 
language as mediation, but not necessarily only in terms of signification, i.e. 
its referential distance from the so-called real, but also as mediation between 
speakers. Moreover, mediation does not merely concern production of 
meaning or means to an end. Neither does it have to be understood as an 
irrecoverable loss or lack of immediacy. Mediation alludes also to the space 
of possible communication opened up by speech, on the thresholds of 
language and the speakers, and in between them. This calls for a 
reconsideration of the inter-production, referred to by Trinh, as well as the 
notion of meaning itself. 
There are resonances here with the notion of critical inhabitation, which 
acknowledges language as not a mere tool but something each speaker is 
entangled with/in. It also underlines the possibility to linger uneasily on the 
borders of language (or, for example culture or fields of knowledge), never 
able to gain mastery over it, yet not simply mastered by it either. This means 
that one has to give up one's secure position and sense of control as a 
speaker, as Trinh argues about the stranger. 314 Could I think of the example 
of the father in these terms? He suggests in his repetitive speech that he 
cannot make clear sense of the things he is telling. In his inability to make 
sense he becomes feminised. This lack of control over one's thoughts, 
emotions and self-expression can be associated with reciting and, 
furthermore, thought as a realm of leaps as discussed earlier. Speaking 
words that are not one's own, or thinking thoughts not strictly mine, gestures 
312 Deleuze & Guattari 1986, 26. See also Trinh T. Minh-ha 1991, 199. 
313 Trinh T. Minh-ha 1991, 198. 
314 Trinh T. Minh-ha 1991, 199. 
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towards a loss of self, possession even, or inauthenticity and lack of 
interiority traditionally attached to femininity, and/or deemed pathological. 
Yet, as argued before, reading and thinking aloud underline the outward 
orientation of speech and shift emphasis to the edges of the subject. If this 
speaker's position is understood as an inhabitation of a threshold, it opens 
onto a space of mediation that is a space between, a space of "to". As 
Irigaray claims: 
161 
"The "to" is the guarantor of indirection. The "to" prevents the relation 
of transitivity, bereft of the other's irreducibility and potential 
reciprocity.,,315 
The "to" keeps the space of mediation open. Furthermore, in Nancy's thought 
this "directional sense" that "heads in all directions at once" gets entangled 
with signification, instead of being opposed to it. 316 This supports my view 
that the outward reach and intensity or senselessness of speech discussed 
above is not incompatible with or definable as the negative of signifying 
functions of speech - whether this concerns barking or an awkward use of 
language as a stranger. Neither can it be determined by a specific direction 
nor by an end. In fact, the distance of "to" is meaning, according to Nancy.317 
He associates meaning also with the space between: "meaning takes place 
between us and not between signifier, signified, and referent".318 Meaning is 
no longer a matter of interpretation, Nancy stresses, but an event.319 It is not 
reducible back to the subjects of the encounter, any more than the 
movement towards, the space opened up by thought and speech, or the 
address is. 
The distinction of thought and knowledge, as discussed by Arendt, may 
complicate matters here further, but in a helpful way: the senselessness of 
speech can be thus distinguished from knowledge and understanding. 
Meanwhile the reach of speech entwines with meaning in the space of 
315 Irigaray 1996,109. 
316 Nancy 2003, 40. 
317 Nancy 1997, 77. 
318 Ibid., 57. 
319 Ibid., 58. 
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address. Meaning does not take place here through co-production or 
viewer's interpretive input, which could be said to complete the work. 32o This 
would assume that meaning and its origins can be located back in the work 
and/or the viewers, even if both are seen to be also produced in the process. 
Instead, as Nancy emphasises, it is never completed, but always yet-to-
come. Both Nancy and Irigaray call for a meaning as a sharing. Irigaray 
associates this closely with communication, with speech "generated and 
unfolded between the two", which starts from the two but then can no longer 
be divided again. 321 The space of address, of speech and of meaning, cannot 
be defined as a between-two. It is not a relation, reducible back to the sum of 
the positions whose encounter allowed for its emergence.322 
TELLING 
The narrator (voice-over) in Consolation Service explains that she finds 
herself in between words. She takes hold of them, creates a role for herself, 
and begins to act. Does she, thus, tell herself into the story, take part in it? 
The narrator's speech may be another mode of thinking aloud. The story, 
including her words, is not simply the narrator's, although it is also created by 
and in her speech. As she puts it in her own words, which are not quite hers, 
she grasps the sentences, the lines, that the characters act, speak or read 
out. She is not one of the characters, but not outside the narrative either. 
320 On the reader's interpretive role, see the classic post-structuralist discourse on the death 
of the author and birth of the reader, e.g. Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author", in 
Roland Barthes, Image, Music, Text (London: Fontana, 1977); Michel Foucault, "What Is a 
Author", in Josue V. Harari, ed. Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (New York: Cornell University Press, 1979), 141-160. See also e.g. the aesthetics 
of reception and influence, introduced by Hans Robert Jauss into the discourse of literary 
history and theory. According to Jauss the significance (both in terms of potential of meaning 
and of influences) of (literary) works unfold in the events of their reception reflected against 
the horizon of expectations, both in terms of other works and everyday social experiences. 
Hans Robert Jauss, Towards an Aesthetic of Reception (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1982). 
321 Irigaray 2002, 27; Nancy 1997, 78. 
322 The space of address, and the encounters and communication taking place there, require 
a critical rethinking of the notion of inter-subjectivity, amongst others. I have decided to steer 
away from the notion because of its persistent emphasis on the subject positions even when 
focusing on what takes place in the space of address opened up. See more in the 
Introduction and the next chapter on witnessing. 
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EIJA-LIISA AHTILA CONSOLA TlON SERVICE (1999) 
Yet neither are Ahtila's characters simply in the fictional realm. They are 
telling the story as well, not merely acting it out. The wandering voices of the 
characters are at times not rooted in visible embodied subjects but act as 
voice-overs. They seem to be somewhat detached from their own narratives, 
neither quite inside nor outside. As suggested earlier, the coordinates and 
boundaries of the narrative realm as well as the different levels of address 
become confused in the narration.323 Like the narrator, the characters appear 
to think and read the story aloud, instead of claiming it as theirs. Their 
speech (whether voice-over or not) tends to be descriptive, which I claim 
further reinforces a sense of mediation. This troubles the distinction of 
showing and telling, or monstration and narration that lies at the heart of 
narrative theories.324 This distinction, with its roots back in the opposition of 
mimesis and diegesis, or description and event, is open for challenge, as 
Mieke Sal has argued. Description is also performative, she claims. It creates 
narrative: it is a form of "world-making", not mere illusory representation.325 
According to Austin the difference between constative and performative 
utterances is a matter of emphasis: either on the act of saying or the act in 
323 See Barbara Johnson's claim that when the boundaries between narrator and character 
are unsettled yet not completely undone by the narrative voice, it is no longer possible to 
identify either the subject or the nature of discourse. Johnson 1987, 171. 
324 See e.g. Chatman 1978, 146-7. Distinction of mimesis and diegesis implies a direct 
presentation assuming an overhearing audience as opposed to communication from narrator 
to audience, or a sense of witnessing in opposition to a sense of narration. This problematic 
will be retumed to in relation to witnessing. 
325 Bal 2006, 120 & 138. See also Robert Stam's emphasis on cinematic narratives as 
performative utterances as well as his argument on film's specific capacity to simultaneously 
narrate and monstrate. Robert Stam, "Introduction: The Theory and Practice of Adaptation", 
in Robert Stam & Alessandra Raengo, ed. Literature and Film. A Guide to the Theory and 
Practice of Film Adaptation (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005b), 11 , 35. 
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saying. To state is always also to perform an act, when considered not as a 
sentence but as an utterance in a speech situation. 326 Thus, description does 
not merely create fictive worlds, but acts in complex events of speech. 
The narrative reality can no longer be seen as directly presented in the 
characters' acts or the audiovisual landscape. This illusion is troubled by the 
disjunctions of temporal and spatial coordinates in the installations, but it is 
also disrupted by the speech that fluctuates between different modes of 
address and usually distinct levels of narration. It makes me question how 
does the visual address me? It does not offer me a view into the realm of the 
characters and the events, nor does it give me an insight into the characters' 
subjective experiences. What kind of world(s) are these "monstrations" 
making? Whose worlds am I seeing from an unfixed perspective here? In 
manifold performative ways the characters' mode of speech claims an 
uncertain position at the thresholds of the narrative realm and their own 
stories, as if simultaneously acting out, reporting on and producing the 
narratives. Similarly the multitude of views in flux, which are offered in the 
installations, refuse unified perspectives. The relationship of what is seen 
and what perspective it is seen from, like the distinction of what is shown and 
what is told, is complicated as the points of view defy fixity.327 The question 
of who sees or mediates my view, just like the question of who speaks, is 
sidestepped as attention is drawn to the mediation and the space it opens 
up, the space of address. 
If the characters are not simply within the story, are they with it instead? Are 
they, like the narrator, addressing the narrative, speaking to the story? 
"Who speaks? What speaks? The question is implied and the function 
named, but the individual never reigns, and the subject slips away 
326 Austin 1962, 99, 138. 
327 See the distinctions in narratology of who speaks and who sees, of what is seen and who 
sees, and from what point of view (through the eyes of a "focalizer") the viewer/reader sees, 
i.e. is given entry into the narrative, Ba12006, 3-39. 
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without naturalizing its voice. S/he who speaks, speaks to the tale as 
s/he begins telling and retelling it. S/he does not speak about it.,,328 
If a story is addressed, as Trinh T. Min-ha suggests above, the speaker does 
not hold a position of mastery in a binary relation of subject and object. The 
story and its telling do not provide representation or fix the identity of the 
teller. The story is neither assumed to pre-exist nor be the product of the 
teller, nor do the story and the teller fuse together in the speech act, as she 
argues.329 The narrative and the narrator remain distinct although entwined in 
the becoming of each one. The speech, the telling, opens up a space of 
mediation and co-narration, distinct from the hierarchical distance marked by 
"about". Or, the story and its telling are mediation themselves, as Trinh T. 
Minh-ha claims. 33o The mediation she refers to concerns representation, yet 
not simply the denial of immediacy in representation, but the adaptation that 
takes place in narration. Narration as a performative utterance is an act, an 
event, and does not simply refer to a pre-existing reality (script, original story 
etc), as Robert Starn has argued. 331 Moreover, all aspects of the story and its 
telling add to this event, also the so-called descriptive ones. The directness 
of presentation is questionable, and so is access to a story beyond its telling. 
What is the story then, the story addressed in its telling? Is it a collective or a 
personal narrative, something hidden or something openly and repeatedly 
told? The simultaneous distance and possibility of communication 
established by the address, by the "speaking to", guarantees the story 
irreducibility. The story cannot be pinned down, or emptied out, in its telling. 
This resonates with the idea that showing is also always telling, but not 
necessarily telling what it shows, as Sal argues in relation to museum 
displays.332 The story is within yet beyond its telling and showing. It is always 
more, and also elsewhere, never one with itself nor with its narration. What 
328 Trinh T. Minh-ha 1991, 12. 
329 Ibid., 12. 
330 She writes: "A form of mediation, the story and its telling are always adaptive. A narration 
is never a passive reflection of a reality." Ibid., 13. 
331 Stam 2005b, 11. 
332 Bal 2006, 201. 
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then are the stories addressed in Ahtila's work? I could call them stories of 
gender, of normality, of relationships. This naming, however, could not take 
place simply in the works, in their narration. These stories are also 
addressed by me, a viewer, as they emerge in my encounter with the works. 
I speak to the stories, not only to the artist, the narrators, the characters. 
I would claim that each event of the story and its telling opens a space of 
encounter and of becoming. This is another aspect of their role as mediation. 
In Ahtila's works the characters and the narrator meet there, all addressing 
the shared and unshared stories in their own ways. This is also where I may 
join in. How do I then speak and listen to the story, address it, instead of 
taking it as something told? How do I take part in its telling? This has not got 
to do with the production and/or completion of meaning through an active 
role of interpretation, as argued earlier. More so, it could be seen as a 
continuation of narration, following Bal's claim that viewing is itself imbued 
with narrative process. 333 However, I emphasise that it has to do with the 
outward reach, the movement toward of speech and thought. It has to do 
with exposure, with the space opening from the edges of the thinking, 
speaking and writing subject. Does thinking aloud, thus, allow for lingering on 
the space opened by speech and its reach, before speech solidifies into a 
message? Or, perhaps it simply unveils that speech and what is spoken, as 
well as the speaker and who is spoken to, never solidify after all. 
Thinking aloud may suggest a mode of practice I could undertake here, in my 
own writing. This is something I was made acutely aware of in a conversation 
with another viewer of Ahtila's work. It was a call to continue dialogue - to 
keep my thoughts open, directed outward. For a while, I had not been 
thinking aloud myself, but had become fixated on a figure of thought. Figures 
and figuring as representational operations was what I aimed to move away 
from both in my own critical approach and in what I focused on in the works. 
Thinking aloud was meant to shift attention from the speaking subjects to 
their modes of communication. If I was to think aloud in my writing, what 
333 Ibid., 258. 
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kinds of engagements with the works and with theory would that imply? 
Opening my thoughts out would mean they no longer belonged simply to any 
one of the participants in the dialogue. Moreover, the outward orientation 
entwines with a move forward, as discussed earlier. When not relying on 
previous thought, thinking projects to the unknown, allowing for unexpected 
and non-predetermined points of connections to emerge with(in} the world 
and with(in} myself. Arendt calls for a notion of thought that does not arise 
from and rely on a (teleological) continuum of past thought and tradition as 
knowledge production.334 For me this evokes an urgency to think - to think 
for, to and with oneself - as general rules and shared principles have been 
lost, given up or dismantled. This is thought in action, as action. It is rooted in 
the present, yet not determined by the past or the future, its origins or its 
end. 335 Nor is it defined by its content. It is not aimed at knowledge 
production but at meaning, that is sharing. 
In the beginning I suggested my attempts to address the modes of speech in 
Ahtila's works, and the questions arising from them, lead me to the space of 
address. What does it mean to address a question, a work or something in 
it? It implies a response to a call that does not originate in the work, but is 
already shared. A response to the call that voices ceaselessly the urgency of 
communication, perhaps.336 My address happens, thus, similarly between us, 
in the encounter(s}. My thought takes place there and is no longer simply 
mine. 
334 Arendt 1971,212. She writes here about a loss of continuity of past and of "certainty of 
evaluation", and about a fragmented past as characterising the conditions we live in. 
335 See Arendt's argument that thought is no longer "politically marginal activity" once it 
reaches beyond one's own life span, judging the past and willing the future into being. 
Arendt 1971, 192. Thinking in the present is then not determined by its past or its future, yet 
it is oriented towards the future as well as outward, beyond the bounds of the individual. The 
notion of judgment (of the past) is here problematic for me, as I will discuss in some detail 
later in relation to witnessing and Mieke Bal's notion of "suspension of judgment". Bal 2006, 
455. See also the notion of the present in relation to questions of located ness, as discussed 
earlier in terms of the address, as well as to thought being both located and transgressing 
this with their movement. This is returned to in the next chapter on witnessing and in the 
Conclusion. 
336 See earlier discussion. Nancy 2003,42,297. 
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Simon O'Sullivan writes, following Deleuze, that thought arises from an 
encounter with something in the world. This encounter is not a matter of 
recognition, but of a rupture that forces me to think.337 Arendt also associates 
thought with rupture: according to her thought interrupts the everyday, until 
its urgencies in turn disrupt thought. Thinking is "out of order".338 These two 
views are not necessarily incompatible, I would claim. Encounters interrupt 
the habitual and allow for a momentary flight. This temporary withdrawal 
does not, however, have to be understood as introversion or enclosure. As I 
have discussed here, thought makes space for dialogue and reaches back 
out towards the world. It is dependent on encounters, on ruptures, while it 
makes them possible by opening the thinker for communication within and 
without. Thought keeps me on the edge of myself. 
337 O'Sullivan 2006, 1. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (London: Continuum, 
1994),139. 
338 Arendt 1971, 197. 
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EIJA-LIISA AHTILA IF 6 WAS 9 (1995-6) 
The work begins with the voices of girls filling the dark space. Their 
unconvincing recitations of moaning and fragmentary dialogue remind of 
clumsy sex scenes in porn. The girls give themselves full points for the 
performance and then, on the three adjacent screens, images appear of an 
automatic doorway of a shopping mall, from where two girls emerge. 
The narrative is structured around individual stories, told one at a time by 
teenage girls. Their words are mainly addressed to the camera. The rest of 
the girls often linger by as if half-listening while engaged in mundane 
activities of eating, school work, playing the piano. Matter-of-factly the girls 
share their memories of, amongst others, a first encounter with porn and 
childhood fascination with the holes of the body. 
The storytelling takes place mostly in domestic settings, while the intervals 
between them scan across cityscapes and zoom into urban passages, such 
as a gateway or a path in a park. Towards the end of the work many of these 
sites can be identified, according to the story of a girl , as public places where 
people have confessed to having had sex. 
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3B. WITNESSING 
IN THE MIDDLE 
"I imagine - ruf ruf. Ruf ruf. I am standing in the middle of characters' 
lines. Without action I grasp the sentences and function as the 
narrator." 
The voice-over narrator in Eija-Liisa Ahtila's video installation Consolation 
Service (1999) finds herself, according to her own words, in the midst of 
spoken lines. She is like a witness to the words, amongst them. This space 
between and around the dialogue is where she speaks from, tells the story. 
In one of the scenes the narrator is, actually, referred to as the neighbour, 
who is writing this story. Does a story need a witness, or a narrator who 
bears witness? What is my role then as a viewer, as one of the witnesses to 
the narrative - addressed by both the narrator and the characters? 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA CONSOLA TlON SERVICE (1999) 
I am spoken to in the media daily, with various tones of voice and from 
numerous points of view - whether informed, convinced, confessed to, etc. 
Traditional news reportage with its talking heads and narrative conventions 
merge together with documentary stories and competition dramas, i.e. the 
whole spectrum of the so-called reality-TV. In some of them I can vote and 
take part in directing the reality of the competitors. However, is it possible to 
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see my role - as a witness to this reality - as active beyond the cast of 
votes? What is the role of the viewer as a witness to all sorts of confessions 
alongside ceaseless horrific events? Is she only a passive receiver, an 
emphatically identifying viewer or a voyeuristic cynic? Or like a passer-by, 
who by accident has ended up in the middle of the events? If as a viewer I 
become, thus, implicated, what kind of responsibility does this involve? How 
can I assume responsibility, act? These questions are the driving forces 
within my writing here. 
Ahtila's works draw my attention to the nature of speech as a performance, a 
narration, an event or an act that reaches out and towards - an address. 
The characters in Ahtila's works speak to me. They direct their words and 
their gaze towards the viewer like in documentary narration, from news 
reportage to reality-TV. The usual position of this talking head is 
problematised in the images, where it appears at times on a single screen yet 
sometimes is present on a number of adjacent screens simultaneously. For 
example, the bond between the image and the voice is broken momentarily. 
At times a face stares at me mute while the voice of this character keeps on 
talking to me from elsewhere. At other times the character is speaking on one 
screen while silent, possibly listening, on another. The presence of a 
character in many parallel images emphasises the sense of disjunction 
between the characters, their stories and the fictional realm they inhabit. 
They act as if witnesses and narrators to their own lives. Through narration 
the characters appear to distance themselves from the events and attempt to 
make their experiences sensible, available for sharing. This distance can also 
be sensed in, for example, the matter-of-factness of their speech, or even a 
lack of expression. Yet sensibility does not here merely refer to clarity of 
meaning nor does the distance provide a detached perspective needed for 
analytical focus. Instead, they open up a space of mediation and contact, a 
possibility for communication, both with oneself and with others. 339 
339 See later: the space opened up by speech, which simultaneously pulls together and apart; 
a space of address, of touch and of communication. See also Nancy's thoughts on the 
"presence-to-itself' and the emphasis on the "to", which also marks the outreach of speech in 
"speaking to", as discussed in the chapter 3a. Thinking Aloud. Nancy 1997, 77. 
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The characters appear to fluctuate or split between simultaneous acts of 
witnessing and bearing witness, or moments of experience and their 
narration. Yet this experience of witnessing is not of immediacy here. It does 
not refer to a truth, nor does it show something or merely register what is 
shown as opposed to the event of telling. 340 The distinction between 
monstration and narration is troubled. According to its definitions witnessing 
refers in its various contexts of use to both showing and telling. 341 Witnessing 
as a notion may, thus, suggest that neither is simply representative or 
descriptive repetition (discussed in the previous chapter Thinking Aloud). 
Furthermore, neither mode of witnessing provides evidence or refers in an 
uncomplicated manner back to an original event as such. Both what is 
witnessed and what is told is here in a process of becoming. The focus shifts 
from veracity to dialogical processes. 
If the characters' mode of speech is described as testimonial, this paves way 
for the consideration of the viewer's position and engagement with the 
speech that addresses her. As a listener to the testimonial the viewer 
becomes a so-called secondary witness, a witness to the process of bearing 
witness. My argument is guided by a shift of attention from veracity of the 
witness account to the address, and to the encounter called forth by it. This 
implies a number of crucial moves: first of all, a shift aside from an emphasis 
on the position of the witness that guarantees the truth value of the account 
and which may be reinstated through the act of bearing witness when, for 
example, testimony is a mode of working through trauma. 342 Furthermore, the 
secondary nature of the witnessing that the viewer is involved in, looking at 
and listening to the testimony, has to be also problematised. If authenticity or 
truth are not at stake here but engagements, the notion of witnessing allows 
for a further critical investigation into what happens in the space of address, 
340 See the narratological distinction of mimesis and diegesis, discussed in the Introduction 
and the chapter 3a. Thinking Aloud. 
341 See e.g. Oxford English Dictionary Online 2000-; Betty Kirkpatrick, ed. Cassel/'s 
Thesaurus (London: Cassell & Co, 1998), 756. 
342 In the discourse on trauma truth is also problematised, yet the focus remains on the 
subject/self and its position. See e.g. Felman & Laub 1992. 
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what emerges from it, and what kind of an active role this may allow for the 
viewer. 
Here it is important to pay some attention to what I refer to as the characters' 
speech. As discussed earlier, the awkwardness of their speech and the 
wandering voices are due to a complex audiovisual choreography 
characteristic to Ahtila's works, to her use of cinematic means of narration 
together with the multi-screen installation format. The impression that the 
characters address me, a viewer, and reach out of the fictional realm with 
their speech, is down to the image at least as much as to the voice. The 
images of the characters speak to me, yet who addresses me cannot be 
pinned down as easily (discussed in the chapter Thinking Aloud). The rather 
inexpressive articulation together with the disjunctions between the voice and 
the image only give constantly fluctuating coordinates for the possible origins 
of the speech. These audiovisual elements entwine with what is said and 
give the characters' speech its confessional, or, as I will argue, its testimonial 
nature. When in the following I refer to speech, this aims to encapsulate the 
audiovisual speech situation in its complexity that is described here. 
In terms of the discourse on witnessing I must, therefore, underline that 
speech or text is not privileged here over image. As Frances Guerin and 
Roger Hallas persuasively argue in the anthology The Image and the 
Witness (2007), the critical discourse on witnessing from the 1980's onwards 
has in its close affiliation with trauma studies largely focused on the spoken 
or written testimonial, i.e. on language and listening in the process of bearing 
witness. The image as a witness, and its troubled status as evidence, has not 
been theorised to the same extent. 343 This poses a considerable challenge to 
my work, yet also highlights its specific focus. How can I think of the viewer's 
position as a witness to the audiovisual testimonial- not only as a listener to 
the spoken accounts, but also addressed by the image, the cinematic body of 
the installation work as well as the embodied fictional characters and the 
343 Frances Guerin & Roger Hallas, "Introduction", in Frances Guerin & Roger Hallas, ed. The 
Image and the Witness: Trauma, Memory and Visual Culture (London & New York: 
Wallflower Press, 2007). 
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unfolding visual landscape and events of the narrative? The image, however, 
is not examined here as a document and its veracity is not of relevance to my 
investigation. Therefore, the attention on the address bypasses the 
problematics of representation and the impossibility of absolute truthfulness 
or capture implied in it, which haunts the discussions of the visual in relation 
to witnessing. 344 As is notably emphasised in the discussions of testimony 
and trauma, the recreation of the original events or the reliving of past 
experiences is not what is at stake in witness accounts, but the production of 
subjectivities and of shared narrative memories through address, through 
speaking and listening.345 
How does this address, this speaking and listening, take place in the field of 
the visual? What does the image and its encounters give rise to beyond 
representation, beyond making visible or acting as truth claims? How does it 
operate otherwise? Hilary Robinson addresses specifically the visual in her 
discussion of Irigaray's strategic mimesis as a practice of rethinking 
representation. She proposes a notion of "witnessing-woman" as an 
alternative to Irigaray's "parler-femme", suggesting that witnessing could be 
an active mode of reclaiming and reworking within the field of 
representation. 346 Her argument implies, yet does not make an in-depth claim 
for, an assumption that witnessing involves active agency and, thus, differs 
from passive viewing. In the field of the visual, as a parallel to speech, 
witnessing suggests performativity. This is what I set out to explore here in 
detail. What else can this imply than active participation in the economy of 
representation? What else is at stake in witnessing than visibility, voice or 
knowledge, of and about the witnessed and/or the witness? Testimonies, as 
well as various kinds of documentaries, can be seen as productive in terms 
of exposure, i.e. as revelation, and evidence. They make visible and inform, 
and the knowledge shared has some intrinsic value. This brings us again 
back to the questions of truth. It suggests that knowledge does something, 
344 See e.g. Guerin & Hallas 2007. 
345 See e.g. Felman & Laub 1992. 
346 Robinson argues that the notion of witness-woman indicates both "an active witnessing of 
the construct 'woman' and the performative mode of a woman bearing witness". Robinson 
2006,42. 
THE ADDRESS: WITNESSING 175 
yet it also asks how knowledge is produced and who does it empower. My 
investigation, however, is geared here not towards knowledge but sharing, 
the event of communication through witnessing and not any content as such 
that may be transferred in it. Or, knowledge itself has to be, thus, 
reconsidered as an event. 
So, what else does witnessing give rise to than awareness and 
understanding? Frances Guerin argues that the image is not merely a 
mediator in an intersubjective relation between, for example, witness and 
viewer, but it can be said to have its own agency.347 The image addresses, 
beyond and aside from what it pictures, as discussed earlier in relation to the 
address. As a viewer-witness I engage with and respond to it, not solely to 
what is depicted or who is speaking in it, such as the characters in Ahtila's 
works. However, my argument does not focus here on the question of 
presence that Guerin refers to, whether of or in an image, as I want to shift 
attention away from the positions of the witnesses per se. 348 The momentary 
encounter in itself, and what happens there, is the key to my considerations 
of witnessing as a viewer. Furthermore, mediation, not immediacy, is of 
crucial importance to this encounter, as will become apparent later. Mediation 
can be said to persist in all modes of witnessing. As a narration that refers to 
the past, the witness account, or the act of bearing witness, is distanced from 
the event and the experience of witnessing itself. The notion of truth is 
always highly problematic in this context as personal memories entwine with 
collective ones when filtered through available modes and languages of 
narration. Yet aside from the question of truth, I argue that this non-
immediacy is what guarantees a space for the address and for the encounter. 
My emphasis on the secondary witness, the viewer, can be seen as 
problematic, particularly in the face of the testimonies of victims and/or 
347 Frances Guerin, "The Grey Space Between: Gerhard Richter'S 18. Oktober 1977", in 
Frances Guerin & Roger Hallas, ed. The Image and the Witness: Trauma, Memory and 
Visual Culture (London & New York: Wallflower Press, 2007), 114. 
348 Central to the argument of Guerin and Hallas is the notion of "iconic presence", or the 
ability of images to bring the event into iconic presence and, thus, mediate intersubjective 
relations. See e.g. Guerin & Hallas 2007, 9-10,12-13. 
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survivors of horrors and tragedies beyond the scope of the experience and 
imagination of most of the viewers. 349 However, I will argue that this shift from 
veracity and, for example, from giving and regaining voice, does not devalue 
the so-called first person witness accounts. Furthermore, it does not imply a 
choice between the speaker and the viewer. On the contrary, it highlights the 
importance of dialogical engagements at the heart of the processes of 
witnessing. It puts weight on the present and the future of these processes 
instead of the past they refer to, on the event itself instead of its origins. It 
focuses on what witnessing does and what it may give rise to. The issue of 
responsibility also emerges anew from these engagements, as argued in 
detail later. Responsibility does not here concern a singular experience that 
demands yet defies complete truthful depiction. The questions of who can 
speak as a witness, what are the criteria of truthfulness, or who controls the 
image, are sidestepped with the shift of attention from the speaker and the 
origin. Responsibility arises from the address and implies, therefore, the 
viewer-witness as much as the one giving testimony or the producer of the 
image. 
With an emphasis on the encounters I sidestep the need to differentiate 
between, for example, first person and secondary modes of witnessing. This 
move also calls into question the distinctions of presence and absence, or 
inside and outside. As attention is drawn to the middle - of the process of 
witnessing, between witnessing and bearing witness, between witnesses-
the following questions gain urgency: How does witnessing relate to the 
address? What kind of communication does it imply? What happens, if 
witnessing is thought of in terms of impossibility and irresponsibility? This 
chapter aims to tackle these questions through a critical focus on the 
following notions: the space of silence and proximity, empathy as similarity 
and rupture, and exposure as encounter. 
349 See e.g. Stephanie Marlin-Curiel's discussion of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the ethically charged and complex problematics of bearing 
witness either to the experience of others or to our own witnessing or trauma. Stephanie 
Marlin-Curiel, "Re-collecting the Collective: Mediatised Memory and the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission", in Frances Guerin & Roger Hallas, ed. The Image and the 
Witness: Trauma, Memory and Visual Culture (London & New York: Wallflower Press, 2007), 
69-81. 
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WITNESSING AND THE ADDRESS 
Ahtila's characters often appear to tell us about the past. They repeat 
their experiences, go over events as if rehearsing them, or analysing 
them through reiteration. For example, in The House (2002) Elisa 
describes the gradual rupture of the coordinates of her self and her 
home. She talks in and about the present, not about the past, yet her 
mode of expression implies narration, repetition. This is not, however, 
a return to or a representation of the past. She describes what she 
sees and experiences in the present, as if in wonder. 
EIJA-liISA AHTILA THE HOUSE (2002) 
Luce Irigaray has written about wonder as a mode of encountering something 
for the first time. She calls for this emotion of surprise and delight, which 
does not aim to possess the encountered as an object, to be returned to its 
place between two subjects as a guarantee of difference and an open space 
that is never fully crossed. 350 Elisa's wonder in the face of her everyday 
environment could be seen as a refusal to take anything for granted, a 
reminder that the world persists as unknowable and unfixed. Observation 
then no longer produces clarity but seems to complicate matters as 
discussed earlier in relation to description (in the chapter 3a. Thinking Aloud). 
Yet, together with the mode of speaking that reaches out towards the 
audience, description as wonder may not be necessarily an attempt at 
capture at all, but a way of insisting on distance and of lingering in this 
unmapped space. The notion of the here and now no longer promises 
350 Irigaray 1993a, 12-13, 72-82. 
THE ADDRESS: WITNESSING 
immediacy but acts as a site of something else than knowing or 
possessi ng. 351 
178 
The way Elisa invites us into her own private realm and shares her thoughts 
with us has an air of confession. Yet her mode of speech differs from 
confession so far as that is understood to be a revelation of a reality that has 
already taken place or is otherwise determined.352 Speech that reminds of 
confession fixes here neither a truth of a certain past nor a private reality 
internal to the subject. Instead, it reaches to and opens up the borders of the 
speaker's realm onto a space of communication, where the distinction of 
internal and external loses its fixed coordinates.353 According to Jean-Luc 
Nancy communication takes place on our boundaries as exposure - both 
uncovering and opening one to the other.354 Confessional mode of speech 
may also be thought of as an exposure, not simply an unveiling. It calls for a 
witness, invites for an encounter. It may, then, be understood as testimonial -
a testimony using confession as its vehicle, to borrow Shoshana Felman's 
words.355 What is told is a medium for something beyond the confession. If all 
speech can be seen as "unwittingly testimonial", as Felman further claims,356 
no testimony, or any speech, is mastered by the speaker. This may refer to 
what is unintentionally unveiled in one's speech - of the speaker, but also of 
speech itself, and of communication. It may hint at both what is or can be 
said as well as at how speech operates, i.e. its address, its orientation 
towards others which depends on the others for its event. Testimony appears 
351 Wonder is returned to in relation to unknowing in the Conclusion. See also discussion of 
unknowing in the chapter 3a. Thinking Aloud. 
352 On the definitions of confession, see Oxford English Dictionary Online 2000-: e.g. 
disclosure of something humiliating, acknowledgement of one's fault or of the truth of a 
statement or of sin, and declaration of belief. Ahtila's works could be also considered in 
terms of appropriation and unsettling of the tropes of documentary narration and the 
confessional in moving image works yet this focus on methods and conventions is beyond 
the frame of my argument and research here, as discussed in the Introduction. 
353 My argument problematises the assumption of pre-existing fixed and bound realities of 
e.g. the fiction and the viewer drawing attention to how these are constantly produced in the 
encounters. See the discussion of the threshold, surfaces and boundaries, as well as of e.g. 
the problematics of immersion in installation art and cinema, in the Introduction. 
354 Nancy 1991, 30, 60. 
355 Felman & Laub 1992, 14. 
356 Ibid., 15. 
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as an event of communication that does something beyond a revelation of a 
private past or an interior state. 
Ahtila's characters appear to have unclear relationships with their own 
narratives, as if balanced uneasily on their borders. From these boundaries 
the characters call for the viewers to take part in the narration, handing out 
their stories as invitations and as demands.357 They urge me, a viewer, to 
witness their testimonies as well as the world that both gives rise to and is 
told into being in their speech. A listener, or a secondary witness, is integral 
to witness accounts, as Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub argue in their 
seminal work on trauma and testimony Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in 
Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (1992).358 A testimony is an address. 
It cannot be a monologue, as Laub states. 359 Furthermore, the ability to 
address and to be addressed is integral to the ability to witness and, 
entwined with it, the sense of subjectivity.360 Yet, as testimony is always 
addressed to others, the witness can be seen as a medium or a vehicle for 
an event or an emergence of something beyond him/herself, Felman 
claims.361 Thus, when understood as witness accounts, the characters' 
speech acts address the viewers, and the narratives no longer merely 
concern or convey singular experiences. Nor do they simply refer back to, 
confirm or give rise to subject positions. 
The notion of witnessing allows further investigation into the characters' 
mode of speech as address, but it also concerns the viewer's position. The 
way the characters split onto parallel images, both in the roles of speakers 
and listeners, is one of the aspects that problematizes the position of the 
characters in relation to their narratives as well as multiplies viewpoints into 
and within the works. It is as if they simultaneously bear witness to and 
357 The characters of Ahtila's works could be compared here with the public personas created 
in reality-TV, but this investigation remains beyond the frame of this thesis. 
358 Felman & Laub 1992. See also e.g. Mieke Bars emphasis on the need of a second 
person to act as a confirming witness for narrative memories. Mieke Bal, "Introduction", in 
Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe, Leo Spitzer, ed. Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present 
(Hanover & London: University Press of New England, 1999), x. 
359 Felman & Laub 1992, 71. 
360 See e.g. Felman & Laub 82; Bal 1999, x-xi. 
361 Felman & Laub 1992, 3. 
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witness their own testimonies, occupying different witness positions (of both 
firsthand and secondary witness) at once. This echoes with the emphasis on 
the dialogical nature of the thinking subject discussed in the previous 
chapter. The viewer, then, acts as a listener to the testimonies, but also as a 
witness to the complexity and fragmentation of the speaking and addressing 
subject: to the questioning of normative subjectivity and unity of an individual 
(see e.g. The House and the fracturing of the self in psychosis or If 6 Was 9 
(1995-6), where the stories of individuals have a collective air and challenge 
temporal linearity) or the simultaneous distinction and non-distinction of the 
characters' singular realities (e.g. Today (1996-7) and Consolation Service). 
At the same time the viewer's role is that of a witness amongst the others, 
always necessarily with a partial and unfixed perspective like that of the 
characters. I am listening to and looking at the speakers, while standing 
alongside the characters talking and listening to themselves. 
The characters could be seen to both witness and give rise to something 
through the process of testimony.362 As my focus is drawn to the 
abovementioned questions of subjectivity, I take part in this production. This 
is not so much despite as thanks to the way my position as a viewer is hardly 
any clearer than that of the speakers, who appear to be in the middle of a 
process without a secure place within or in relation to what they are 
witnessing, i.e. their own stories. As I am not guided into the narratives 
through single view points (such as those indicated by what is called the 
focalizer in narratology), I am made aware of the different levels of witnessing 
possible for me as an analytical viewer of the narrative: as a witness of the 
story, of the text, and of its production and reception. 363 But with their 
examples the characters also point me towards the multiple co-existing levels 
of listening as a secondary witness, which Laub defines as being witness to 
oneself within the experience told (autobiographical awareness), to the 
testimonies of others (as a companion on a journey), and listening to the 
362 See distinction in e.g. Felman & Laub 1992, 16. 
363 See distinction of levels in Irene Kacandes, "Narrative Witnessing as Memory Work: 
reading Gertrud Kolmar's A Jewish Mother', in Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe, Leo Spitzer, ed. 
Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present (Hanover & London: University Press of New 
England, 1999), 56. 
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process of witnessing itself (reflection).364 As a secondary witness, 
responding to an address, I do not simply view the works from an analytical 
distance, but may get entwined within the witnessed and go along with the 
other witnesses, yet can also critically reflect on this complex event. The 
latter modes of witnessing are discussed in more depth in the following. 
Neither the characters nor the viewer appear to occupy single definable 
positions as witnesses in Ahtila's works. According to a general definition, the 
witness is either a third party, for example between two rival parties in court, 
or a person with first hand experience.365 The witness is either a neutral 
outsider, who has the authority to prove something true or false, or someone, 
who has lived through the event and therefore, necessarily, has a partial 
viewpoint on it. Witnessing has to do with both seeing and telling, and its 
definitions repeat the dichotomy between objective overall perspective and 
subjective view, distance and immediacy. Truth remains a matter of 
negotiation - whether it is understood as firsthand experience or the privilege 
of an impartial observer. However, there is also an insurmountable difference 
between being a witness and bearing witness, a gap between an experience 
and its articulation, a lived moment and its recollection. 366 This is marked by a 
shift from solitary witnessing to sharing, a transgression of solitude through 
an address, the importance of which Felman stresses.367 The directness 
associated with first-hand witnessing is, amongst others, problematised by 
this gap. It also highlights the impossibilities, and potential, that permeate 
witnessing. 
364 Felman & Laub 1992, 75-6. 
365 See e.g. Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (New 
York: Zone Books, 1999), 17. 
366 See e.g. Yomi Braester, ed. Witness Against History: Literature, Film, and Public 
Discourse in Twentieth-Century China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), ix; Jane 
Blocker, "Binding to Another's Wound: Of Weddings and Witness", in Gavin Butt, ed. After 
Criticism (London: Blackwell, 2005), 52, 56. 
367 Felman 1992, 3. 
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IMPOSSIBILITY AND COMMUNICATION 
The witness accounts offered by the characters do not quite satisfy the 
criteria of testimonies of those with sovereign firsthand knowledge. Instead, 
they fluctuate constantly between the various witness positions, from 
witnessing to bearing witness and to witnessing their own testimonies. If 
taken as witnesses, Ahtila's characters do not fit into the clear-cut distinction 
of in- and outsiders. Am I, as a viewer, an outsider, or does my fragmented 
view or my assumption of a place as the addressee of the characters 
compromise this expected external perspective and objectivity? 
Some notions attached to witnessing, such as the bystander, do unsettle this 
binary. In his discussion of witnessing in Remnants of Auschwitz: The 
Witness and the Archive (1999) Giorgio Agamben focuses also on the space 
between the two opposing poles. Commenting on the testimonies of the 
survivors of Auschwitz he writes about events seen at close hand. Then the 
witness does not speak in the name of truth and consistency but his speech 
draws attention to that, which it cannot bear witness to. Agamben positions 
the witness on the threshold between inside and outside, in the space of 
impossibility and uncertainty.368 This threshold is neither connection nor 
dialogue, Agamben stresses. 369 Perhaps it can be understood as an opening, 
and not a relation between, for example, inside and outside or experience 
and its recollection. It is, then, not defined by the two opposing poles, and it 
allows neither for their distinction nor fusion. It may be likened to the space of 
communication and proximity, which I examine later reflecting on the 
thoughts of Nancy and Irigaray. This is where my focus lies, this threshold 
opened up by the impossibility inherent in, or even driving witnessing, and 
not in what it is that cannot be borne witness to. I am not striving to examine 
where this impossibility originates, such as the horror that cannot be captured 
by the expressive means of language, but what it allows. The space that it 
clears I also aim to inhabit in what follows. 
368 Agamben 1999, 33-35. On the impossibility to witness (death) from either inside or 
outside, see also Felman & Laub 1992, 232. 
369 Agamben 1999,36. See discussion of threshold in the chapter 2a. No-Thing Leaking. 
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If the witness is positioned neither in nor out, but on a threshold, is this where 
the address of the witness account also arises from? The threshold would be, 
thus, not a space of dialogue between two, but an opportunity for the 
emergence of communication. The exploration of this space and of what 
emerges there, draws focus on how witnessing is entangled with speech and 
language. The importance of language is stressed in the critical examinations 
of witness accounts, for example in terms of the significance of speech and 
narration in the working through of trauma.370 In testimony language is in 
process and in trial, Shoshana Felman claims. 371 This is echoed in 
Agamben's argument that language is born in and as testimony.372 When 
bearing witness the limits of language are tested - language happens. The 
impossibility to bear witness - to say - may be what drives the urge to 
address, to speak and to allow language to emerge in testimony. 
It may be the very impossibility that makes communication then possible. The 
existence of language does not, in itself, contain an obligation to 
communicate, as Agamben writes: "only if language is not always already 
communication, only if language bears witness to something to which it is 
impossible to bear witness, can a speaking being experience something like 
a necessity to speak."373 The impossibility, which gives birth or spark to 
communication, is in my view not only something excluded by the internal 
logic of language.374 It is not a lack or a void waiting to be filled within the 
limits or by the expansion of the bounds of a particular language. It is 
necessary for speech and for communication. This impossibility may be 
associated with the gap between bearing witness and being a witness that 
makes journeying together in language possible - the space that does not 
allow for an assimilation of experiences nor of privileging certain witness 
accounts as more valid than others due to their perceived relation to an 
authentic origin. I shift attention, thus, to the gap itself, as a space of address, 
370 See e.g. Felman and Laub 1992; Bal 1999. 
371 Felman 1992, 5. 
372 Agamben 1999, 38. 
373 Ibid., 65. 
374 With testimony Agamben refers to the relation between inside and outside, the sayable 
and the unsayable in every language (or langue). Ibid., 145. 
THE ADDRESS: WITNESSING 184 
from the distinction of experience and its articulation.375 The emphasis of my 
argument lies not on the irreducible distance between language and what it 
refers to, and the associated problematic oppositions of matter and meaning 
or immediacy and mediation. Impossibility, or the beyond of language and 
representation, is not here linked to what can or cannot be spoken and 
shared. Rather, they have to do with the sharing itself, I argue, and the 
spacing necessary for it. 
EIJA-liISA AHTILA TODA Y (1996-7) 
The characters in Ahtila's works hover on the borders of the events, as if 
onlookers, witnesses. Their mode of speech distances them from the events 
and, in this way, seems to emphasise the shift that takes place in narration, 
the shift from witnessing to bearing witness. Their testimonies are marked by 
this impossibility of direct transfer or an unbridgeable gap inherent in 
witnessing. Yet they appear haunted by some kind of an impossibility to 
speak as well, or at least an awkward relationship to the language at their 
disposal (see chapter Thinking Aloud). It is as if they were trying to speak on 
375 See Nancy K. Miller and Jason Tougaw on the space between experience and its 
articulation: Nancy K. Miller & Jason Tougaw, ed. Extremities: Trauma, Testimony, and 
Community (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002). This connects, later in this 
chapter, with the discussion of Agamben's thoughts on community and language, with its 
shift from content to speech itself. See also further examination of the space of address as a 
space of with , which troubles the above binary distinctions, towards the end of this chapter. 
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behalf of someone, possibly on behalf of themselves, in this fictive space-
time of ruptured coordinates. In The House Elisa attempts to communicate 
and reframe her experience of psychosis and her fragmented self, who could 
not herself tell of her own experiences. In If 6 Was 9, then again, the voice of 
older women is audible in the speech of the girls as it attempts to recapture 
the awakening sense of sexuality, which the teenagers do not yet have their 
own language for. 
The characters could be said to act out the impossibility of witnessing. Yet, 
they do not merely represent it, but this impossibility is what makes their 
witnessing possible. 376 The works do not represent processes of witnessing 
but implicate the viewer in the event of witnessing itself, no longer simply as 
a reader or a receiver. Or, in other words, following Agamben, in their speech 
the characters bear witness to their own incapacity to speak. This spoken 
language cannot be archived, Agamben stresses. 377 This event of speech 
cannot be captured, catalogued or interpreted. Instead, it requires that the 
viewer becomes another witness and responds to the address, listens. What 
is at stake here, for my argument, is not the gap between the event and its 
articulation that is impossible to overcome. Rather, this irreducible distance 
opens onto another space, that of address between the speaker and the 
audience. This spacing between the one bearing witness and the witnesses 
to this very event of speech is not to be bridged by, for example, 
understanding either. The emphasis shifts from attempts at capture through 
representation and signification of an experience. What matters here, in this 
notion of witnessing, is the movement, the outward orientation. The focus is 
drawn from what is witnessed, or what is impossible to bear witness to, to the 
encounters initiated in witnessing. 
376 See later discussion of certain narrative structures and rhetoric tropes, such as 
fragmentariness, as a performance of trauma that invites the viewer to act as a narrative 
witness. Kacandes 1999, 62-65. However, neither the analysis of the operations of the works 
nor a focus on the viewer's involvement as a mode of reading is at stake in my argument 
here in its move away from the problematics of representation. 
m Agamben 1999, 161-2. 
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What happens when speaking to and for someone? As mentioned before in 
relation to thinking aloud, the wandering voices of the characters appear to 
be without both clear predefined origins and a pre-assumed audience. 
Therefore, it is problematic to say that the works, or the characters in them, 
give voice to or speak on behalf of someone, who does not have one's own 
voice or language. This implies the pre-existence of a subject within the 
existing frame of language and knowledge, who needs representation and 
could be represented. Giving voice is also associated with visibility, 
representation and naming, i.e. recognition of the specificity of those 
previously excluded, silenced or ignored.378 Ahtila's characters and their 
mode of speech, however, defy this as their voices never perfectly coincide 
with their images and never gain fixed points of origin. Yet, instead of being 
irredeemably lost and without a voice, they appear to insist on this openness 
and unfixity. The characters do not here regain previously lost subject 
positions or gain new ones through their testimonies, or through the address 
and response of a viewer-listener. I would argue that the work actually shifts 
focus away from what kinds of subjects the characters may represent or call 
forth. Instead, with their speech the characters gesture towards and call 
something, and not simply someone, into being. 379 This mode of witnessing 
may be drawing forward both the viewer and the speaker, into co-existence. 
The emphasis rests then on the space of address and encounter between 
them. 
Speech is only communication when it happens together. As Luce Irigaray 
stresses, it starts from two, but can then no longer be divided again. 380 
37& Peggy Phelan's problematisation of identity politics that rely on the economy of visibility 
and representation has been central to my argument here. Phelan 1993. 
379 Ahtila has argued that in her works she sees performance as a mode of giving. Giving 
could, thus, be said to call for the receiver, or the viewer. Following my argument, it does not 
just call the viewer into being but for something to emerge in and out of the encounter. The 
critical discourse around the notion of giving is, however, beyond the scope of my research 
here. Eija-Liisa Ahtila, Email correspondence with Taru Elfving, 2002. See also texts based 
on this conversation, with some further discussion of performance as giving: Taru Elfving, 
"Eija-Liisa Ahtila: Alles tegelijkertijd (On the Thresholds)" in Metropolis M, no. 1, Feb/Mar 
2003 (Utrecht, 2003b); Taru Elfving, "Eija-Liisa Ahtila. Acts of Sharing" in Breaking the Ice: 
Contemporary Art from Finland (Bonn: Kunstmuseum Bonn, 2006). 
380 Irigaray 2002,27. 
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Irigaray writes about an unbridgeable distance, an interval: "a reserve of 
silence appropriate neither simply to me nor simply to the other, space 
between us where we are going our way toward one another through the 
gesture (of) speaking."381 There we move toward the other with our speech 
and speechlessness, addressing and listening. This space can no longer be 
defined as a between-two.382 
When the woofs die down in the barking scene of Consolation Service 
the couple bury their faces in their hands and the woman cries for 
help. People from the waiting area walk quietly into the therapist's 
room and sit down by the walls. Invisible to the couple and the 
therapist they seem to witness the divorce. 
EIJA- lIISA AHTILA CONSOLA TlON SERVICE (1999) 
The people listen, giving the couple the silence, where to speak. As Irigaray 
writes: "silence is space-time offered to you with no a priori , no pre-
established truth or ritual. "383 The silence created by the witnesses along the 
edges of this space and moment is not defined by anyone or coloured by any 
specific perspective. They all simply open up to the event, and through 
listening and looking allow it to happen. As stressed earlier, listening as a 
witness is a response that is called for by the address of testimony. But the 
381 Ibid., 66. 
382 On the space opened up by speech, see the chapter 3a. Thinking Aloud. This also has to 
do with questions of relationality (of e.g. subjectivity) as an open process, not definable in 
terms of the different parties, but gaining shape in their encounter, unfolding between them. 
This is comparable to the ideas of subjectivity as well as meaning as emerging from 
communication , as "being-with". See e.g. Nancy 1997, 77-9; Nancy 2000,1-15, 87; Irigaray 
1996, 109-110; Irigaray 2002, 34-44. 
383 Irigaray 1996, 117. 
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witness is also to address silences, to hear them, as Laub states in his 
discussion of the psychoanalyst-listener's task. 384 The silences in speech are 
the potential ground of emergence, not unlike the silence offered to the 
speaker by the witnesses. The listener-witness' role is, thus, neither simply 
involved nor detached. She stands by and makes space with her distanced 
proximity, by being addressed and by addressing in turn by seeing and 
hearing. 
What may silence allow for, what may emerge from it? Is this a space of 
mutual address, a site of an encounter, where meanings happen? Meaning is 
an event and a sharing according to both Irigaray and Nancy. It is then no 
longer merely informing or passing on, stresses Irigaray, while Nancy 
emphasises that it is never completed, but always yet-to-come. 3g5 Meaning, 
detached from representation, is no longer incompatible with the dynamics of 
address or with the senselessness of the orientation of speech (as discussed 
in the chapter Thinking Aloud). In her writing on witnessing in Unclaimed 
Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (1996) Cathy Caruth focuses 
similarly on the openings that words create. Communication is not exchange 
but an encounter that unsettles our knowledge and perception. 386 The 
incomprehensibility of the encountered and the experienced, and the break 
away from understanding that follows, discloses a novel way to look and to 
listen. According to Caruth this is what makes witnessing possible. 387 When 
words no longer convey messages or promise to signify, they move towards 
the others, calling for witnesses. 
384 Laub 1992, 58. 
385 Irigaray 2002,27; Nancy 1997, 78. 
386 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore & 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996),35. According to her, this opening does 
not happen through meanings, but it is given birth by a demand (or a call to listen) that defies 
meanings and by the questions that arise from this. Compare with the "interruption" Nancy 
emphasises as that which maintains openness in communication, and with Irigaray's claim 
that communication is not transmission of messages nor exchange but sharing. E.g. Nancy 
1991,60-65; Irigaray 2002,27. 
387 Caruth 1996,56. Compare with the argument of Marianne Hirsch on the potential of 
images to rupture the narrative flow and allow for "indirect witnessing". Marianne Hirsch, 
"Projected Memory: Holocaust Photographs in Personal and Public Fantasy", in Mieke Bal, 
Jonathan Crewe, Leo Spitzer, ed. Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present (Hanover & 
London: University Press of New England, 1999),20. Hirsch refers here to the rupture or 
incomprehensibility as an exception or a detail within a narrative, while Caruth discusses the 
whole of the encounter in these terms. 
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Testimony addresses events or experiences that exceed signification, as 
Felman argues,388 but it also operates itself beyond signification. This 
excessiveness does not imply opposition to sense. Instead meaning, like 
language, happens in testimony. Neither meaning nor knowledge can pre-
exist it, nor can it be possessed outside of the "dialogic process of bearing 
witness", as Felman writes. 389 With this I do not, however, refer to a co-
production of meaning, or its completion in interpretative dialogue. 
Communication does not here take place on the plane of signification. In 
testimony, in its address, communication breaks free from the economy of 
signification and begins to operate otherwise. It may, then, no longer be a 
search, whether individual or shared, for an expression or a meaning for 
something that so far has remained unsaid, beyond words and 
understanding. What matters is not any particular information passed, 
discovered or produced, but the situation of bearing witness itself, the 
happening of knowledge, as Laub emphasises.39o 
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As discussed earlier, the witness is positioned according to Agamben on the 
threshold between the outside and the inside, in a space of impossibility.391 
This impossibility must be also unhinged from the opposition of signification 
and nonsense, or the associated binaries of telling and seeing, recollection 
and experience. 392 Suspended in the middle it no longer refers simply to an 
impossibility to say or to understand. It is what allows, and demands, a shift 
away from the privilege of signification and production of knowledge. 
Impossibility in witnessing also implies dispersion as the witnesses do not fix 
the witnessed, but could be said to take the event with them, as Jane Blocker 
observes. 393 The production of the narrative and its meanings together, in 
communication, fails in the end to lead to a single truth, story or knowledge. 
388 Felman & Laub 1992, 5. 
389 Ibid., 51. 
390 Ibid., 62 & 85. In Laub's discussion of psychoanalytic listening practice the stress is on the 
working through of trauma and healing, or even re-construction, of the self that is allowed in 
this process. As will be evident later, my interests here lie not on construction of subjectivity 
but on witnessing as an encounter, yet this dialogic event is also my point of focus over any 
product as such, which are, anyway, inseparable from it. 
39\ Agamben 1999, 33-35. 
392 "To bear witness, it is therefore not enough to bring language to its own non-sense", but it 
has to open to that, which does not have a language, Agamben claims. Ibid., 39. 
393 Blocker 2005, 55-61. 
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Yet, as stated above, any products as such are here, anyhow, outweighed by 
the encounters that give rise to them, or where they emerge.394 The response 
of listening, of witnessing, allows for narration and for making sense but, as 
an event, not for closure. 
How is the encounter called forth? How do I become a witness? The 
woman's cry for help in Consolation Service can be seen as a performative 
that calls for and inaugurates witnesses. 395 It also places the viewers in the 
role of witnesses, makes them part of a silent group on the borders of the 
narrative realm and the event. As a witness nobody is fully an outsider.396 As 
an addressee, a second person, the viewer-witness is implicated in complex 
ways. The viewer's engagement, its field of possibilities, is guided with 
various narrative tropes and strategies. Mieke Sal equates in Looking In 
(2001) direct address (in its numerous rhetorical forms) with a powerful 
speech act that "establishes a continuity between the subject of address and 
the addressee". Simultaneously, the viewer may be "rhetorically 
contaminated" by the similarity between her position and that of the 
witnesses within the narrative - whether an affirmative stance like my reading 
of the silent witnesses in Consolation Service suggests or, for example, 
something ethically problematic. 397 Indirection, such as in the form of gaps in 
394 Jane Blocker writes about e.g. wedding photographs, as discussed above, but similarly 
media images of events (or fictive works such as Ahtila's) could be seen to reach out like 
words, calling for further witnesses. They make, thus, contacts possible, instead of merely 
attempting to freeze a moment gone and to communicate something about it. 
395 Performative utterances have the power to cause change, e.g. to declare someone 
innocent or guilty, as well as simultaneously to inaugurate witnesses to this event. See e.g. 
Blocker 2005,53. See also questions of responsibility in witnessing, as this inauguration can 
be understood as "a call to duty", e.g. David Dibosa, "Witness This: Art, Memory, 
Democracy", in Parachute: art contemporain / contemporary art, 111 (Montreal: Parachute, 
2003), 94. I problematise this emphasis on duty in a detailed discussion of responsibility here 
later. 
396 Compare second person, the addressee, with the third person. The novelist Siri Hustvedt 
has written about the importance of the witness in fiction as a third person, not fully an 
insider nor an outsider, not really present yet not absent either, like the narrator. Siri 
Hustvedt, A Plea For Eros (London: Sceptre, 2006), 63-65. Hustvedt focuses in her 
argument on the questions of vision meanwhile problematising the boundaries of reality and 
fiction, outside and inside, presence and absence. This has a close connection also to the 
problematics of subjectivity and otherness. E.g. Trinh T. Minh-ha writes about the 
"inappropriate other", who troubles the distinction of inside and outside, in relation to cultural 
difference and its representation. Trinh T. Min-ha 1991, 65-78. 
397 Mieke Bal, Looking In: The Art of Viewing (Amsterdam: G+B Arts International, 2001), 
103. 
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the narrative, can be also said to call for the viewer's involvement as a 
narrative witness, piecing the story together. Irene Kacandes, then again, 
associates this fragmentariness with traumatic symptoms: the viewer is urged 
to witness the indirections as silences that testify within the narrative. 398 
However, what calls for the viewer does not simply reside in the works. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, a response to something as a direct 
address, for example, is guided also by the viewer's own desires. 399 The 
different modes of engagement as a viewer-witness, thus, touch on the 
problematics of identification as well as the persisting critical distinction of 
inside and outside. The uneasy balance on the threshold is also highlighted 
by the hazards that Felman and Laub associate with secondary witnessing or 
Iistening.40o As a witness I am faced with the at times unbearable weight of 
questions of life as well as my own boundaries, amongst them the limits of 
my comprehension. The challenge is to remain on this edge, without 
withdrawing behind the walls of defensive reactions. 
COMPASSION 
In the work The Hour of Prayer (2005) a woman tells about the illness 
and death of her dog. In the four-screen installation she describes 
unemotionally the events, at times addressing the camera directly, at 
other times as a narrator's voice-over. The change of seasons is 
reflected in the scenes from New York via Finnish lakes to Benin. In 
398 Kacandes 1999, 63, 65-66. See also Miller & Tougaw on different rhetorical tropes that 
allow for specific kinds of engagements with testimonial texts. They discuss e.g. asyndeton 
as a figure that invites the viewer to fill in the gaps and, thus, to "remember with" the other, 
which involves recognition of both what connects and what differentiates yet resists 
identification. Miller & Tougaw 2002, 10. Ahtila's works could be argued to both bear witness 
to traumatic events and with the use of particular rhetoric tropes to act out traumatic 
symptoms as gaps, silences and disjunctions in its narrative. Yet, as argued earlier, my 
argument does not focus on the textual or narrative strategies of the works, nor on 
witnessing as a mode of reading. On the complexity of possible readings that focus on the 
narration and, in particular, on the disruption and overlaying of various narrative conventions 
in Ahtila's work, see e.g. Mieke Bal's analysis of The House: Mieke Bal, "What if ... ? 
Exploring 'unnaturality"', in World Rush 4 Artists (Melbourne: National Gallery of Victoria, 
2005). 
399 See the chapter 3a. Thinking Aloud, and Johnson 1987, 185. 
4()O Felman & Laub 1992, xvii. 
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between we catch glimpses of a dog. The speech is composed, even 
matter-of-fact, but its rhythm is soft. Past events are told, presented to 
me as a story. In the end of the piece the staging turns smoothly into a 
stage, the cinematic reality into a performance of a song. 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA THE HOUR OF PRA YER (2005) 
I am not very fond of dogs. Nevertheless the story of a dog's death touches 
me. So does the barking in Consolation Service. I am not, however, 
interested in what touches me here as much as on what happens when I am 
touched? Following Irigaray touch could be associated with proximity - not a 
fusion but a contact.401 To be touched by an image or a narrative does not 
necessarily mean either identification or emotional immersion in contrast to 
critical engagement and understanding. It can be moving, not just onto the 
verge of tears, but to the edges of myself, of what I know and of knowing 
itself. I respond to something as an address and am moved towards it. 
The sorrow that surfaces while watching the work is not simply a matter of 
identification or empathy. Empathy, when understood as an ability to assume 
the other's position, is problematic because it implies that our feelings and 
experiences are commensurate. This, just like identification, may lead to a 
denial or at least to a forgetting of the unknowability and difference of the 
other. Cathy Caruth stresses that an encounter is possible once 
understanding is requested and simultaneously denied as an impossibility -
this opens up a space, where easy empathy is disallowed yet we are not 
completely locked apart.402 Similarity addresses in this way: it is "not only an 
analogy, "like you", but an address: "listen to me".403 The similarity of our 
40 1 Irigaray 2002, 18; Elfving 2005, 28. 
402 Caruth 1996,41. 
403 Ibid. 
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experiences - not their sameness - enables a connection that has room for 
difference. Like Caruth states in her writing on trauma, it is a call of an other, 
which demands to be heard and responded to, yet always remains 
mysterious. 404 
This openness, a kind of incompleteness, does not have to be considered in 
terms of lack. It is not necessarily a horrifying emptiness that gives rise to 
movement, desire and attempts of completion. What cannot be told, passed 
on or compared, may be seen as a common yet indefinable space. It does 
not so much resist signification as calls for its complexity and infinity. It is a 
space of address, of speech and listening, that allows for encounter. It may 
be integral to processes of healing and of regaining one's voice, as stressed 
in the discourse on trauma. Yet it is also a space of rupture, and this is what I 
focus on here.405 
Witnessing is discussed in terms of unsettlement and, furthermore, 
associated with empathy but not with identification, by Nancy K. Miller and 
Jason Tougaw in Extremities (2002). Empathy appears, then, as an 
openness that allows for encounter yet defies closure either through fusion or 
resolution of some kind. 406 Similar to this notion of empathy, identification 
itself has also been thought of as a mode that insists on a space between. 
With an emphasis on identification-with, instead of identification-as, it has 
been critically reconsidered in the examination of witnessing by Marianne 
404 Ibid., 8-9. 
405 Much of the theorisation on witnessing in relation to visual culture or narration focuses on 
trauma and the role of witnessing and witness accounts in the working through of trauma. 
Without wanting to dismiss these unquestionably invaluable and urgent investigations I aim 
to, however, open up the notion of witnessing to other modes of operations as I believe it 
allows for further considerations of various encounters, with their own urgency, in the 
everyday. See also Mieke Bal's discussion of witnessing in terms of healing, solidarity and 
narratibility. Ba11999, x. Compare with my discussion of communication in terms of rupture 
and exposure, and the emergence of "we", later in this chapter. I do not see Bars view as 
necessarily contradictory to mine, yet need to emphasise critical rethinking of e.g. terms 
such as commonality or making sense away from implied closure. 
4()6 Miller & Tougaw 2002,6. They refer here to Dominic LaCapra's notion of "empathic 
unsettlement", Dominick LaCapra, "Trauma, Absence, Loss", in Critical Inquiry 25 (Summer 
1999) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 722. See also LaCapra on empathy in 
writing history, analysis and observation, Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma 
(Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 40-42. See also Bars 
emphasis on "ethical connectedness not based on appropriation" in her discussion of 
witnessing, Bal 1999, xii. 
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Hirsch. She refers to Kaja Silverman's term "heteropathic identification", or 
"identification-at-a-distance", as a way of "aligning oneself with" instead of 
assimilating the other.407 This draws out the space between and 
problematises the very possibility of identification as fusion, sameness. 
However, persistence on the notion of identification continues to focus on 
subject and object positions as well as their specificities. With my choice of 
emphasis on empathy I aim to shift attention firmly on the space of "with" 
itself. 
In Jean-Luc Nancy's thought similarity entwines with the question of the 
fundamental togetherness of being.408 This Nancy depicts as a rupture in 
Being Singular Plural (2000). He also places compassion in this space of 
disruption: 
"not compassion as a pity that feels sorry for itself and feeds on itself. 
Com-passion is the contagion, the contact of being with one another in 
this turmoil. Compassion is not altruism, nor is it identification; it is the 
disturbance of violent relatedness.''409 
It is a matter of touches as well as of clashes but, as in Irigaray's thought, not 
of fusion. Empathy can, then, also be understood as compassion or "intense 
affinity", and not only in terms of identification, Rosi Braidotti claims in 
Transpositions (2006). She locates empathy between individuals and 
distinguishes it strictly from both the personal and the universal. Braidotti 
suggests that it is based on "the radical immanence of a sense of belonging 
to and being accountable for a community, a people and a territory."410 This 
407 Hirsch 1999,9. See also Silverman 1996, 185. Hirsch also discusses identification and 
witnessing with a reference to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's emphasis on allo- instead of auto-
identification, i.e. identification-with instead of -as. Marianne Hirsch, "Marked by Memory: 
Feminist Reflections on Trauma and Transmission", in Nancy K. Miller & Jason Tougaw, ed. 
Extremities: Trauma, Testimony, and Community (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 2002), 76; Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1990), 59-63. 
408 E.g. Nancy 1991, 33-34. 
409 Nancy 2000, xiii. 
4iO Braidotti 2006, 205. Braidotti has dealt with the problematics of empathy in her work, e.g. 
in terms of an expanded notion of community (beyond humans) and ecological concerns. 
Here it is also, in my view, important to understand immanence in terms of being located, 
defying the opposition of matter and meaning. Empathy can be, then, understood as 
troubling the opposition of identification and analysis, or immersion and detachment. 
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refers, in my view, to a constantly re-situated sense of commonality that 
resists fixed definitions and in our encounters ceaselessly unsettles the 
bounds of ourselves and of what we know. It could be associated, thus, with 
the address and thought, which were both discussed in the previous chapter 
as simultaneously located and reaching beyond this location. It is not 
founded on a shared identity or rooted in an origin of some kind. Instead, as 
will be discussed in more detail later, it is a sense of belonging and of a 
community that emerges and keeps on shifting in communication. 
Compassion, and the accountability Braidotti mentions, has to be also 
distinguished from a specific notion of responsibility as duty. In relation to 
witnessing Agamben brings up the question of responsibility and its link to 
the law, obligation and guilt. According to him irresponsibility, not 
responsibility, is what is central to ethical questions - not as an opposite of 
responsibility but as an area before all distinctions of good and bad.411 A 
move away from obligation appears to be a key to the problematics of 
witnessing as well. An address that inaugurates witnesses is not so much a 
call to duty but a reminder of accountability beyond any sense of obligation. 412 
It may be a matter of recognising one's implication, not as a sense of 
responsibility but as a feeling of some essential belonging, like that being-in-
common that Nancy writes about. Nancy associates responsibility with 
response and engagement, and stresses that it is not "a task assigned to us, 
but an assignment that constitutes our being."413 Irresponsibility is, thus, not a 
denial of or indifference to one's implication. A touch is always a rupture, 
before any meanings and roles that assign responsibility. It does not, 
however, entail a return or a regression, but it is an opening, a reach out and 
Therefore, I argue for a notion of empathy that is no longer tied to identification, but 
associated now with "being-in-common" instead of "having-in-common", following the 
differentiation by Irit Rogoff in her critique of empathic viewing and the related identity 
politics. Irit Rogoff, "No Longer Required: From Empathic Viewers to Participants", in A.K. 
Jortvelt & A. Kroksness, ed. Devil-may-care: The Nordic Pavilion at the 5dh Venice Biennial 
2003 (Oslo & Ostfildern-Ruit: Office for Contemporary Art Norway & Hatje Cantz, 2003). 
411 Agamben 1999,21-2. Compare with Butler's mention of responsibility that the citationality 
of language brings with it: "Responsibility is thus linked with speech as repetition, not as 
origination." Butler 1997,39. Instead of responsibility and obligation my argument focuses 
here on what performativity allows, i.e. pushing of the boundaries of the sayable and of what 
is predetermined in speech. 
412 See David Dibosa's suggestion that a witness is called to duty. Dibosa 2003, 94. 
413 Nancy 2003, 296. See also his notions of being-with and being-in-common, Nancy 2000. 
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a becoming. Therefore, witnessing has to do with proximity, being and 
coming close, similarity. 
196 
Communication is also this intimacy, which does not lead to fusion and which 
cannot be captured in words or detached from its event. Yet this, an 
impossibility, is what I attempt to approach here - to tell what has happened 
with Ahtila's works, and to allow further communication to take place here in 
my writing. While reaching out to the edges of the fictional realm the speech 
of the characters in Ahtila's works breaks away from representative 
expression. Their performance does and not merely represents something. 
Nancy writes that storytelling, performance or theatre "no longer means the 
scene of representation: it means the extreme edge of this scene, the 
dividing line where singular beings are exposed to each one another."414 It 
requires, therefore, another mode of listening than identification or analytical 
interpretation.415 Listening appears as an exposure. It draws me to my edges, 
it addresses. Also the very hazards involved in listening, as discussed in 
terms of secondary witnessing by Felman and Laub, have to do with facing 
the questions of life and death that push against our limits and against the 
bounds of our habitual modes of communication. Exposure is not so much 
revelation nor transgression of the boundaries, but inhabitation of them.416 
From our boundaries opens up potential to imagine communication without 
limits, following Agamben's thoughts: 
"if humans could, that is, not be-thus in this or that particular 
biography, but be only the thus, their singular exteriority and their face, 
then they would for the first time enter into a community without 
presuppositions and without subjects, into a communication without 
the incommunicable."417 
414 Nancy 1991,65. 
415 Compare with Caruth 1996, 52. 
416 See also Miller and Tougaw's discussion of the "politics of empathy" and "reading for the 
extreme" in relation to negotiations of "the limits of our civic engagement". Miller & Tougaw 
2002,18. 
417 Agamben 1993, 65. 
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This refers, in my view, to encounters without predefined positions, as pure 
surfaces of contact, without assumptions about what lies beneath them. 
Communication is oriented then towards the future. It generates something, 
in this moment, without relying on what is already known. The unknown or 
the unknowing is no longer something impossible for speech and 
communication, but an opportunity and an invitation. This is what makes 
communication possible. It offers a space we can inhabit momentarily 
together without, however, coming to a halt. It no longer assumes knowledge 
as its counterpart, nor is its mobilising force powered by a need to know, to 
overcome the unknowing.41s 
With Ahtila's works I neither merely mourn my own losses nor take part in the 
grief of the characters. Something notable happens between. When the 
difference of the other in all its impossibility and incomprehensibility is 
recognised, an approach requires a distance, Irigaray claims.419 Difference 
opens onto a no-man's-land, where we can meet. Encounter with the 
strangeness of the other unsettles also the familiar: "the recognition of 
nothing in common calling into question the proper of each one". 
Simultaneously this move towards the other allows me to become, in myself, 
Irigaray stresses.420 Singularity, difference and the unknown, are not in 
contradiction with commonality, and neither is an essence incommensurable 
with an event.421 The sense of being in common that we experience in this 
emergent space is not something found, but it is constantly given birth to in 
our contacts and proximity. It is not, for example, a solid foundation for my 
identity, but it allows me to ceaselessly become together with those I 
encounter. It allows us to co-appear, neither the same nor simply 
ourselves.422 
418 See earlier discussion of e.g. thought and not-knowing, in the chapter 3a. Thinking Aloud. 
419 Irigaray 2002, 133. 
420 Irigaray 2002,168; 1996, 104. 
421 More on singularity in relation to "co-essentiality" of being, or "being-with", see Nancy 
2000, 1-99. 
422 On co-appearance and the related political and ethical questions, particularly in the field of 
visual culture, see e.g. Silverman 2000; Irit Rogoff, "Looking Away: Participation in Visual 
Culture", in Gavin Butt, ed. After Criticism (London: Blackwell, 2005),117-134. Both refer 
these ideas back to the thought of Hannah Arendt. See Hannah Arendt, The Human 
Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958). 
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WITH 
In the installation If 6 Was 9 a group of teenage girls tell stories which all, 
in various ways, have to do with the awakening of sexuality. The lines 
uttered by the girls have been composed of the narratives and memories 
of adult women. Together with a mode of speaking that reminds of 
recitation from memory or of reading aloud these slightly inappropriate 
expressions create a confusing effect that breaks the cinematic illusion as 
well as differs from documentary confession. 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA IF 6 WAS 9 (1995-6) 
The stories are suggestive of adult recollections of childhood, and the girls 
appear to be, therefore, borrowing someone else's language and memories 
here. They are mediators between past and future, as well as between 
collective and individual narratives. By their curious detachment from the 
language used, the teenage girls voice this very displacement. They draw 
attention to the insufficiency of means to communicate their own experiences 
as well as to the problematic assumption of immediacy attached to the so-
called first-hand witness accounts. Simultaneously they throw into turmoil the 
coordinates expected to fix the significations of the words they use with ease 
yet inexpressively, and seemingly without much investment. Meanwhile they 
hint at a possible other mode of communication between them, which I, a 
viewer, do not have entry into. When the girls speak with one another, I 
cannot hear their voices. It is as if I am excluded, or catching the scene of 
their exchanges by accident or in secret, eavesdropping. Or, perhaps my 
attempt to catch their words is geared towards understanding while their 
communication is not based on what is said. 
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The origins of the speech that I do hear, then again, seem to also escape 
from me. Who are speaking here? A choir of others, or "an inherited set of 
voices" to borrow Judith Butler's words, can always be heard in one's 
speech.423 Do the girls unsettle this voice of convention, of others, or unveil 
it? Perhaps their speech simply defies this distinction between collective and 
individual. It may highlight that one is never a total master of one's speech, 
but in it constantly negotiates one's position as an individual within a 
collective.424 
Is this "volatility of one's "place" within the community of speakers",425 as 
Butler puts it, exposed by the awkward mode of speech in Ahtila's works? 
The characters often hover with their speech on the boundaries of the fictive 
realm, somewhat detached from the other characters, from their own 
narratives, as well as from the viewers. Their speech does not have fixed 
origins and the meanings it carries appear similarly uprooted and instable. 
Focus wavers again from significations towards the different modes of 
address. These modes of speaking in the works are suggestive of various 
ways of positioning oneself within a group and of becoming part of a "we". 
As the girls one by one talk to the viewers, face to face, the others 
appear uninterested, listening only half-heartedly, if at all. They hang 
around in the background as if witnesses or some kind of support for 
the story. The presence of the group seems to simply provide 
affirmation for the individual narratives. 
Listening, maybe even of a seemingly disinterested sort, makes space for 
speech - space, where narratives become shared. As Irigaray stresses, 
listening does not equal understanding but openness to the self-expression 
of the other and possibly also to something novel that may emerge between 
423 Butler 1997, 25. 
424 This uncertainty is not only due to inherent excessiveness of signification, but can be also 
linked to the nature of speech as an event. See e.g. Butler's thought that: " ... the temporality 
of linguistic convention, considered as ritual, exceeds the instance of its utterance, and that 
excess is not fully capturable or identifiable (the past and future of the utterance cannot be 
narrated with any certainty ... )". Ibid., 3. 
425 Ibid., 4. 
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US.426 Listening creates a space, where the stories can take place and shape. 
The simultaneous detachment and entanglement of the girls is underlined in 
this curious choreography of the narration. The intimate privacy of the stories 
is undermined by their collective presentation. 427 This could be compared to 
the scene in Consolation Service, where the silent witnesses in the 
therapist's room appear necessary for the private ritual of break up. How 
does this all affect the viewer, who is a witness to the stories that appear 
revealing, even disquieting? The girls present their stories in a collective 
adult language of sexuality, yet something mysterious seems to be folded 
within their shared silence, beyond the reach of the words. We cannot hear 
their shared discussions but the stories we do hear are obviously directed 
towards us, the viewers. Perhaps the girls invite me to join them, to listen and 
to witness with them. Like in Consolation Service I may here also become 
one of the silent witnesses, neither quite inside nor outside the narrative. 
According to the girls' example witnessing seems to mean not only seeing 
and hearing, but participation in a polyphonic narrative. This narrative 
appears here fragmentary, even collage-like. The mildly disinterested mode 
of listening that marks the co-presence of the group of girls in If 6 Was 9 
underlines the sense of disjuncture. Listening does not promise completion. 
Instead of smoothness and illusion of a whole, different coherence emerges 
that not only accommodates but actually consists of the gaps between the 
always slightly unfitting pieces. 428 
My role as a viewer-witness may be not so much to tell my story alongside 
the girls. Nor am I to fill in the gaps between them so as to make sense of the 
4261rigaray 1996,116-117. 
427 Intimacy troubles the opposition of private and public as it occurs always between, e.g. 
between the girl speaking and those listening, her peers and I, her witnesses. It connects, 
thus, with the problematics of touch and proximity that are discussed here e.g. in the chapter 
2c. Haunting and closely relate to the space of address. 
428 Ahtila's works break here with the conventions of cinematic narration and montage-
techniques, where the storyline and fictional reality is built out of various elements. E.g. 
narratives that are constructed out of unrelated sequences of events, like individual tableaux, 
that in the end of the film are revealed to be connected, differ from Ahtila's work, where the 
individual stories are not separated completely, e.g. into different sets and scenes, but 
coexist, such as the stories told by the girls in If 6 Was 9. This complicates further the spatial 
and temporal coordinates as this is not a question of e.g. parallel lives, but instead, draws 
attention to how these rub against each other yet the gaps between them cannot be filled in 
so as to produce one smooth whole. 
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whole, or to forge it into a smooth narrative unity. The spaces between the 
stories, like the address of the girls, invite me to witness, to look and to listen. 
As a witness, I remain on the edges of the narrative, neither an insider nor an 
outsider. I may, nevertheless, become part of this group as long as its 
uncertain nature is kept in mind. I may take up a place alongside these 
entangled yet separate lives. The ambiguity arising in the narration from the 
clash of the individual and the collective, as well as of experience and 
expression (of sexuality), or of witnessing and bearing witness, emphasises 
that the group of girls is not simply based on a shared identity (such as 
shared experience specific to a gender and an age). Instead, it is formed in 
this very process of narration.429 Hence, it opens towards the viewer yet does 
not invite identification. It holds onto a distance by, for example, quite literally 
closing the viewer out of the group's internal dialogues, which highlights 
desire for belonging yet does not guarantee its possibility. 
A sense of commonality does not arise from recognition but from the event of 
speech. We become part of a community of speakers not merely through 
participation in the re/production of meaning, but by addressing and being 
addressed, bearing witness and witnessing. 430 Both the speaker's relationship 
to a community and this community itself are constantly shaped in different 
modes of speech and address, as well as in the various repetitions of the 
conventions of language. Community happens in communication. It is an 
event. Belonging, such as Braidotti's notion of "situated belonging" mentioned 
earlier, is not necessarily originary but constantly emergent. This view does 
not, however, deny the existence and effect of various modes of belonging 
pre-existing the event of an encounter, yet stresses that these are all in 
ceaseless production as well. 
429 See the problematisation of identity and its foundations by e.g. the notion of the 
"unmarked", Phelan 1993. Discussion of the unmarked in relation to femininity and the figure 
of the girl in the Part 2: The Girl. 
430 See Butler on community of speakers, Butler 1997, 25. See also the claim that the author, 
speaker or narrator (the characters of the narrative as well as the viewer) has to give up 
one's mastery and control in order to challenge notions of essential identity and, furthermore, 
of e.g. otherness. E.g. Trinh T. Minh-ha 1991, 198. 
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In witnessing, just like in address and performance or thought and speech, to 
open and to move towards the unknown, as well as towards unknowing, is of 
crucial importance. Do "we" happen as this opening, as Nancy claims?431 
"We" may be this very space between, which is continuously told into being. 
A performance or a narrative calls its audience into being, in this in-between. 
According to Nancy, writing and each written work inaugurate a community.432 
Here the movement towards the other and to the future is central. Then 
speech, or writing, does not assume a specific, existing community, but in the 
event of address calls it into being, to listen and to respond. 
This has some connections to the thoughts of Deleuze and Guattari on minor 
literature, on the expression that breaks away from representation and, 
according to Simon O'Sullivan, creates new ways of being. These modes of 
subjectivity imagined into being are always collective, he emphasises. 433 In 
speech the singular voice of an individual takes part in a diverse choir and, 
simultaneously, in the formation of a community - speech oriented towards 
the future ruptures the conventions of expression and the established 
community of speakers, unfolding this sphere of the familiar towards 
something new. This is not only a question of changing meanings of the 
messages, but of a novel form of communication that holds both the 
significations and the participants in a process of becoming.434 To quote 
Nancy: 
431 Nancy 2000, xii. 
432 Nancy 1991, 68. 
433 Deleuze & Guattari 1986; O'Sullivan 2006, 71-76. See also Miller & Tougaw's thoughts 
on the "power to form a community entangled together through the act of listening" in their 
emphasis on the collective nature or desires and potential for a community at the heart of the 
culture of first-person writing: "a desire for common grounds". Miller & Tougaw 2002,2 & 19. 
They do not, however, examine this in much critical depth: for example, they do not address 
the risks of assimilation inherent in this "desire", or whether the "common ground" is 
something pre-defined and found, or emerging in the event of encounter, of speech and 
witnessing. 
434 Butler's notion of performativity has been criticised precisely for that it remains within the 
dualism of surface-depth and meaning-matter, and therefore the potential in repetition for 
change can only be understood as taking place on the plane of signification. See e.g. 
Braidotti 2002, 42, 56. The notion of being-in-Ianguage or the community of speakers does 
not, however, necessarily reinforce the opposition of signification (Le. representation and the 
symbolic) and materiality. See later discussed Agamben's idea of being-in-Ianguage as 
being-in-common, which breaks away from representation. Giorgio Agamben, The Coming 
Community (Minneapolis & London: Minnesota University Press, 1993),86-7. 
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"We do not "have" meaning anymore, because we ourselves are 
meaning - entirely, without reserve, infinitely, with no meaning other 
than "US"."435 
Testimony aims at bridging the distance between the speaker and the 
audience, claim Miller and Tougaw.436 As I have argued, however, this gap 
cannot and should not be fully closed. Yet this move from a solitary position 
of a witness, through address and an empathic response, towards a possible 
community matters in itself. Here the distinction of speaker and listener 
demands closer attention with the help of the notion of the address. Can we, 
actually, define the direction and the origins of the address? Are "we", the 
audience, being addressed by "them", the characters in the fictional realm? If 
we, as an audience, are created as "we" through this very address, and if this 
address is understood as a collective effort and an invitation to share, and if 
we respond to this call, this distinction between them and us begins to 
dissolve. As discussed earlier (see chapter 3a. Thinking Aloud), address 
originates neither in those who address nor in those who respond. It happens 
in an encounter. Not unlike witnessing, address takes place neither in nor 
out, here nor there, but on a threshold. Does another "we", thus, emerge from 
this space of address? Community, "we", happens in the contact made 
possible by address - in momentarily shared imaginaries, as Irit Rogoff 
writes.437 We, then, no longer encompasses only an audience. Following 
Nancy this could be associated with an interruption: 
"It is a contact, it is a contagion: a touching, the transmission of a 
trembling at the edge of being, the communication of a passion that 
makes us fellows, or the communication of the passion to be fellows, 
to be in common.,,438 
Communication that gives birth to community is contagion and contagious. It 
is disturbance on our edges that does not allow them to solidify but keeps 
435 Nancy 2000, 1. 
436 Miller & Tougaw 2002, 11. 
437 Rogoff 2005, 123-124. 
m Nancy 1991,61. 
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both the singular individual and the community open. The way community is 
turned outward appears to be insisted on by both Nancy and Agamben. The 
notion of outward that haunts my text does not, in the end, refer to another 
space as such, but it can be understood as a threshold that makes 
communication and contact possible. 439 Agamben also positions speech at 
the heart of community in The Coming Community (1993). According to him 
an obstacle between the world and the speakers is formed by the separation 
of language from what it reveals and manifests in this media age. At the 
same time, however, this allows us to experience our "own linguistic being -
not this or that content of language, but language itself, not this or that true 
proposition, but the very fact that one speaks."440 Agamben suggests that 
there may be a way to "co-belong without any representable condition of 
belonging", i.e. a possibility to form a community that does not affirm a 
specific identity. This being-together is based on being-in-Ianguage, i.e. on 
belonging itself, according to him. As such it threatens the forms of 
community based on identity, such as a nation state. 441 In my view it turns the 
separation, which Agamben mentions, from a border into a space between 
that both connects and distinguishes us all in communication. This 
unbridgeable space no longer necessarily refers to a void separating, for 
example, the material world and the speaking beings. It may be located 
between speakers, when speech as mediation allows for their 
communication. This takes us back to Nancy's urge to rejoice over the loss of 
clear messages. 442 
An audience shares a mode of witnessing, although everyone takes what is 
witnessed along with them, further and elsewhere. Perhaps we, in the end, 
always witness our own being-with, which Nancy claims to be our ontological 
state on being.443 It draws together and apart, just like the space held open by 
439 Agamben calls this threshold a "face". Agamben 1993, 68. The problematics of the face 
could also be investigated further, e.g. in relation to Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of 
faciality and their call for the dismantling of the face in connection to problematisation of 
signification and subjectivity. Deleuze & Guattari 1988, 167-191. 
44D Agamben 1993,83. 
441 Ibid., 86-7. 
442 Nancy 1991, 67. 
443 Nancy 2000, xvi. 
THE ADDRESS: WITNESSING 205 
the word "with", where we co-exist. 444 Testimonial narration that calls for 
witnesses draws attention to this space that arises between the works and 
the witnessing audience. The importance of mediation in communication is 
here emphasised instead of immediacy. With certain means of audiovisual 
narration a distance necessary for encounter is maintained, as I have 
attempted to describe. For example, the characters' modes of speech could 
be thought of as gestures that, according to Agamben, liberate means from 
ends and make them visible. A gesture is: 
"communication of a communicability. It has precisely nothing to say 
because what it shows is the being-in-Ianguage of human beings as 
pure mediality."44s 
For the girls in If 6 Was 9 spoken language appears to be yet another layer of 
mediation they take on in order to be seen and heard. Yet, this is not only a 
matter of gaining voice and visibility but of making contact, bearing witness 
and calling for witnesses. Speech offers the mediation necessary for any 
relation. However, the notion of relation must be rethought here in terms of 
encounter that troubles the distinctions of immediacy and mediation as well 
as of proximity and distance. Calling for this reconsideration, Irigaray 
associates communication with touch: 
"For there to be an exchange, it is essential that the other touch us, 
particularly through words. But we do not yet know this touching with 
words, except in a mode that reduces proximity to confusion, to 
fusion. "446 
This implies a move away from the oppositions of visibility and tangibility, 
mind and body, separation and fusion, where touch is sided with the ideal 
lost plenitude as well as the feared loss of boundaries, ultimately in death. 
444 Ibid., 62. 
445 Giorgio Agamben, Means Without Ends: Notes on Politics (Minneapolis & London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 57-59. This could be compared with performativity, 
when it is understood to emphasise inhabitation of language over its use as tools etc. See 
e.g. Butler: "We do things with language, produce effects with language, and we do things to 
language, but language is also the thing that we do." Butler 1997,8. 
446 Irigaray 2002, 18. In relation to the questions of mediation and communication, see also 
the problematics of "to", as in speaking and listening to: "The "to" is the sign of non-
immediacy, of mediation between us." Irigaray 1996, 109. 
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Speech understood as tactile and sensible allows us to think of its operations 
and success not merely in terms of making sense, carrying meaning, but as 
mediation. Like the notion of contagion, amongst others, touch also implies a 
disturbance on the edges of the speaking subject and, moreover, locates 
communication on these borders - embodied, symbolic and other bounds. It 
can be understood, in Irigaray's words, as "a call to co-exist, to act together 
and dialogue."447 Along similar lines Nancy focuses attention on a space 
implied in and by speech, the "with" that is "the closeness, the brushing up 
against or the coming across, the almost-there of distanced proximity."448 
What is marked by the "with" is not a relation between this or that, in this or 
that way. It cannot be defined as taking place between two or more pre-
existing entities or positions. Instead, it may emerge from the unbridgeable 
interval Irigaray writes about, the space-time of silence and speech referred 
to earlier.449 The being-with that Nancy emphasises is not, in my 
understanding, a pre-existing essence, but arises from the "communication of 
the passion to be fellows".45o Speech does not merely aim towards, but 
happens with. This may be the very goal of its reach, its momentary fulfilment 
yet never closure or completion. 
FINALL v: FOR 
In Consolation Service the story of the divorcing couple unfolds on two 
adjacent screens. The distinct pictorial spaces reflect the different 
views and experiences of the man and the woman. They appear to 
speak from within different realms. The ideal of a perfect unity has not 
been achieved and their little baby seems to be the final proof of this. 
They thank each other for her - she has become a mediator between 
them. 
447 Irigaray 1996, 125. 
448 Nancy 2000, 98. See also Nancy 2000, xvi: "language does not easily lend itself to 
showing the "with" as such, for it is itself the address and not what must be addressed"; and 
the discussion of speaking-with in terms of non-permanence and sharing. Nancy 2000,87. 
449 Irigaray 2002, 66; Irigaray 1996, 117. 
450 Nancy 1991, 61. 
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EIJA-LIISA AHTILA CONSOLA TlON SERVICE (1999) 
In the beginning of the work the narrator's voice describes the conclusive part 
of the story as a consolation service. In it the couple finally meet each other, 
in silence, bowing down before one another. The space between the two is 
no longer a void signifying failure and inadequacy, nor is it defined and filled 
by the product of their relationship, their baby. 451 Instead, the baby girl marks 
an unmarked space between them where to meet.452 When one no longer 
knows how to address the other, how to open towards the other with one's 
speech, there still remains space for listening and looking in quiet. 
With their bows the estranged couple witness each other - into being, 
on their own. In the end of the work the voice of another neighbour, 
not the previous narrator, orders his dog: "Quiet! No barking. Now 
quiet! Quiet!" The silence opens up into a space also for the viewers, 
for us. 
The space that opens or even calls for me is what I have been trying to map 
out here. Furthermore, with a focus on the notion of witnessing I have been 
attempting to grasp what happens in this space of speech and silence, of 
address and listening. So, how do I witness? Do I bear witness, respond to 
the address with my thoughts and speak in this writing, in the silence 
offered? Referring back to Dori Laub's distinction of different levels of 
451 Irigaray refers often to the child in her critical rethinking of the relation, difference and 
space between the sexes. See e.g. Irigaray 1993a. 
452 See also discussion of mediation in the end of the Part 2, The Girl. 
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listening taking place in secondary witnessing,453 is this where my self-
awareness, journeying with the other( s) and reflection on the process is 
transformed from witnessing to bearing witness? 
208 
Witnessing and silence are rethought here as having also another kind of 
urgency alongside that associated with making visible and giving voice to 
what has been repressed or unrecognised. Here I am not aiming to trivialise 
or abstract these terms from, for example, the discourse of trauma but 
appropriate them to another context, that of everyday viewership. Witnessing 
appears then as a mode of response and of taking responsibility for one's 
encounters as a viewer, as an addressee. It is no longer linked to truth or to 
the possession of knowledge but to the possibility and challenge of allowing 
knowledge to emerge in dialogue. Silence, then again, refers to an insistence 
on making space and listening out for that which refuses to or cannot be 
articulated within modes of communication geared towards understanding or 
fixed positions. Both are simultaneously potential responses to an address 
and addresses in themselves as they are oriented outward and toward. 
The notion of a modest witness presented by Donna Haraway in 
ModesC Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan©_Meets_ OncoMouse ™ 
(1997) allows me to consider witnessing further in relation to not only 
viewership but also critical thought. Haraway takes the figure from the history 
of science, where it performs as an ideal of objective scientific practice, "the 
civic man of reason", who is a "self-invisible source of vision".454 She 
examines this masculine figure revealing its exclusiveness and, furthermore, 
sets out to queer it in order to enable another kind of modest witness who is 
more corporeal, inflected, situated and finite. What emerges is a "mutated 
modest witness" for whom, according to Haraway: 
"Witnessing is seeing; attesting; standing publicly accountable for, and 
psychically vulnerable to, one's visions and representations. 
Witnessing is a collective, limited practice that depends on the 
constructed and never finished credibility of those who do it, all of 
453 Felman & Laub 1992, 75-6. 
454 Haraway 1997, 24, 32. 
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whom are mortal, fallible, and fraught with the consequences of 
unconscious and disowned desires and fears."455 
209 
What do I see and hear, what do I respond to, what can and will I bear 
witness to, how do I witness, how and who do I address with my own 
account? These questions give the wavering yet necessary coordinates for 
my witnessing as well as guide the next question: What does my witnessing, 
or my witness account, in the end, allow for? Rosi Sraidotli argues that the 
notion of modesty (neither of the masculine rational nor of the feminine bodily 
type) suggested by Haraway is a form of accountability and open-ended 
dialogue that aims at "witnessing, not at judging". According to her this allows 
for a rethinking of critical practice in terms of empathy and affinity: 
"The 'modest witness' is neither detached nor uncaring, but a border-
crossing figure who attempts to recontextualize his/her own practice 
within fast-changing social horizons."456 
This mutated modest witness takes also part in the production of knowledge, 
but insisting on partiality and located ness unlike the objective and 
transparent scientist. Witnessing could, then, be understood to open towards 
the other, recognising one's always limited and limiting position yet 
attempting to hold back one's own preconceptions and presuppositions in the 
encounter. In contrast to judging it would not be focused on achieving 
closure, discovering truths or mastering knowledge about something. It is a 
practice that aims to allow something yet undefined to emerge in a dialogue. 
What could be said to be at stake in my engagement with Ahtila's works and 
their narratives here is, thus, not suspension of disbelief but suspension of 
judgement, to borrow Mieke Sal's words.457 
Sal suggests elsewhere that when secondary witnessing is understood as 
mediation it can offer us a model for critical reading. 458 For my argument here 
455 Ibid., 267. 
456 Sraidotti 2006, 206. 
457 Sal 2006, 455. 
458 Sal 1999, x. 
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mediation has to be distinguished from operations such as interpretation that 
bridges a gap between, for example, experience and its narration. Instead, I 
approach it as inhabitation of this liminal space, as well as of the bounds of 
myself and my knowledge, whereby it is turned into a space of address and 
communication. This requires rethinking of witnessing not only as a critical 
practice in terms of reading, or, alternatively, reconsideration of what reading 
implies. Furthermore, witnessing is always for something, as Haraway 
argues.459 If it is not aimed at truth, what is it for?460 Some driving forces are 
always present in witnessing, but here the motives and goals are recognised 
as integral to the practice. As Haraway claims, "nurturing and acknowledging 
alliances with a lively array of others, who are like and unlike" is of central 
importance.461 She calls for: 
"models of solidarity and human unity and difference rooted in 
friendship, work, partially shared purposes, intractable collective pain, 
inescapable mortality, and persistent hope."462 
For me, this resonates with the notion of similarity that allows for contact as 
well as irreducible difference, as discussed earlier in relation to compassion. 
Solidarity and commonality do not have to be seen as contradictory to 
rupture. These affinities and affiliations are not necessarily something pre-
existing the event of witnessing, but may emerge in and from it: Who do I 
speak to? Who or what do I speak for? What I am for, as much as who and 
how I am, keeps on being readjusted in the process of witnessing. 
Both Haraway and Braidotti emphasise here accountability. How could this 
be understood in relation to the irresponsibility stressed by Agamben? If 
irresponsibility is associated with the intimacy of being-with or being-in-
common, as suggested earlier, then accountability could be seen as 
459 This connects with the question of situated ness , as Haraway writes here also: "Location is 
also partial in the sense of being for some worlds and not others." Haraway 1997, 37. 
460 See Yomi Braester's argument about Chinese writing of the 20th Century that it is against 
history, not aimed at providing evidence or demonstrating the significance of events etc. 
Braester 2003, x. Defining what bearing witness is against he, however, leaves open the 
question of what it is for. 
461 Haraway 1997, 269. 
462 Ibid., 265. 
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recognition of those affiliations that guide our witnessing and come out of it. It 
is not a matter of pre-existing laws and obligations, but of a "we" that cannot 
be predefined yet I can be open and attuned to.463 It is about being situated, 
and unsettled, and repositioned again. 
This leads me back to the question of knowledge production that Haraway's 
mutated modest witness appears to take part in. As argued earlier, testimony 
does not transport messages or make meaning. Like speech that reaches 
towards the other, bearing witness allows for something to be born. It urges 
communication into being. What emerges is "we" and this very "we" is 
meaning, as I earlier quoted Nancy.464 The situated knowledge that is 
achieved is also closely entwined with this always momentary community. It 
comes out of unknowing, and never forms into a product as such, as it exists 
only in its event. 
What kind of communication do I take part in and what kind of a community is 
given rise to in my witnessing? I need to return here to the impossibility that 
Agamben locates at the heart of witnessing and which he claims makes 
communication possible. Neither inside nor outside their stories, Ahtila's 
characters bare witness to themselves. As a viewer I may have to do the 
same as Ahtila's characters, to speak without a clear-cut position as a 
speaking subject, while making space for another emergent mode(s) of 
communicating, in and through my speech. This may suggest an impossibility 
to ever fully see and speak for others, on behalf of them - or even for 
themselves, as the case of Ahtila's characters indicates. It may also refer to 
an impossibility to see and to speak when closed within one's secure 
463 This can be compared with Judith Butler's notion of responsibility as rooted in the 
citationality of language: it is also about a recognition of a community of speakers one 
always takes part in and gives further shape to in one's speech. Butler 1997, 27, 41. As 
argued in the Introduction, the potential opened up by citationality may be thought beyond 
questions of signification: it concerns modes of communication, not simply the limits of what 
can be said. See also Wendy Hui Kyong Chun on witnessing and citationality: she writes 
about the citation of similar events that can forge links while insisting on singularity of each 
one, and sees this as integral to the establishment of a community through the speech acts 
of testimony and, furthermore, to a politics of listening that is not based on understanding. 
Chun 2002. These ideas on repetition in the service of production of community and 
communication instead of re-signification, deserve further in depth examination but remain 
beyond the scope of my research here. 
464 Nancy 2000, 1. 
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boundaries. When something calls for me it draws me outward, to the edges, 
from where seeing and speaking can take place. From this impossible 
position communication becomes possible. Communication and impossibility 
have to be, then, thought away from the opposition of, for example, linguistic 
and non-linguistic communication, or signification and senselessness, that 
has been discussed in depth earlier.465 Here it is not a matter of representing 
those without their own voice, but of compassion that is not based on 
identification. It is about the ability to be-in-common despite, or even thanks 
to, the irreducible differences that entwined with the similarities address me. 
This is of crucial importance in terms of, for example, the ethics of 
sustainability and ecology that appear as questions not merely of 
responsibility but of community, or of an expanded sense of community that 
emerges from the emphasis by Haraway and Braidotti on affiliations and 
affinities that may exist not only between humans.466 
What is this writing, my testimony, for then? I see yet-undefined and 
indefinable modes of being and of affiliations emerging from the narratives or 
witness accounts of the characters in Ahtila's works. They address me and 
as I respond I hope to write for them. Nancy observes that: "To write for 
others means in reality to write because of others."467 This emphasises how 
writing for others is an address, not an attempt to speak on their behalf. 
Witnessing for entwines with an orientation towards. It is not driven solely by 
465 See here also Agamben's thought that the inability to speak and to see addresses in its 
inhumanity the human. This humanity drawn forth by impossibility may be the fundamental 
commonality, the co-existence Nancy writes about or the being-in-Ianguage Agamben 
discusses. The notion of humanity calls for some further critical attention in relation to the 
intricate tie woven between language, communication and belonging here. As Agamben 
suggests a move aside from content, he nevertheless holds onto the significance of 
language. This may prove problematic when considering the expanded notion of community 
put forward by Haraway and Braidotti, and discussed here shortly. Agamben 1999,54; 
Nancy 2000; Haraway 1997; Braidotti 2006b. See also discussion of the senseless, as not 
the opposite of signification, such as materiality, in the chapter 3a. Thinking Aloud. 
466 E.g. Haraway questions models of solidarity, unity and difference rooted in kinship, 
Haraway 1997, 8, 265; Braidotti 2006a, 270-271; Braidotti 2006b, 199-200, 205. The 
problematics of "expanded community" connect intricately with my investigation here, e.g. 
with the senselessness of speech and similarity, as well as resonate with the reoccurrence of 
and references to pet animals in Ahtila's works (e.g. Consolation Service, Love is a 
Treasure, The Hour of Prayer). This calls for further critical consideration that, nonetheless, 
falls beyond the scope of this thesis. 
467 Nancy 1997, 67. 
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some desire of my own but also by their call for me. I could not give them 
voice, but I can listen to them. Our encounter is what I aim to write here. 
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My account is, thus, not simply about what I have witnessed with/in Ahtila's 
works. Through this account I hope to reflect on my experience as a witness 
to the manifold narratives, documentary and other, that call for my attention 
and response on a daily basis. What does my implication as a witness 
demand, what does it promise? According to Haraway the discourse on 
science maintained with its exclusions a critical boundary between watching 
and witnessing, popular culture and scientific fact. 468 In my rethinking of 
witnessing this distinction has to be unsettled: active engagement as a 
viewer of audiovisual culture is not dependent on who is watching or what is 
being watched, but how one watch. This means that the so-called art works 
are not in any privileged position in relation to the more popular products of 
audiovisual culture. I would, nevertheless, claim that video installations such 
as Ahtila's works challenge and encourage the viewer to break out of the 
habitual positions and to search for different modes of watching than the 
mainstream cinema and TV usually do. The works by Ahtila, like those of 
many contemporary artists working with the moving image, challenge the 
viewer to actively search for a position in relation to what they witness. My 
argument here is that these works draw our attention to how speech and 
various modes of address operate in different audiovisual media. 469 They call 
for a critical practice of situated viewing, or witnessing. Therefore, they can 
be seen to continue a critical tradition in video art, which was founded 
amongst others on the belief in the potential of the medium as a two-way 
communication tool that, however, has not been developed to its full 
interactive potential due to various economic and political interests.47o 
468 Harayway 1997, 33. 
469 I am here particularly thinking about the wide range of moving image installations, which 
appropriate in different ways numerous modes and genres of narration. 
470 See e.g. Douglas Davis, "Video in the Mid-70's: Prelude to an End/Future", in Ira 
Schneider & Beryl Korot, ed. Video Art. An Anthology (New York & London: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1976), 196-199; Martha Rosier, "Video: Shedding the Utopian Moment", in Doug 
Hall & Sally Jo Fifer, ed. Illuminating Video: an Essential Guide to Video Art (New York: 
Aperture & Bay Area Video Coalition, 1990). 
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The above considerations about witnessing that my engagement with the 
works has allowed for can be applied to the viewership of all audiovisual 
culture. This is one of the things I have here written for. As a partial, situated 
witness of news reportage as well as everything from nature documentaries 
to the everyday banalities of reality-TV dramas, I search as well as aim to 
allow for affinities and affiliations I did not previously have, or was unaware 
of. The limits of what I can be, see and hear, become porous, as I am 
touched, moved by what I witness. Witnessing, like thought, keeps me on the 
edge. Bearing witness and thinking aloud, such as in this writing, I may 
succeed in not only unveiling but inhabiting these bounds. Since, according 
Nancy: 
"writing is the act that obeys the sole necessity of exposing the limit: 
not the limit of communication, but the limit upon which communication 
takes place."471 
This chapter has attempted to address the rupture of compassion and 
exposure that takes place on my boundaries. I have aimed to map it out in 
the writing with the support of the thought of others while remaining in close 
dialogue with Ahtila's works. The works have prompted me to engage with 
the notion of witnessing in the first place with their mode of address or, to be 
precise, through my response to their address, which always already 
implicates me. They have also persistently disallowed me the comfort of 
descriptive definitions of witness positions or modes of bearing witness. The 
works call me to witness yet they touch me, draw me to my edges only 
fleetingly. They could be seen to explore the rupture inherent in witnessing 
alongside the theoretical investigations I have turned to. The works, the texts 
and my writing may all be driven by the concern about how to inhabit this 
space of encounter without becoming overwhelmed by emotion or paralysed 
by the threat of this collapse of boundaries. 
The question of silence, not as an imposition but as an act, is of crucial 
importance here. The characters in Ahtila's works appear to be unable and, 
411 Nancy 1991, 67. 
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notably, unwilling to occupy single embodied voices or clear-cut speaking 
positions. This insists on the impossibility located at the heart of witnessing, 
which allows for communication. It may underline the impossibility to speak 
ruptures of being-with or the contagion of compassion, to capture them in 
words and to make sense of them. What does this imply in terms of my 
witnessing? Witnessing carries with it responsibility to transgress solitude 
and to address others. Does my witnessing only become dialogic once I bear 
witness, transcend my solitary experience? Yet, can I also insist in my 
witness account on silence, on the impossibility, and on the space of address 
opened up by not only speech but also silence? Bearing witness may not be 
dependent on a language that captures coherently, transparently, either the 
witnessed event or the rupture that this witnessing causes. Its potential may 
lie in how it calls for further witnessing, how it addresses with urgency yet 
without answers, and how it allows for further communication and contagion, 
further affiliations and (com)passion to be-with. 472 
Compassion is, for me, intrinsically linked to an urge to act. It is not based on 
identification, sameness, but on a sense of being-in-common or being-with 
that ruptures me, draws me to my edges. This is where (ir)responsibility also 
arises from, as a response to the rupture. Responsibility, like being-in-
common, no longer refers to the past but takes place in and for the present 
and the future. It denies the existence of a readily available space or a 
community of dialogue, where witnessing takes place. 473 It urges me to share, 
to step from solitary experience towards communication. Yet this does not 
necessarily imply speech, but also listening - silence that makes space for 
communication, for the emergence of different modes of communication. Not 
necessarily space for new languages or new significations, nor for visibility or 
472 See e.g. Irene Kacandes on narrative-witnessing, and on how openness calls for further 
narrative-witnessing. Kacandes 1999, 67. 
473 See Yomi Braester's argument about a "crisis of testimony" in China that "challenges the 
notion of a space of discussion that sustains critical witness" and allows for the formation of 
functional yet imaginary communities. Braester 2003, xi-xii. Braester's critical claim focuses 
on the lack of available public space for and culture of discussion in the particular context of 
20th Century China. Yet, I also want to problematise the assumption of a pre-existing space 
of dialogue in my rethinking of what communication implies and, furthermore, the necessity 
of this for witnessing. Instead, in my view this space is created in ad through witnessing 
itself. 
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voice, but simply for encounter. Encounter gives rise to thought. Thinking, 
seeing, listening, witnessing all act, even if in silence - they draw me to my 
edges and open me to a dialogue from within, outward and forward. They 
already address by responding to an address and, therefore, not simply act 
but co-act. 
What differentiates writing, as thinking aloud or bearing witness, from these 
acts is its call for further encounters. This does not imply a withdrawal to a 
reflective stage from self-awareness and journeying-with within the levels of 
witnessing. Their entwinement, their coexistence that denies me a centred 
unified position and draws me to my bounds, is what allows for witnessing to 
take place as an address. In the encounters, which are called for in bearing 
witness as well as allow for it in the first place, I am exposed together with 
the encountered. Exposure does not bring into visibility or inform. Rather, it 
can be understood as an encounter that takes place on the edges - as an 
opening on the bounds of knowledge and of ourselves. It is a matter of 
communication, but not of communication as transferral of information. It is 
about coming together. As I am exposed, my implication and affiliations as a 
witness are made tangible: a sense of community is momentarily established. 
This is what I am called for as a witness, this is what my witnessing and 
writing is for - for the communication of this being-with. It is not for making it 
visible or speaking it out as such, but for making space for further ruptures. 
What emerges in the critical practice of witnessing is the urgency of 
communication and the need to (co)act. This gives rise to as well as requires 
situated knowledge that has to be kept in constant process together with my 
own position and affiliations as a viewer, a witness. What am I for, now? 
217 
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EIJA-LIISA AHTILA WHERE IS WHERE? (2008) 
When entering the space of the installation the viewer is faced with a 
projected drawing of a clock spinning time fast. Around the corner four walls 
of a square room are covered floor to ceiling with projections on which the 
main narrative unfolds. The staged scenes are interrupted at times with 
painted or animated images and with documentary footage from Algerian 
war. On leaving the space the viewer encounters one more projection, a 
short loop of black and white documentary footage of dead bodies. 
The narrative is woven around a female character, a poet. As she sends her 
sons to school a male figure, who is greeted as death, enters her house and 
asks for words. From then on the poet's space-time gets more and more 
entangled with the past and an elsewhere of a village (identified towards the 
end of the work as a site of an infamous raid, where French soldiers killed 
dozens of villagers). First a staged village is shown, yet later characters 
dressed as French soldiers and Algerian civilians enter the rooms of the 
writer's house. Cut in between the scenes with the poet another story 
unfolds, that of two young Algerian boys who kill their French friend. When 
interrogated, at the end of the work, the boys can only explain this deed as 
the single contribution they could make into the ongoing battle. 
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In Where is Where? (2008) the poet turns to god, to religion , as she 
attempts to give words to death. The poems she writes and performs 
in the work, as a kind of a narration to the events, are at first 
descriptive. Quickly, however, they transform into reflections on the 
confusion of temporal and spatial coordinates. 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA WHERE IS WHERE? (2008) 
The poet's words do not make sense of death. Neither can the staged events 
communicate the gravity, the permanence of it. Death remains 
incomprehensible, ungraspable. What is there to understand in it? Where is 
the where that death takes us? Lost, the poet rejects an attempt by a priest 
to offer her god's forgiveness. She questions how could she be forgiven for 
what has happened to others. If everything is forgiven , she argues, this leads 
to disinterestedness. Knowledge or understanding is not an answer to 
death's challenge, nor is forgiveness. The poet calls for another mode of 
involvement, where words do not capture but always start anew, and fail 
again. Or, can this be called a failure any longer if words are liberated from 
the service of signification and the task of transferring meaning? 
This conclusion gathers together strands of thought woven through the thesis 
on what it may mean to be implicated in that which haunts or that which is 
witnessed and written. Not only does it offer a last glance at the key threads 
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that hold the argument together, such as the concepts of silence, similarity, 
not-knowing and empathy. It draws with them also into focus a set of 
questions that have gained urgency during the research: How to face the 
plight of others, the global suffering and joy, that is told and pictured in visual 
culture? How to act in these daily encounters and in response to them? And 
how to critically examine the affect on and the implication of the viewer when 
the problematics of representation no longer appear sufficient - as both the 
witnessed and the experience of witnessing point out the very limits of 
representation? 
These questions cannot be addressed without a reconsideration of my 
engagement with Eija-Liisa Ahtila's works, which has guided the argument 
yet also set it certain bounds. This has to do with my implication as a viewer, 
witness, writer. Ahtila's work can be described as a point of departure here. 
In my research the work has offered a material albeit moving ground from 
which to leap with thought. Notably it has also acted as a partner in 
conversation that has time after time demanded rethinking and inspired 
another leap, yet again. Now at the end of this particular journey, however, 
the work ushers me on as it can no longer sustain my investigation into the 
questions that our dialogue has led to. 
Arising from dialogue these concerns cannot be contained simply by the 
work. They may well be suggested by the work but with their focus on the 
viewer's implication they point always already beyond it. These questions 
break the otherwise rather closed, hermetic even, relationship between my 
thought and Ahtila's work in this thesis and reach outward calling for further 
dialogue and encounters. Moreover, the key shifts mapped out here reflect 
the changes of approach and emphasis away from the discourse on 
representation that have taken place in the field of visual culture, as argued 
in the Introduction. Urgencies have shifted ground, in Ahtila's body of work 
over about 15 years and a decade of my research, as well as in my 
relationship with the work and with the world in general. 
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The main shift in this thesis has been to the problematics of the address. 
This has demanded a change of focus from the content of the works and the 
narrative strategies employed in them. It has also required undoing the 
mastered tools of interpretation and deconstructive analysis. The close 
engagement with the works that provides the platform for the argument 
appears to be, thus, in a tension with the critical concerns that have risen out 
of this very dialogue. Yet, as argued in the beginning, the method of close 
reading and the associated notion of writing with, not about, aim to answer 
the challenge posed by the problematics of the address. Moreover, the 
process of thinking and writing with the works can be described as haunted 
by that which can neither be contained by the work nor directly addressed or 
captured in the dialogue. The limits laid out by the persistent focus on only 
one artist's body of work has, therefore, created a productive strain that has 
made the key moves in this project possible. 
The brief discussion of the work Where is Where? at the very beginning of 
the thesis posed the question whether the encounter with fictional narratives 
differs necessarily from the engagement with, for example, documentary 
imagery and associated forms of narration. With Ahtila's work my attention 
has lied on the inner turmoil of fictive characters rather than on documentary 
material and collective tragedies. Focus on fiction encourages a shift from 
certain questions of representation, such as those of veracity and exposure 
(as unveiling). Yet, I argue that the concept of the address defies the demand 
of such differentiations with its step aside from the problematics of 
representation. Moreover, it also bypasses these distinctions as it allows for 
the rethinking of spectatorship beyond the binary alternatives of reception 
and reading, as well as the implied modes of knowledge distribution and 
production. 
Aiming not only to think but also to perform viewership beyond the 
problematics of representation and in the spirit of the address has been a 
balancing act. Methods of close reading and writing with have both been 
responses to this challenge. As defined in the Introduction the process of 
writing with is a dialogue where the works urge critical enquiries on, while the 
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theoretical discussion places the works in contact with questions not usually 
associated with them. This echoes what I claim close reading has allowed 
me to achieve, i.e. bringing together a number of theoretical approaches and 
critical concerns that arguably have urgency in current cultural debates. It 
has, amongst others, led to the unexpected liaison between Ahtila's narrative 
works and the questions mainly associated with documentary material and its 
spectatorship. Furthermore, close reading aims to operate here as an 
address in itself that makes space for dialogue. As such it also hopes to 
serve as a response to a call for a mode of critical engagement that neither 
relies on an analytical distance nor illustrates theory with the works, yet is not 
immersed or descriptive, i.e. led by the work, either. Thus, it has to do with 
proximity that is associated with the address in my argument. The closeness 
to detail is an ongoing negotiation in-between analytical reading and literal 
appropriation, detachment and fusion, as my thought intimately intertwines 
with the examined aspects of the works. It nears possession, yet neither 
quite capturing the work nor being engulfed by it. It takes place on the shared 
bounds of my thought and the works. 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA WHERE IS WHERE? (2008) 
Take, for example, the boat that appears in Where is Where? In one 
narrative sequence a boat with two of the works central characters, the 
Algerian boys, is shown floating in a pool. The poet asks: "What brought the 
boat to this private swimming pool passing thousands of kilometres, ignoring 
borders and immigration laws?" This leads me back to the work The House 
(2002), where the female protagonist speaks about a ship bringing refugees 
to every port. Slightly agitated she describes how people enter and press 
against her body. Her boundaries do not hold and she is occupied by others. 
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She may be possessed, yet this can be understood in terms of empathic 
rupture and exposure. She appears affected by the narratives and fates of 
others, as if haunted by her co-existence with the dispossessed and the 
displaced of the global world. 
EIJA-liISA AHTILA THE HOUSE (2002) 
The boat is a much-used metaphor of global circulation and dispossession 
that has been often employed as a bridge between specific locatable 
tragedies and the wider critical issues.474 Here, in particular, it is a point that 
supports my thought in its leap from the interior states of subjects, such as 
the psychosis of the woman in The House, to global political concerns. It acts 
as a site of contact between the fictional narratives of individuals and the 
lived experiences of the multitude. It allows me to consider the entanglement 
of the unsettled boundaries of subjects with the troubled territorial and 
economic borders. The position of the viewer who is addressed by a fictive 
character entwines, thus, with the implication of the witness to current affairs. 
The boat has taken me to the haunted border zones - in what is witnessed 
and what it is to witness. In my argument both haunting and possession has 
appeared as turmoil on the boundaries. This is not a matter of fusion together 
with or being taken over by others. It is about being touched, moved on and 
to one's edges, by a call for something to be done. What there is to be done 
does not necessarily concern correcting the past in the present or breaking 
beyond the surface, unveiling something hidden. The loss of clear 
boundaries can be understood as a reach towards the others, which carries a 
474 Numerous recent art works have used thus the figure of the boat, weaving together in 
various ways specific historical tragedies and wider concerns regarding borders, migration 
etc. This detail in Ahtila 's works, alongside many others, would allow for further dialogic 
connections not just with critical thought and political issues but also with visual culture of the 
moment. This remains, however, beyond the scope of the thesis. 
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sense of urgency that unsettles the distinction of the individual and the 
collective. Haunting, as an encounter, is an event on our bounds. As Avery 
Gordon argues, it is to touch: 
"the ghostly matter of things: the ambiguities, the complexities of 
power and personhood, the violence and the hope, the looming and 
receding actualities, the shadows of our selves and our society.,,475 
How can one open towards the others, towards the huge scale of human 
disaster and suffering that is beyond the limits of one's experience and 
comprehension yet in which one is also implicated? How to do this without 
risking total loss of oneself? How to gain here, instead of losing, one's 
potential to act? 
IN SILENCE 
While working on the chapter on witnessing I attended a workshop titled 
Eyewitness476 , initially slightly concerned about what I would come to witness 
there. In the end, however, I was not confronted with many troubling images, 
but mainly with readings of visual documents and analysis of how they can 
be understood to operate as witnesses, testimonies, or evidence. There was 
hardly any reflection on our roles as witnesses: How do we, as speakers and 
other participants in the workshop, act as so-called secondary witnesses to 
the visual witness accounts? Or, how do we testify, bear witness to the 
encounters within the workshop itself, in the form of papers or contributions 
to the discussions or otherwise? 
What emerged in the workshop was a tangible shift away from questions of 
veracity and towards a focus on the performative nature and transformative 
potential of the visual in the processes of bearing witness. The role of the 
visual as informative was explicitly problematised. Exposure was no longer 
475 Gordon 1997, 134. 
476 Eyewitness. A Leverhulme Workshop on the Documentary Turn in Law and Visual 
Culture, University of London, London, 7-8.3.2008. 
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seen as of intrinsic value in itself in the operations of documentary material. 
Critical attention was geared instead towards the context and the use of the 
visual in witnessing. However, for me this called for a rethinking of exposure, 
not as revelation but as rupture. 
Silence appeared as a bridge between my thoughts on witnessing and the 
workshop discussions. Silence was the term chosen by Nicole Wolf to 
discuss a refusal to visualise events or to give voice to victims according to 
the available means of, for example, documentary film making.477 This refusal 
to take part in the prevailing politics and economies of the visual, and to 
produce visual narratives predetermined by this frame, was approached as 
not simply reactive. It carries disruptive potential as it points out the need for 
another not-yet-available language, Wolf argued. 478 Notably, this silence 
does not imply turning away. Instead, it opens a space of looking and 
listening. It made me ask how to refuse to engage according to the available 
critical means, how to allow for the potential of other modes of response to 
emerge, for example, in the context of the workshop? How to engage with 
the question of the visual in relation to witnessing no longer analytically, 
through practices of reading? 
I remained a silent witness to the event of the workshop, aware of my own 
inability to speak in this context, or maybe at all, about how the 
documentaries as well as fictions that I saw and listened to affected me. I 
claim that this is not simply due to my emphatic responses being based on 
identification and, thus, denying analytical distance. Instead, perhaps, there 
is no language yet for my own practice of witnessing, for responses to the 
exposure and compassion that ruptures my position and bounds as a viewer, 
writer, thinker. Or, maybe this response demands not another means of 
expression but a different mode of communication altogether, no longer 
geared towards articulation and knowledge. 
477 Nicole Wolf, "'I Prefer Not To': Documentary filmmakers after the genocide in Gujarat", an 
unpublished article, at Eyewitness. A Leverhulme Workshop on the Documentary Turn in 
Law and Visual Culture. London: University of London, 2008. 
478 Ibid. 
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Insistence on silence, on listening and thought, that refuses to make sense or 
to give voice, makes space for communication where words do not capture. 
This is to be distinguished from a lack of voice within a prevailing order. It is 
rather a suspension of one's privileged position and ability to speak on behalf 
of those silenced or unheard. It is a call for another mode of encounter with 
them. Like in the work Where is Where? words are then no longer simply 
those of the speakers such as the poet. They arise from her contact with the 
world and entangle her with it while they serve as paths towards the others. 
The senselessness of words, referring here to another operation than that of 
assigning signification or of transporting messages, appears as a rather 
sensible response to the senselessness of war and death. 
This has to do with the encounter of that which haunts - including that which 
cannot be contained in the art works discussed here and in this very dialogue 
with them. Haunting, like invisibility and silence, demands awareness of 
something that resists capture. Something beyond my knowledge, beyond 
my ability to see or hear, i.e. something invisible or silent to me. To notice 
this persistence of invisibility or silence is to not-know, to face the 
unknowability that insists in everything encountered. It does not invite me to 
overcome it, to make it visible or to give it voice. If it demands to be reckoned 
with, as Avery Gordon argues in relation to haunting, this reckoning may be 
another mode of engagement.479 
"One must see, at first sight, what does not let itself be seen. And this 
is invisibility itself. For what first sight misses is the invisible.,,48o 
This may imply treasuring invisibility and silence, lingering in the first sight 
emphasised by Jacques Derrida in the above quote. It may mean holding 
onto wonder that precedes any attempts at understanding, as Luce Irigaray 
claims. 481 Like invisibility silence becomes, thus, a space between or a 
distance that allows for communication instead of hindering it. It no longer 
479 Gordon 1997,183. 
480 Derrida 1994, 149. 
481 Irigaray 1993a, 12-13, 72-82. See also the chapter 3b. Witnessing. 
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refers to repression but to a possibility of an encounter. The viewer is 
challenged to respond to the address of the invisible and the silent. This 
means to address, in turn, with the silence of witnessing and thought. 
227 
As argued in this thesis, the unmarked also addresses in silence or in its 
invisibility. An unmarked figure that does not figure, i.e. the Girl, drew initially 
the attention here to surfaces and shifted focus from suppression and 
exclusion to an outward and forward orientation. "In the riots of sound 
language produces, the unmarked can be heard as silence,,482, Peggy 
Phelan claims. Silence addresses. Silence in listening and silence as the 
unmarked both offer space where something may emerge. Yet, the event 
itself counts, undetermined by what it gives rise to. Furthermore, the event 
needs to be thought as excessive of binary logic. This is what an encounter 
with a ghost points towards, Derrida argues.483 This implies a necessity to 
undo the oppositions that have been troubled throughout this thesis, such as 
those of interior and exterior, depth and surface, matter and meaning. 
Invisibility and silence have to be similarly liberated from their place as 
negatives of, and defined by, what is seen or heard. In the event of 
encounter they operate otherwise. Listening and speaking, witnessing and 
bearing witness, no longer appear as opposites, as passive and active 
positions. Silence, of thought and of listening, moves outwards and towards 
the future, not unlike speech, instead of remaining locked in the past or 
turned inwards. 
SIMILARITY 
At the heart of my research journey has been a shift from resemblance and 
its strategic appropriation in mimesis as not the same, to similarity that 
addresses and mediates. It allows for communication and a sense of being-
in-common. Like affinities and affiliations, or the rupturing sense of being-
with, similarity is not only something pre-existing encounters, but it arises 
482 Phelan 1993,27. 
483 Derrida 1994, 63. 
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from these events. It addresses yet it also emerges in the response, in 
communication. The focus has been drawn, thus, onto the surfaces, to 
resemblances without the fixity of some core, or reliance on any immutable, 
predefined positions. Not unlike haunting, this has to do with touching the 
not-quite, the not-yet or the no-more, the shadows that trouble the assumed 
immediacy and clarity of the here and now. Therefore similarity carries with it 
a risk, and a potential , of contagion through contact. 
E IJA-liISA AHTILA THE W IND (2002) 
In The Wind (2002) the main protagonist, Susanna, mentions how the 
newspapers stain her hands. She also talks about the staining effect of "lots 
of us" - the polluted, the dangerous. Is it the others who stain, such as the 
Third World, that she refers to? Is she becoming stained, implicated, and 
staining herself? In this contact, contagion, it is no longer self-evident who 
stains. Susanna gestures here towards a similarity between herself and the 
others - or, "us". This "us" is not necessarily predetermined, but something 
arising out of contacts and, possibly, empathy. If empathy is thought, as I 
have argued, in terms of similarity and possession, it has to be considered 
distinct from identification. It no longer has to do with "having-in-common", 
but "being-in-common", to borrow Irit Rogoff's words. Furthermore, Rogoff 
argues that this has to do with performative enactments, not reliance on and 
reproduction of some pre-existing sense of the shared.484 The emerging "we" 
not only ruptures my position but also questions any existing definitions and 
criteria of commonality. It demands and allows for an open sense of 
community that may be expanded beyond the prevailing bounds of, for 
example, people, territory, or even the human and the organic. 
484 Rogoff 2003, 127, 130. Rogoff critiques thus empathic viewing, associating it with 
identification and identity politics, yet at the heart of my argument is a claim that empathy 
can be rethought in those very "participatory" terms that Rogoff calls for as an alternative. 
See also chapter 3b. Witnessing. 
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What does this mean in terms of the viewer's involvement? Mieke Bal writes 
about "rhetorical contamination", where the viewer's place is similar to the 
positions of some in an image. This may suggest, for example, something 
morally questionable such as voyerism, as in Bal's example.485 For the 
argument here, however, what is noteworthy beyond the positions 
themselves is the implied potential shift from identification to implication 
through contagion. This may happen between the viewer and the various 
perspectives built into or pictured in an image. A difference and a distance is 
sustained. This allows and calls for a response as the positions in question 
open outward and forward in the address of similarity. 
In a way, my encounter with the poet in Ahtila's Where is Where? has been 
contagious in this way. On seeing the work for the first time I was struck by 
what I perceived as our similarity. To be precise, there appeared to be 
remarkable similarity between the questions that arose from the work and 
those that my research had led to, as I was then just about to finish the part 
on the address. This could be down to zeitgeist, the shared here and now -
and, unquestionably, in part to the particular perspective of my enquiry. What 
matters, however, is what this sense of resemblance allows for, not where it 
originates. It arises from my dialogue with the work of Ahtila but gestures 
towards other affinities, beyond this engagement, such as resonances within 
the wider field of visual culture and critical thought. It also gives another 
insight into the central role of similarity in my research and the shifts within it. 
The method of close reading has appropriated resemblance in its attention to 
detail, which through descriptive accounts opens them into points of myriad 
connections. Yet similarity is at play in the shifts in my argument and position 
with the works as well. The unintentional mimetic adoption of a red shirt 
during my investigation of the figure of the Girl differs considerably from what 
I have recognised as a contagious affair with the poet. This is marked by a 
move from hovering uneasily between the poles of identification and 
deconstructive analysis in my engagement with and investments in the Girl to 
a critical inhabitation of this very in-between, the space of proximity. In the 
485 Bal 2001, 103. 
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encounter with the poet I am no longer possessed by the work, nor simply 
analysing the dynamics of mimicry taking place between the work and 
myself. Rather I meet the poet in this space of mediation, the space of the 
stain through which we are constituted and differentiated, together. Haunting 
has, thus, called for witnessing, for a further transformative contact. 
EIJA-liISA AHTILA WHERE IS WHERE? (2008) 
The poet in Where is Where? has now helped me, as a viewer and a writer, 
to wrap up this thesis. What I have perceived as our similarity has guided the 
thoughts on my role as a witness. Moreover, contagion not only takes place 
here between two writers and witnesses, i.e. the fictional poet and myself. 
Both witnessing and writing appear also as modes of such engagement with 
the witnessed. The viewer, like the poet, bears witness to archival 
documentary material and a historical tragedy in the work, yet writing does 
not reproduce or revisit an original event as much as weaves it together with 
the present, the moment and the place of writing. The perspective and the 
voice of the writer gets entangled , lost, and has to find itself anew in co-
existence with the witnessed. This is not a return and it does not take place 
through assimilation, description or other attempt at capture. It demands, and 
allows for, entry into the space of address, where the reach of words and the 
sense of being-with keep an interval between us open. This is where 
communication can happen, as contagion that does not lead to the reduction 
of the space distinguishing the witness from the witnessed, or myself from 
the poet. The "we" that may emerge here does not compromise this distance 
implied in similarity but is founded on it. 
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What does openness to this emergence, through similarity and contagion, 
require of the viewer in the event of encounter? If event is to be considered in 
non-binary terms as earlier suggested, viewing and thought do not need 
writing or speech in order to act. Writing does not causally follow from or 
activate viewing. Witnessing does not have to lead to a witness account that 
tells the experience in order for it to transgress solitude and become a mode 
of sharing. Like thought and speech they are entangled, simultaneous 
processes of engagement with/in the world. Witnessing - listening and 
looking - is a mode of address. Not dissimilar to thought it acts as it opens 
out to the world. Lingering in the encounter, in wonder, it is active orientation 
towards the others without an attempt at closure or capture. Witnessing is, 
thus, a response to the address of similarity, the alike yet never the same. It 
does not simply lay ground for communication but is contagion already in 
itself. 
NOT-KNOWING 
"How far can you enter into someone to understand them?,,486 
EIJA-LIISA AHTILA WHERE IS WHERE? (2008) 
The above question asked by the poet in Where is Where? suggests that 
understanding has to do with the negotiation of boundaries distinguishing us. 
It is a delicate balancing act. It is, thus, not possession of or by the other but 
transformative contact. Understanding entwines with a move towards the 
other and a reach across our shared bounds. In terms of the viewer's 
486 Eija-Liisa Ahtila , Where is Where?, 2008. 
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position this gestures towards another approach than either immersion and 
identification or interpretation at a distance. It also questions what it is to 
understand, and what is the meaning of the viewed, the witnessed. As the 
method of writing with art works instead of about them implies, the meaning 
of the work is not determined by any of the parties of the encounter, 
according to Irit Rogoff. 487 When the emphasis shifts onto the engagement 
between them, I have argued that meaning no longer has to be approached 
as signification - whether as grounded, given or produced. Rather it appears 
as a sense of being-with, or simply "us", as Jean-Luc Nancy claims. 488 It is 
the "we" that emerges and exists in the event of communication, contagion 
and rupture. 
Understanding is, therefore, an event geared outward, toward and forward. It 
is not an end, or a result, but what allows for something to be done. It has to 
be rethought as much in terms of not-knowing as knowing. It is given rise to 
and driven by not-knowing, yet not aimed at overcoming this. Rather it strives 
towards further not-knowing that makes space for yet more encounters. Not-
knowing is associated with thought by Nancy and, as such, with a passage 
and a movement toward. It has to do with the address. Thought is not geared 
towards knowledge but further not-knowing that keeps thought on the move 
and opened outward. Moreover, it is aimed at making a difference in its 
engagement with/in the world. Thinking is out of order, as Hannah Arendt 
claims. 489 It is action. It has to be dissociated from mere means in the service 
of search and production of knowledge. This calls for a reconsideration of 
knowledge as well, no longer in terms of an end in itself but as an event. Not-
knowing appears, thus, as not simply an opposite to knowing. Knowledge 
also entwines with action and engagement with/in the world that constantly 
reworks my place as a viewer. Knowledge is then not simply something 
gathered or gained by the viewer-witness as either a goal in itself or as a tool 
and ground for action. Rather, in order to overcome the frustration and 
detachment in the face of the vast amounts of information and exposure, it 
487 Rogoff 1998, 26. More on the notion of "writing with" see the Introduction. 
488 Nancy 2000, 1. See the chapter 3b. Witnessing. 
489 Arendt 1971, 197. See also the chapter 3a. Thinking Aloud. 
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has to be thought of in terms of the viewer's implication and empowerment in 
its very event. 
When implicated in the event of knowledge that which is beyond my 
comprehension together with the awareness of not-knowing urges my 
thought on, never satisfying the desire for mastery. As one is implicated in, 
for example, the senseless and needless death of others, elsewhere, neither 
the events nor the viewer's implication can be explained away with 
knowledge of the historically and culturally specific circumstances that led to 
them. It is not a matter of understanding in this sense of containment and 
closure. Rather, not-knowing drives one ceaselessly towards further 
knowledge and comprehension, not only of what has been but also of what 
can be. The viewer's implication happens in the event of encounter and not 
only due to some prior entanglement, such as shared histories, economies 
etc. It has not got to do with personal or collective guilt that can be forgiven. 
Neither is the urge to act, which is here associated with it, driven by 
obligation. As a witness one becomes involved in the here and now. This 
calls for acts in the present and poses questions of urgency: How do the 
events resonate in the present and towards the future? What can be done to 
prevent other utterly pointless deaths and suffering similar to that witnessed 
- i.e. how to turn them meaningful after all, in and for the future? 
Situated knowledge can be approached in these terms of orientation, reach 
and constant process in the present. 490 It is guided by affinities and affiliations 
while geared towards further contacts and connections. Here situated ness 
does not refer to a position that grounds. Rather it happens. The move aside 
in this thesis from subject and other positions, their foundation and 
unsettlement, production and re-establishment, has not aimed at denying the 
significance of positions for our potential to act. The focus on the address 
has, instead, demanded consideration of location, belonging and boundaries 
490 In addition to Braidotti's recent thought, my understanding of situated knowledge has 
been shaped by the feminist discussions following Donna Haraway's article "Situated 
Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective". 
Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (London: Free 
Association, 1991), 183-201. 
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as processes entangled in the acts. As argued, the notion of thought as 
action does not do away with, for example, interiority in its emphasis on the 
outward reach, but places dialogue at the core of the thinking being.491 As 
observed in Ahtila's works, what appear as inner monologues and turmoil of 
the characters reflect their various kinds of relationships. Dialogue within the 
subject is inseparable from interactions with/in the world. Likewise, when 
turning outward, in and as a response to an address of the works, the viewer 
is exposed as not-one in the encounters. This calls for situated and 
accountable critical practice(s), as Rosi Braidotti stresses.492 She refers to 
this as a method that denies the strict opposition of involvement and 
distance.493 This resonates with what I have earlier called distanced proximity 
or mediated immediacy.494 Situated practices appear, thus, integral to the 
creation and inhabitation of the space of address. 
One of the key questions driving the argument in this thesis has concerned 
this very possibility of making space in-between the viewer and the viewed, 
which allows for thinking and communication, i.e. action, in the encounter 
with visual culture. As argued here, this space is opened up by an address 
that calls for response while it situates that which addresses (the image, 
event, or other) as distinct from the viewer-addressee. This space implies 
distance but not detachment. It is mediation, but as such it does not 
necessarily turn death, for example, into something that merely happens to 
others and can be consumed as a spectacle or objectively analysed. It defies 
also the possibility of identification and the reduction of the other's 
experience to what is already known or knowable by the viewer, as well as 
helps to avoid immersion where the viewer is engulfed by emotion that 
leaves room for neither critical thought nor reciprocal acts. It has to do with 
similarity and proximity, empathy and exposure. 
491 See the chapter 3a. Thinking Aloud, and e.g. Arendt 1971, 185. 
492 I am indebted to Braidotti's critical understanding of situated practice that underlies her 
most recent discussions of "the nomadic subject". However, as emphasised here, my 
argument focuses on the practices instead of the possible alternative positions they may 
imply. See Braidotti 2006b; See also the chapter 3b. Witnessing. 
493 Braidotti 2006b, 93. 
494 See the chapter 3a. Thinking Aloud on mediation and the space of address, and e.g. 
Nancy 2000, 98. 
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Being situated is a ceaseless process that does not imply, necessarily, re-
centring. Yet it defies complete loss of position that would mean not only lack 
of agency but also of responsibility. It opens outward and forward, requiring 
recognition of affinities and interdependences that guide the further contacts 
and relations to be forged. Considered in terms of situated practice, empathy 
appears no longer to be based on recognition or identification, but affinities 
and desire for a sustainable future. The rupture that, according to my 
argument, is integral to compassion arises from interrelations while giving 
rise to further affiliations and, therefore, future. Witnessing is associated, by 
Braidotti, with the containment of the pain, and joy I would add, of others that 
allows for affirmative bonding.495 Containment or possession is not fusion but 
rather, like compassion, it implies exposure, an event on our bounds. Future-
orientation does not, then, mean denial of all existing positions or a turn away 
from the past. It has to do with a different dynamic relation to what is and has 
been that does not ground as such but opens up the yet-to-come, here and 
now. 
THINKING ALOUD, IN THE PRESENT 
My writing, or thinking aloud, takes place in a charged present. It is allowed 
for yet driven to move on from the past tense of the Introduction, the 
reflective mapping of my research journey. It happens through the chapters 
and, finally, aims to leap toward a future present here, in the end that I hope 
acts as another beginning. 
The past tense of the Introduction does not ground, nor is the journey 
something unearthed there. Or, it could be argued that the shifts outlined in 
the Introduction have indeed haunted the process of research and writing. As 
such they have both taken place and been unveiled in the thesis. Whatever 
has haunted the process has not demanded to be dealt with in order to able 
my thought to move on. The whole project of my research, i.e. the journey it 
495 Braidotti 2006b, 88. 
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entails, has arguably a haunted nature. It is, for example, haunted by the 
questions that have not and cannot be contained in the works or in my 
dialogue with them. Therefore, the thesis could be said to call for witnessing. 
Witnessing does not, however, here imply revealing what has haunted, what 
has driven the process, what has persisted in between the lines and in the 
shadows, what has never been directly addressed. If haunting is no longer 
understood in terms of repression, the unseen or the unheard, but as an 
address, haunting appears as something to be insisted on instead of 
overcome. Witnessing, in turn, is a mode of addressing haunting. My work 
may be haunted by wordly contacts, as Avery Gordon argues about 
haunting,496 as well as by questions concerning them. Thus, it also calls for 
further contacts and responses. 
My work has been urged on by haunting, and the rupturing encounters - of 
compassion, contagion, communication. The importance of these disruptions 
does not lie in themselves, but in their mobilising effects. My writing cannot 
be, thus, simply a mapping of the encounters. It has to be, in itself, oriented 
outward and towards the future. Thinking aloud is thought in action, and 
action speaks volumes. It has weight of its own. In this writing, as thinking 
aloud, the emphasis should therefore lie as much on the act of speech, its 
movement and address, as on what is said. How does my thought, and 
writing, act in the world? What does it do, here and now as well as in the 
future present tense? Like Ahtila's work, which can also be approached as a 
mode of thinking aloud as discussed in the Introduction, it is an address, a 
call for dialogue, and an opening towards unexpected connections. 
What do I write for? Does this thesis relocate me following the ruptures that 
have made up the research journey? How can I be situated here without 
giving my journey a closure? Perhaps this thesis allows for a temporary 
position, from which to reach out and call for further encounters. It may be a 
mode of exposure, both taking place and focusing attention on the edges, the 
boundaries as thresholds. It has certainly unveiled a multitude of affiliations, 
496 Gordon 1997, 197. 
CONCLUSION: Now HERE 
responded to perceived similarities, as well as forged new connections en 
route. It has revealed a series of choices and pondered upon their effects. 
Yet, does it also remain oriented forward, outward, for something else? 
237 
Ruptures and contagions, such as empathy, have effects on writing. This 
calls for a kind of writing that does not follow any available models or 
methods, as Dominick LaCapra argues.497 Like thought in action this writing 
cannot be simply referred back to previous writing and thought. It happens, 
acts, as a reach. Therefore the mode of close reading that has carried the 
argument forward here has aimed to operate as a way of writing and thinking 
with art - as a method and an event not of capture but of exposure. It is a 
site of entanglement of the works, my thinking, the thought of others, and a 
set of critical concerns. Close reading is, thus, an address and as such not 
geared towards reinstating any particular positions.498 Rather, it opens a 
space of mediation, of the future-oriented present. This emergence, of the 
space of being and becoming with, is the very act and aim of my thinking 
aloud. 
The thesis does not make claims for Ahtila's work but rather for the potential 
of encounters with art works to give rise to questions that are not, or even 
cannot be, directly addressed in the works themselves. Furthermore, it 
argues for the potential of these engagements to undo the viewer's habitual 
positions and to open possibilities for re-assessing the viewer's role in 
relation to how one is addressed and what is witnessed in visual culture. The 
emphasis is not on particular questions here but on the space and the act of 
address in general- not on what the viewer is called to respond to but on the 
call itself and its implications. This has come into focus hand in hand with the 
shift from figures, such as the Girl, to the engagement with them and to their 
497 LaCapra 2001, 40. See also chapter 3b. Witnessing on empathy. 
498 At the heart of this thesis is the thinking of the address in terms of becoming instead of 
being, and in terms of sharing instead of subjectivity. My argument does not distinguish 
particular types of writing or speech as outward and forward oriented modes of address, but 
focuses on the fundamentally dialogic and open-ended nature of the address. See e.g. 
Claire Colebrook's association of the so-called direct address with being and indirect with 
becoming, in Claire Colebrook, "A Grammar of Becoming: Strategy, Subjectivism, and 
Style", in Elizabeth Grosz, ed. 8ecomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and Futures 
(Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1999). 
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mobilising effect. Thus, for example the girl from If 6 Was 9 (1995-6) 
mentioned here shortly acts as unmarked, yet her impact is no longer as a 
figure that does not figure. Rather with her uncertain position and mode of 
address she encourages reconsideration of my place and project in terms of 
an indeterminate present. 
What does this, together with future-orientation, imply for the viewer's 
involvement and potential to act? How to act not against, for example, 
repressive representations but for something else - whether in relation to the 
figure of the Girl or the suffering witnessed daily in the mass media? Artists 
may, amongst other things, insist on the unmarked and explore its potential, 
troubling not simply prevailing representations but also our reading and 
viewing habits. How could the viewer act correspondingly? The question 
remains unanswered here. I suspect that now it is time to move on to 
address these issues that have been increasingly haunting my dialogue with 
Ahtila's works. The future exploration may engage in a dialogue with an array 
of visual culture. With its focus on the viewer's implication and the address it 
will bridge over distinctions such as fiction and documentary. This ongoing 
enquiry also aims to weave further links from the concerns and approaches 
of feminism to other questions of critical and ethical urgency, such as 
sustainability and human rights. Furthermore, it examines not only the 
potential of spectatorship but also of curating in these terms. 499 Alongside 
this research I have already engaged with a number of these concerns in my 
curatorial practice as well as in other modes of creative writing on art and in 
teaching. 50o Yet I need to now end this particular research project in order to 
be able to go on, elsewhere and otherwise. 
499 Inspiration for this is e.g. the work by Ariella Azoulay on the "civil contract" of 
photography. Ariella Azoulay, Civil Contract of Photography (New York: Zone Books, 2008). 
500 In dialogue with artists, I have examined questions concerning e.g. sustainability and the 
expanded notion of community (as the co-curator of Lofoten International Art Festival 2008), 
as well as tested the possibilities of viewers' implication and the potential of critical 
discussion and collaboration in site-specific art projects and process-based working groups 
(e.g. as the curator of Centrifugal, an ongoing research and exhibition project between 
Belfast, Helsinki and Zagreb). 
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EIJA-LIISA AHTILA IF 6 WAS 9 (1995-6) 
Here at the end I thus return to the beginning in order to conclude. Instead of 
closing my argument in a circle, I aim to collapse the line of progress that this 
narrative of my research journey has sketched out. The first and the last work 
of Ahtila's that I have encountered come together now, not only as points of 
reference but in terms of what they allow for my thought. So, with a focus on 
the here and now I return to If 6 Was 9, which I initially came across in an 
exhibition NowHere (1996). One of the girls in it claims that she has been 
returned back to girlhood after wanting too much as a woman. The linearity 
of time is disrupted by a possibility of reversal, while girlhood is still 
presented as predetermined as a to-be-woman. This determined future 
appears, furthermore, as a certain kind of socially constructed womanhood. 
The girl's insistence on not becoming that woman points towards a possibility 
of resistance. There may be potential to imagine and to will something else 
into being. What the future holds may not be rooted solidly in a specific, 
already-defined past as its ground. Both the past, the girlhood, and where it 
leads to remain unmarked by the girl's refusal to take part in a particular 
culturally determined line of development. This suggests that not only the 
past but also the future may emerge otherwise, in the present. 
"The present is always the future present: it will have made a positive 
difference in the world. Only the yearning for sustainable futures can 
construct a liveable present. "SOI 
The notion of the present, as suggested by Rosi Braidotli here, is oriented 
towards the future. This does not imply, in my view, progress. Future-
501 Braidotti 2006a, 206. 
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orientation is not determined by the past. Yet neither is the reach forward a 
trajectory towards a specific goal in the future or a leap from the present. It 
takes place in the present. Furthermore, if the future is approached as open-
ended this deems also the present indeterminate, as Elizabeth Grosz 
argues.502 Future-orientation resonates, thus, with the notion of thought that 
emphasises action in the here and now over a model of thought as indebted 
to and building on previous thinking while geared towards an end, such as 
knowledge. Thought as action highlights its entwinement with, rise from and 
orientation towards the world. It demands a break from the established 
modes of critical approach, such as interpretation, that rely on what is 
already known and knowable. It has to do with the silence that marks a 
refusal to take part in the prevailing economies of production of knowledge. It 
insists on a lack of closure. This is what my writing aims at as well, not as an 
overcoming of silence but as a mode of thinking aloud or thought in action. 
Urged on by rupturing encounters and kept on the move by a desire for a 
sustainable future - a further sense of being-with - it aims to act as an 
address in the present. The sense of being-in-common that may arise from 
this wavering present is then a mode of becoming-with. 
The shifts central to this thesis have been made possible by an intense 
sense of the present that I have discovered in Eija-Liisa Ahtila's works, both 
in terms of the viewer's engagement with the works and the frame within 
which the narratives unfold. The speech of the characters occupies the 
present, addressing the viewers and as if making observations in the here 
and now even when referring to past events. The lack of drama, even a 
matter-of-factness usual in Ahtila's works, defies attempts at immersion into 
the narrative as well as questions any sense of factuality, as in terms of 
revelation of information or production of knowledge. What seems to matter 
is the moment of encounter. This resonates with the moves in my argument 
towards a growing emphasis on the present and the future over the past -
from reactions against what is and has been, from the discourse on 
502 Elizabeth Grosz, "Thinking the New: Of Futures Yet Unthought", in Elizabeth Grosz, ed. 
8ecomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and Futures (Ithaca & London: Cornell University 
Press, 1999), 18. 
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representation and the strategies of deconstruction to the problematics of the 
address, from what is engaged with to the event of interaction itself. 
There are no answers as to why things have happened, one of the Algerian 
boys appears to stress at the end of Where is Where?, when demanded 
reasons for the killing of their French friend. There is nothing to be 
understood. This does not imply that the past irreversible deeds no longer 
matter. Yet the weight is on the present, on what can be done and on the 
implication of all of us in this narrative, in this moment. The boy throws the 
ball back to the analyst and the other characters questioning him - and to us 
viewers: "Now, you do what you have to do". It is up to us to act, here and 
now. 
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